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Abstract 
 
 
The end of XX century was marked by an increase in the number of ethnopolitical 
conflicts throughout the world. The redrawing of the political map of the world in the last 
century, following the results of world wars, the elimination of the colonial system and 
the collapse of empires, has affected the growth of ethnic confrontations in modern 
society.  
In view of the fact that any conflict inside the state is always detrimental to socio-
economic and political development of the country, and the world is full of polyethnic 
states, the birth of new interethnic contradictions, can affect the stability and security of 
the entire world community.  
In this regard, particular importance in the policy of each state, is the deep study 
of the characteristics of ethnic clashes, for the subsequent development of mechanisms for 
their forecasting, regulation and prevention. In this thesis I will try ty examin the 
connflicts of South Caucasus: Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Naghorno-karabakh. 
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             Introduction, Methodology, and Structure 
 
 
 
The relevance of the topic of dissertation 
The choice of the central research topic (South Caucasus, Russia, and the EU: 
Forging an Efficient Over-Arching Cooperative Regional Security Scheme) was made for 
at least two reasons. 
First, for personal reasons, in the August of 1993, started the war between Georgia 
and Abkhazia, so me (3 years old that time) and all my family were obliged to live our 
homes in Abkhazia and we became IDP (Internally Displaced Person). Till today we can’t 
go back to Abkhazia and the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is not still resolved. 
Second reason is that the topic is greatly popular in the context of the 
transformations experienced by today’s international system and the redistribution of 
power among the actors in the system, all against the background of an increase in the 
insecurity and multidimensional threats boosted by globalization.  
The end of the twentieth century, was marked by a series of development of 
conflict situations, on the basis of ethnic and national identity. The modern world too, 
being under the influence of various political, social, cultural, economic and other 
processes, threatens to exacerbate the problem of ethnic self-awareness and self-
identification.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bloc of socialist 
states, Europe has in fact become a new epicenter of the confrontation of various ethnic 
groups, including in the context of this struggle, not only national and ethnic factors, but 
also political interest. But the countries of the post-Soviet space are not the only examples 
in the European region of confrontation on the ethnopolitical component. The ancient 
history includes  an ethnopolitical conflict in Northern Ireland, the Cyprus problem is no 
less acute.  
Many countries in the modern period are multiethnic, which leads to the need for 
constructive interethnic dialogue, not only at the international and regional levels, but 
also at the local level of a single state. Thus, the topic of ethnopolitical conflicts and their 
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resolution is popular today, which justifies the need for studies and development of 
knowledge in this field.  The problems of ethnopolitical conflicts become an object of 
study of many researchers, both in the West, and in the post-Soviet space.  
The events of the end of the last century, also affected the lives of the peoples of 
the former Soviet Union. Ethnic conflicts that arose during the formation of the Soviet 
state, ceased to be controlled by the authorities at the time of the collapse of the USSR, 
which led to bloodshed and destabilization of the situation in the countries of the post-
Soviet space.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 15 independent states were formed on the 
world map. Despite the fact that the creation of post-Soviet states took place under the 
sign of the right of ethnic self-determination of peoples, the leadership of the newly-
formed countries, began to conduct an ethno-nationalist policy, that only complicated 
interethnic contradictions within states and in many cases led to armed actions. Seven 
interethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space have evolved into an open armed clash,  five 
of them occurred in the Caucasus region: the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the 
Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts, as well as the Ossetian-Ingush and 
Russian- Chechen conflicts. 
However, before the events of August 2008, when there was a change in the 
political situation in the region, only three conflicts were finalized in the South Caucasus: 
the Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian. The main feature of 
the interethnic conflicts of the post-Soviet space is, that, all of them became a 
consequence of the policy of the leadership of the USSR. 
The Caucasus region was always the center of intersection, of interests, of many 
countries of the world, in this regard, an analysis of the current state and trends in the 
development of interethnic conflicts in the region, is a priority not only for domestic but 
also for foreign researchers. 
At a time when Russia's policy towards the countries of the South Caucasus was 
passive and contradictory, the US and European Union governments successfully 
implemented the tasks set in the region, increasing their influence and authority. 
However, the events of August 2008 changed the geopolitical position of the countries, 
but they did not defuse the situation in the region. In view of the continuous emergence 
of new and aggravation of old conflicts on the basis of ethnicity, a deep study of the 
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problem of inter-ethnic clashes is beyond doubt. The uniqueness of the issue under 
investigation is also, due to the fact that, in connection with the growing interest of the 
world powers towards the South Caucasus, and the ethnic contradictions that have been 
preserved, the region has become a center for the clash of interests not only of regional, 
but also of extra-regional states, which adversely affects stability and security in the 
Caucasus. 
Transportation of the Caspian energy resources, through the Caucasian corridor, 
as well as track streams from Europe to Asia and back, takes the interest of the world’s 
leader countries, which makes the strong influence on the model of the regional 
relationship.  Such “ambivalence” and attempt are share and make modeling the existed 
reality in Caucasus. Unregulated conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are beyond 
the regional limits and they are making the negative influence on many country’s state 
interests. It depends on us how we will make the relationships in the new future which is 
orientated on the 21st century. Consolidation of the regional security in Caucasus does not 
present the problem of the one country, or of the one nation.  
Our aim is analyzing security’s risk factors of national and regional, the origin of 
which relates to ethnopolitical conflicts.  As well as specifies of conflicts existed in 
Caucasus, original and political aspects of decision, as well as the geopolitical security 
problem in relation with it and the analysis of the approach of the world’s leading   
countries in this issue and it will be able to develop some approaches for providing the 
regional securities. We can clear how realistic perceive regional states such dangers and 
risks which relate to the existence of the conflicts from identification of the regional risk 
factors, evaluation of the risks, views of the regional countries and strategies toward the 
countries safety. How to coincide these risks and causing’s formulation and is it possible to 
create state’s security system with the state documents to provide peace and development 
in the Caucasus region. 
I tried to present the scientific analysis which gives us the possibility to create 
complete imagination on the model of the South Caucasus security. In our foregoing 
thesis is suggested the argument that in the security conceptions of Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
and Georgia the more emphasis is made on the political posts, than on strategic analysis, 
nevertheless the fact that there are not mentioned many important issues, some risks are 
not contemplated by the national security’s conception, or some risks are not mentioned 
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clearly, or the part of the dungarees are not defend correctly. The main orientation of the 
conception (integration in EU and NATO) ignores many serious limitations. The country 
has not the created united view regarding the existed dangers and they also have not the 
will to overcome the challenges first, which causes the conflicts in the region. 
The object of the research is modern ethnopolitical conflicts in the South 
Caucasus, history of formation and development of interethnic conflicts in the South 
Caucasus and methods for their settlement. 
The subject of the study is the activities of regional and international players for 
the settlement of ethnopolitical conflicts in the South Caucasus (from 1992 to the 
present). 
The aim of the study is to identify the nature of ethnopolitical conflicts in the 
South Caucasus, analyze activities of regional and international players in terms of their 
political settlement, determine the ways and methods of its intensification and activation, 
considering regional peculiarities and specific features of the conflicts under investigation. 
In this connection, it is necessary to formulate the following research tasks: 
Conduct a theoretical analysis of existing scientific views on the topic under study 
and determine the author's attitude to the problem of the emergence, development, and 
resolution of ethnopolitical conflicts; 
To identify trends in the development of a system of actions for the settlement of 
ethnopolitical conflicts from the standpoint of modern science and analyze them 
considering domestic and international experience; 
To consider the nature, causes and trends in the development of ethnopolitical 
conflicts in the South Caucasus; 
To analyze possible options for resolving (settling) the conflicts in question; 
Investigate the mechanisms of political influence on the conflicting parties, 
analyze their explicit and latent goals; 
To assess the activities of regional and international representatives and 
organizations aimed at the settlement of ethnopolitical conflicts in the South Caucasus 
and to give their suggestions on improving the effectiveness of such activities. 
The chronological framework of the study  -  During the beginning of the XX 
centuries, important historical events took place, which  affected the fate of the conflicts 
we are examining. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the "parade of sovereignties" led 
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not only to territorial and status changes, but also to destabilization in the regions and 
armed clashes of the warring sides. Originating at the end of the 20th century, interethnic 
conflicts in the South Caucasus remain unresolved (Nagorno Karabakh, despite 20 years of 
experience in building a democratic state, is not recognized by the international 
community, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia are only partially recognized states).  
The geographic scope of the study covers the countries of the South Caucasus: 
recognized states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and the unrecognized republics of the 
region (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia). 
Degree of knowledge of the problem. Despite the urgency of the problem, the 
aggravation of the old and the emergence of new ethnic confrontations, we can state that 
the issue has not been sufficiently studied in terms of history and new trends. In the 
domestic and foreign historiography, a large number of works are devoted to the analysis 
of the aspects of the development of interethnic contradictions in the South Caucasus, but 
there are no studies entirely devoted to the methods of settling conflicts in Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the problem of the independence of the 
republics. 
In the domestic literature, the problems of ethnic conflicts began to be intensively 
studied at the beginning of  90-ies. XX century, in view of the existence of opinion in the 
Soviet Union on the absence of problems in the sphere of interethnic contradictions. 
Proceedings of Russian scientists VA. Avksent'eva, V.A. Tishkova, LM Drobizhevoy, M. 
M. Lebedeva, V.V. Amelina, Yu. V. Harutyunyan, AG Zdravomyslova and other authors 
made it possible to single out the main aspects of ethnic conflicts, the problems of their 
settlement and conduct an analysis of the consequences. It is worth noting that most of 
the domestic research in this area is based on the concepts of foreign historical and social 
schools. 
The ethnoconflictological trend in foreign historical literature began to develop 
late in comparison with other disciplines, only in the second half of the 20th century. A 
special role in the study of ethnopolitical conflictology as a separate subject is assigned to 
Works of such foreign authors as G. Simmel, K. Marx, M. Weber, J. Burton, E. Elmer and 
other researchers. 
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The theories of ethnopolitical conflict and technologies for resolving conflicts are 
devoted to the works of such authors as J. Rodshild, M. Esman, D. Horowitz, E. Azar and 
others. 
Studies of the nature of interethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus are devoted to 
the works of such Russian authors as A. G. Areshev, V. A. Zakharov, A.V. Karavaev, K. 
Myalo, S. Lezov, A. Vasilevsky, V.F. Pryakhin.  
Particulary interesting are the works: G. Hakobyan, S. Minasyan, V.Artsruni, Т.М. 
Shamba, S. Lakoba, T.A. Achugba, V.D. Dzidzoeva and K.G. Dzugaeva. 
The opposing positions are taken by Azerbaijani and Georgian researchers: M.J. 
Gasimli, A.Yunusov, A.Rasizade, M. Kupreishvili, based their work on the principle of 
territorial integrity of the state and consider the actions of the leadership of the former 
autonomies illegal and historically unjustified. 
Significant for the research work, are the works of AA. Yazkova, M.A. Suchkova, 
M. Lapenko and Y. Arshinova, devoted to the role of global players in the region and their 
impact on conflict resolution, as well as the analysis of the impact of energy resources on 
the outcome of an ethnic confrontation. This subject has also received a lot of attention 
from the researchers of the post-Soviet space: RN. Musabekova, A. Shakaryants, V.G. 
Kardumian, N.Gegelashvili, A. Magomedov and R.Nikerov, and others. 
For deep study of the problem,there are several interesting works of historians and 
political scientists, which describe the events of August 2008, which changed the entire 
political system in the South Caucasus. In the works I. Jadan, R. Dzarasova, A. Tsyganok, 
Z. Albarova, K. Dzugaeva, L. Tania, they reveal the events of the summer of 2008: military 
actions against the people of South Ossetia; Inaction of international organizations and 
Russia's entry into the course of the war to “protect” its citizens. 
In view of the unsettledness of the ethnic conflicts under investigation, particular 
attention is paid to the studies of S. Minasyan, S.I. Chernyavsky, A. Vermishev, devoted to 
the analysis and formation of ways out of the current confrontation. The joint work of A. 
Abasov and A. Khachatryan, in which the authors project the existing methods of settling 
ethnic disputes on the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh, is also devoted to this topic. The 
uniqueness of this research work lies in the fact that the researcher represents  conflicting 
side,  as she is IDP from abkhazia, after the war in 1993,  but this fact did not prevent the 
14 
 
objective analysis of the existing situation and the development of possible options for 
settling the ethnic conflict. 
The aim of the dissertation is to identify the nature of ethnopolitical conflicts in 
the South Caucasus for the development of ways and methods for their peaceful 
settlement. 
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve a number of important tasks: 
1) Give a detailed theoretical description of interethnic conflicts; to  Analyze the 
historiography of the study of ethnopolitical conflicts. 
2) To  Define the main theoretical approaches to the study of contemporary 
ethnopolitical conflicts, their types and subjects, as well as the causes and dynamics of 
development. To study the basic concepts, methods and forms of settlement of 
ethnopolitical confrontations;  to establish the reasons for the emergence of interethnic 
confrontations in the South Caucasus;  
3) Reveal the constitutional and legal relations of the conflicting parties in the 
pre-war period and the role of the mediator in the process of peaceful settlement of the 
clashes; 
4) To identify possible options for the settlement of ethnic conflicts in the South 
Caucasus, based on historical experience in resolving such disputes; 
5) Determine the methods of political and economic impact on the conflicting 
parties; 
6) To uncover the reasons for the growing interest of the international 
organizations of the countries to the Caucasus region and their role in resolving the 
existing contradictions;  To identify the role of international organizations in the 
settlement of ethnopolitical conflicts; 
7) To  Analyze the prospects for the resolution of the Abkhazia,  South Ossetia and 
Naghorno-kharabagh conflicts; to establish the prospects for conflict resolution in the 
South Caucasus in the context of changing world politics after August 2008. 
             
The theoretical and methodological basis of the thesis  is the principles of 
historicism, scientific objectivity, system approach, content analysis, comparison method, 
and also the forecasting method. The principle of historicism made it possible to reveal 
the nature of ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus and trace the course of events during 
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the period under investigation. The main special methods used in the work were: a 
historical approach that made it possible to identify the sources of tension in the South 
Caucasus and a certain chronology of the course of ethnopolitical conflicts in this region; 
Comparative (comparative) method, which helped to compare various conflict situations, 
manifestations, models of conflict dynamics and ways of conflict management in order to 
identify both their typical features and differences, which allowed to determine the most 
effective forms of conflict management and actions to regulate and resolve them. In 
addition to the set of general scientific principles and approaches, the main methods are: 
methods of analyzing specific historical phenomena, that affect the formation and 
development of statehood in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Methods of research 
Along with the abovementioned, the methods of empirical research were also 
used: the method of "included observation", the content analysis of the press and 
statistical data, the method of expert interviews and the method of legal analysis, which 
emphasizes the study of the norms of Soviet, Russian, and international law. In general, 
the work has applied a comprehensive approach, which included various scientific 
methods. 
The empirical base of the research was made up of sources reflecting the problems 
of origin, flow and settlement of ethnopolitical conflicts in the South Caucasus, including: 
official regulatory documents of state authorities and international organizations; 
Materials of conferences and symposia; The results of referendums, political science and 
sociological research; Express analysis of periodicals and resources of the global Internet; 
The results of the included observation of the author, taking part in the settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, within the framework of "people's diplomacy". 
The source base of the research consists of types of sources that reveal the 
problems of the origin of ethnic conflicts, their development and settlement. An 
integrated approach to the subject of research required the involvement of documents 
that can be classified as follows: 
1. Normative documents of an international legal nature: resolutions and 
statements of the Presidents of the UN Security Council, the resolutions of the European 
Parliament, the decision of the Council of the Heads of State of the CIS on measures to 
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resolve conflicts in the Caucasus. This group includes reports of non-governmental 
organizations on the analysis of problems of ensuring the rights of ethnic minorities. 
2. Normative-legal documents of the Soviet period: "the law on the procedure for 
resolving issues related to the withdrawal of the union republic from the USSR", the 
resolutions of the XIX All-Union Conference of the CPSU, resolutions of the plenums of 
the regional committee of the Communist Party of autonomies, which allowed us to 
better understand the historical component of the state and legal relations of the republics 
and autonomous regions . 
3. Legislative acts, state-legal and office documents in the post-Soviet period: 
- The Constitution, declarations, resolutions, agreements, etc. of the Russian 
Federation; 
- Constitutions, declarations, memorandums, resolutions, agreements and other 
documents, investigated by us of the conflicting countries.  
4. Materials of the fund 64 of the Russian State Archive of Social and Political 
History (Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (B) 1920-1922), the study 
of which allowed us to analyze the issues of nationalism in the 1920s. in USSR. 
5. Published a collection of documents published on the basis of the Center for 
Caucasian Studies at MGIMO (U) of the Russian Foreign Ministry - "Conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia: Documents of 1989 - 2006". The collection is thematically divided into 
six parts, which allowed to analyze the positions of the states and international 
organizations involved in the conflict (Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia, UN, OSCE, CIS). 
A special group is represented by collections of documents - Documents and 
Materials on the Foreign Policy of Transcaucasia and Georgia, which cover the history of 
the development of Abkhazia's relations And Georgia as independent subjects in the 
integration education. 
Collection of documents "Abkhazia in the Soviet era. Abkhazian letters (1947-
1989) ", contains letters, resolutions, minutes of meetings of the Abkhaz scientific 
intelligentsia, addressed to the Central Power. The study of materials made it possible to 
establish the dynamics of the development of the national movement in Abkhazia during 
the Soviet period. 
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An important role in the study of the problem and the formation of independent 
conclusions on contentious issues, is played by the analysis of the periodical press, the 
outcome of referenda. 
The presented collections of documents reflect important historical aspects of 
building statehood in the region under study. Analysis of their materials allows you to 
explore the positions of the parties to the conflict on political and socio-humanitarian 
issues, not only in the post-war, but also in the pre-war period. 
The system approach is a set of general scientific methodological principles and 
research methods, which are based on the orientation toward disclosing the integrity of 
the object as a system. This approach will be used to demonstrate the need to examine the 
ethnopolitical conflict as a complex phenomenon. The systemic approach provides an 
opportunity to review and analyze the elements that constitute the basis of the conflict, 
i.e. Approaches to the definition, causes, subjects, types, dynamics, etc.  
Content analysis includes analysis of the contents of documents in order to 
identify or measure the various facts and trends reflected in these documents. It is 
proposed to use this method in the process of studying theoretical sources devoted to the 
study of the conceptual foundations of ethnopolitical conflicts and official documents, as 
elements of practical achievements in the field of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, 
Transnistria, and Cyprus. The method of comparison is a comparison of the studied data 
and facts in order to determine the common features or differences between them. With 
the help of this method, various and similar points will be revealed in the proposed 
ethnopolitical conflicts for consideration. Forecasting is a special scientific study of 
specific prospects for the development of the studied object. The given method will allow 
to assume the further development of process of settlement of conflicts in the 
Transnistrian region, Northern Ireland and on Cyprus.  
 
The scientific novelty of the dissertation research is as follows 
1. A comprehensive study of the origins of ethnopolitical conflicts and the 
dynamics of their development was carried out, which made it possible to reveal the 
features of ethnic contradictions in the South Caucasus. 
2. It was revealed that the main reasons for the ethnic contradictions in the South 
Caucasus are the discriminatory policy of the Soviet leadership towards small ethnic 
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groups and the illegal actions of the governments of the newly-formed republics to 
autonomies. 
3. Various possible options for solving ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus were 
studied on the basis of a thorough analysis of historical experience in regulating such 
disputes. 
4. The official positions of the conflicting parties and their options for resolving 
disputes are determined. 
5. The specifics of the recognition of independent republics in 2008, based not 
only on the right of the nation to self-determination, but also on the economic and 
political objectives of certain states, are established. 
6. The role of regional and extra-regional players in the Caucasus, as well as their 
influence on the outcome of ethnic contradictions, is revealed. 
Provisions to be protected: 
1. The process of the emergence of new interethnic contradictions is an endless 
phenomenon, based on the desire of the ethnic group to preserve its culture and unity 
through political self-determination. 
2. The key to success in preventing interethnic contradictions is the prevention 
and timely response of the government to the revival of nationalism in the social 
environment. In view of the fact that the unfinished solution of ethnic disputes can lead 
to the resurgence of new clashes, and conflict relations always adversely affect the 
development of the socio-economic and political situation of the entire state, the study of 
the features of interethnic conflicts and methods of their settlement is the key to the 
security and successful development of the entire world community. 
3. The investigated conflicts in the South Caucasus, in spite of their commonality, 
entities, origins and ultimate goals, based on the principle of the right to self-
determination, have different specifics. Thus, the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and 
South Ossetia are ethnoterritorial disputes related to the restoration of the unity of the 
ethnic group. The conflict in Abkhazia has a status character and is created by the desire 
to create its own independent state.  
4. The negotiating process in the modern world is the most popular and effective 
method of solving ethnopolitical conflicts. However, a study of the dynamics of the 
development of ethnic contradictions showed ineffectiveness of the method due to the 
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lack of interest of the parties in the compromise outcome of the talks. In the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, the negotiation process affected only the cessation of hostilities, 
freezing the contradictions for many years and creating a situation of "neither war nor 
peace." In the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, the negotiation process 
could not prevent the outbreak of hostilities in August 2008. 
5. Russia's active policy in the conflict resolution process in the South Caucasus is 
caused by historical, political and economic aspects. However, if Moscow's mediation in 
signing a peace treaty between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh was 
connected with the desire to establish stability in the region, in time, due to the growing 
influence of extra-regional countries in Transcaucasia, Russia's participation in the 
Georgian-Ossetian war (August 2008) And in the subsequent - the recognition of the 
republics is associated not only with the elimination of tension near its southern borders, 
but also with the desire to maintain its influence in the region. 
6. The prospects for the settlement of conflicts in the South Caucasus depend, first 
of all, on the will of the opposing sides. However, in view of the fact that in modern 
politics the recognition process depends on the geostrategic and economic goals of specific 
countries, the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the recognition by the 
world community of the independence of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of 
South Ossetia will largely depend on the strategic interests of states. 
 
The theoretical significance of the results of the study is a comprehensive study of 
the features of interethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus and deepening of the notions of 
effective mechanisms for their forecasting, regulation and prevention. The materials of 
the dissertation study complement and deepen the theoretical understanding of the role of 
political settlement and its separate components in the structure of the settlement of 
ethnopolitical conflicts. Theoretical significance is the conclusions of the thesis on the 
differential use of strategies / regulation depending on the form, specifics, and stage, 
ethnopolitical conflict, as well as a comprehensive scientific analysis of the essence of the 
conflicts in the South Caucasus. 
Practical significance of the study. The main provisions and conclusions of the 
dissertation research can be used in the practical activities of the authorized bodies on the 
settlement of ethnopolitical conflicts in the South Caucasus region, as well as in the 
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conduct of mediation by non-governmental organizations, associations, and private 
individuals. The results of the research can be useful in forecasting the development of 
the situation not only in the South Caucasus, but also in other conflict zones of the CIS. 
The results of the study will also be useful for many multiethnic states in the prediction 
and prevention of interethnic conflicts. The results of the research will be useful in the 
educational process, in conducting lecture courses and special courses on the new and 
modern history of the countries of the South Caucasus, as well as on international security 
in the region. 
Structure of the dissertation. The purpose, tasks and logic of scientific research 
determined the structure and content of the work. The thesis consists of an introduction, 
four chapters, conclusion, list of sources and literature.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 
In the introduction, the relevance of the research topic is substantiated, the object 
and subject of the study are identified, the chronological framework, the degree of study 
of the problem, the goals and objectives of the study, the theoretical and methodological 
and source base, scientific novelty, the provisions put forth for defense, theoretical and 
practical significance and approbation of work are identified. The thesis contains four 
chapters. 
The first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the history of the development of 
ethnic clashes, their existing classifications and methods of regulating interethnic 
conflicts.The need to study conflicts, with the development of mechanisms for their 
prevention, does not cause doubts either from Russian or in foreign researchers, because, 
according to rough estimates, in the 20th century, due to conflicts over 300 million people 
died. The origin of the conflict begins with the actions of one participant, aimed at 
achieving the desired goals, by causing damage to the interests of the other participant. 
Escalation of the conflict is a tense confrontation between the parties, when negative 
emotions take precedence and the desire to inflict maximum harm to the opponent, stands 
above reason and logic. The final stage in the development of the conflict is its ending, 
which manifests itself in the form of a settlement of the conflict, damping or development 
into another conflict. 
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The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of the causes of the emergence of 
interethnic opposition in South Caucasus. The events of the late XX and early XXI 
centuries. Became a stage not only of profound changes in the political system of the 
world, but also the emergence of a new social thinking and world outlook. Analysis of 
inter-ethnic clashes has shown that the emergence and development of conflicts are a 
complex process based on the struggle of objective and subjective contradictions, 
competition between two international legal principles: the right of nations to self-
determination and the territorial integrity of states. In view of the multi-ethnicity of the 
countries of the modern world and the threat of escalation of ethnic contradictions, the 
international community for many years adhered to the principle of the territorial 
integrity of the state in its policy.  
Third chapter "Interests of regional and extra-regional countries in the South 
Caucasus and their impact on the development of the conflict" reveals the motives and 
forms of expression of the parties to the conflict. The Caucasus region has always been the 
center of the intersection of interests not only of regional but also world powers. Bloody 
wars in the eyes of the international community created the image of the region as a 
center of instability and ethnic conflict. An important factor in solving regional conflicts 
today is the energy resource factor, which is most evident in the Azerbaijani-Karabakh 
conflict. Due to the availability of energy resources in the Caspian basin, the world 
powers use the policy of maneuvering, which only delays the process of resolving the 
issue. However, we should not underestimate the actions of a number of states that played 
a major role in ending the war and preserving peace in the region, despite the unsettled 
issue began to be sharply manifested in the period 1993-1994. It was at this time that the 
struggle for leadership grew into a desire to play a major role in the peace process. The 
main task that Washington set for itself in the process of settling the conflict - to prevent 
the strengthening of Russia's influence in the South Caucasus and its superiority in 
mediation, in turn, Moscow could not allow the growth of US and Turkish influence in 
the region. 
Last chapter deals with the  system analysis of ethnopolitical conflicts in the South 
Caucasus, taking into account the growing interest of international organizations and 
World powers in the region, general conclusions have been drawn up for developing 
methods for their conflict resolution and the  scientific results have been obtained. 
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       Chapter One 
 
 
                           History and Typology of Ethnic Conflicts 
 
The end of the twentieth century was marked by a succession of conflicts based on 
ethnic and national origin. The modern world is also under the influence of a variety of 
political, social, cultural, economic and others type of conflicts.  Processes endangers acute 
problems of ethnic consciousness and identity. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the collapse of the socialist bloc, countries in Europe has become the new epicenter of the 
confrontation, but the post-Soviet countries are not the only examples in the European 
region, Northern Ireland has a long history of ethno-political conflict, also Cyprus 
problem is not less acute.1 
Nowadays Many countries are in the need for a constructive inter-ethnic dialogue, 
not only at the international and regional levels, but also on local level of individual 
states. Thus, the theme of ethno-political conflicts and their resolution is urgent today and 
needs a deep studies and development of applied knowledge in this field.  
 
The degree of knowledge of the topic.  
The problem of ethno-political conflict is becoming the object of study of many 
researchers, both in the West and the former Soviet Union. On this basis, the problem of 
thesis requires the study and analysis of the various works of a scientific nature.   
At the beginning of the 21st century, the problem of the development of regional 
security is becoming increasingly important in everyday international politics. It 
especially concerns the post-Soviet countries, which remain in an ongoing difficult 
process of transformation; conflicts and local wars together with the economic crisis are 
signs that the situation is affecting these territories. We should note that over the last 
decade, there have been many studies on the South Caucasus conflicts.  
                                                          
1 Michael E. Brown: Ethnic Conflict and International Security, p: 12 
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However, it seems that the authors of most of them prefer a chronological 
description of events to the detection of possible future scenarios. It is our conviction that 
we should now leave the past behind us and focus on the future. We are going to do this 
by analysing the origins and background of the conflict – which has still not been deeply 
analysed – and by focusing on the possible transformations of the ongoing conflict. 2 
It is obviously impossible to rely on transformation or conflict resolution when 
there is no clarity about the nature and origin of the conflict. Each side has its own 
interpretation of past events and their own visions for the future. These views often 
conflict with each other.  
There are many reasons for including South Caucasus conflict among the 
“intractable conflicts” that require study.3 The following factors all indicate that conflict 
transformation is necessary: the asymmetry of the parties; the deep historical roots of the 
conflict; the scale of human loss experienced by the parties during military operations; the 
high levels of involvement by the entire population of South Caucasus; the sharp 
polarisation of the positions of the parties; and the presence of an “enemy image” in 
descriptions of the counterpart.4 
The purpose of the present work is to further transform the relationships, 
interests, and goals of the different groups involved. 
The geopolitical processes that are associated with increased inter-ethnic 
confrontations, and which are taking place all over the world, complicate the 
development of modern civilisation and increase the vulnerability of all members of the 
international community, creating threats to their security.5  
                                                          
2 Christoph Zurcher. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the 
Caucasus. (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 13. 
3 Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations, and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus,  
Ricmond, Curzon Press, 1999. 
4 See James Hughes, “Managing Secession Potential   in the Russian Federation”, in James Hughes 
and Gwendolyn Sasse (eds), Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in 
Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 33-43  
5 See, for instance: Fiona Hill, Report on Ethnic Conflicts in the Russian Federation, and 
Transcaucasia, 
Harvard University: Cambridge, Mass., 1993; Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations: The 
Caucasus 
and Post-Soviet Disorder, Zed Books Ltd.: London, 1994; 
. 
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In this respect, it is very important to conduct analytical research in this area 
because it contributes to the development of best practice in conflict resolution, which 
undoubtedly entails replicating power scenarios. 
 
 
 
Features of studying ethnic conflicts 
 
Ethnopolitical conflict, as a phenomenon of social life, has been studied in 
domestic and foreign science in some detail. This is due to the fact that conflicts of any 
kind are mainly determined by a whole complex of economic, social, religious, and 
cultural problems and presents an increasing threat to the human community.  
The study of various types of conflict, is currently one of the most important 
directions in the development of social knowledge. In the context of the conflictological 
approach, theoretical grounds for studying conflicts in various spheres of public life are 
developed, as well as various methods for managing these conflicts. Conflict relations are 
recognized as inevitably inherent in society, unavoidable from social life.  
Therefore, the problems of studying the role of conflicts in the processes of 
forming and developing public relations, minimizing their negative consequences, and 
using positive functions come to the fore. Today it is quite possible to talk about the fact 
that, conflictology becomes one of the leading scientific disciplines in the twentieth 
century, there is "a rapid flowering of conflictological research in the second half of the 
century." There are certain theoretical preconditions for such a flowering.6 
These or other aspects of conflict relations, are touched upon in the works of 
many outstanding thinkers of the past: Aristotle, F. Bacon, T. Hobbes, G. Hegel. The role 
of the driving force of social development was assigned to the conflict in the sphere of 
material production by K. Marx and F. Engels. The conclusions drawn in the Marxist 
concept remain important for conflictology. The conflicts are of a very important nature 
in the sociological concepts of M. Weber and E. Durkheim. At the beginning of the 20th 
century, the conflict was the focus of research of V. Pareto, G. Mosca, F. Oppenheimer. 
                                                          
6 See, for instance Saideman, Stephen M. 2001. The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign 
Policy, and International Conflic. New York: Columbia University Press. 
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Gradually an understanding is developed that conflicts can perform some positive 
functions in public life.  
One of the first grounds for this was given by G. Simmel, who wrote that "no 
conflict existed in vain." The identification of the conflict in a special subject of scientific 
analysis, and thus the formation of the basics of conflictology, is usually associated with 
the name of the biggest German sociologist Georg Simmel, who at the beginning of the 
20th century Introduced the concept of "sociology of conflict" into scientific circulation 
and, thus, constituted a section of sociology focused on the study of social conflicts.   
However, the realities of social life proved that these so-called "deviations", are 
encountered too often to be an annoying exception to the rules or "abnormality." The 
tradition of studying conflicts, refining the structural and functional model of society, R. 
Merton first criticized the idea of a "functional unity of society", during which not 
homogeneity and unanimity, but conflict of values and collisions of cultures are typical of 
modern society 7. Thus, the idea of "social equilibrium" was opposed to the idea of "social 
change",8 which in literature is also often called a "conflict" model, or "The theory of 
conflict." Basic theses of the conflict theory of Darendorf: 
1. The main distinguishing features of any society are dominance, conflict, and 
subordination. 
2. The social structure is based on the power of certain groups of people over 
others, for example, employers over workers, officers over soldiers, teachers over students, 
etc. 
3. Each of these groups has common interests, regardless of whether they are 
aware of those entering such groups or not; The interests of members of different groups 
are different and opposite. For example, there may be a conflict between business people 
seeking to increase their incomes, and environmental activists who are fighting for the 
purification of the environment Spirit and water. 
4. When people realize their common interests, they form a social class that can 
find itself in the form of a trade union movement, a lobby of a political party, etc. 
5. Class conflict is exacerbated if: 
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A) Almost all power is concentrated in the hands of several people, while the rest 
are almost completely deprived of it; 
B) Those who are deprived of power do not have the opportunity to receive it; 
C) People can freely organize political groups 9. 
 
Thus, for functionalists, society is a stable, unified whole and main element of 
which is the agreement of its members with respect to common values. Supporters of the 
theory of conflict, on the other hand, proceed from the assumption that there are constant 
changes and conflicts in the society, including those related to the suppression of some 
members of society by others.10 
The conflict model and the consent model were initially value-marked. Even the 
social Darwinists, who recognized the "natural" nature of the origin of conflicts, disagreed 
as to whether conflicts were "an inevitable evil" or "a positive factor in natural selection" 
11. In the same time for most sociologists, the prospect of eliminating tense situations from 
the life of society seemed undeniably much more attractive, and therefore conflicts were 
considered mainly as negative phenomenon, caused by "irregularities" in the public 
device. The efforts of scientists were focused on finding, opportunities for avoiding 
conflicts. The conflicts themselves were of much less interest to them. 12 
 
K. Marx and G. Simmel: sociology of conflict 
 
The strongest spokesmen of the oppositional point of view were Karl Marx (1818-
1883) and Georg Simmel (1858-1918), whose ideas developed followers and in fact laid 
the foundation of modern conflictology. The initial formation of the theory of conflict as 
a definite system of views on the nature of society, its organization and development 
                                                          
9 See, for instance Darendorf, 1959, cited by Smelser, 1994, p. 26. 
10 See James Hughes, “Managing Secession Potential   in the Russian Federation”, in James Hughes 
and Gwendolyn Sasse(eds), Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in 
Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 42-43 
11 Michael E. Brown, “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict”, in: Michael E. Brown, ed., 
Ethnic 
Conflict and International Security (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1993), p. 4. 
12 See, for instance:  Catherine Dale, Development and Implications of the Conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, in: “Conflicts in the Caucasus”, Conference Proceedings, International Peace 
Research Institute: Oslo, 1995; Alexei Zverev, “Ethnic Conflict in the Caucasus 1988-94,” in Bruno 
Coppieters, ed., Contested Borders in the Caucasus, VUB University Press: Brussels, 1996. 
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occurred, admittedly, under the direct influence of the works of Karl Marx. K. Marx is an 
established predecessor of modern conflictology, his ideas are largely shared by most 
conflictologists.  
His main theses that influenced the emergence of a "conflict" model of society, are 
associated with postulating the inevitability of the class struggle, that arises in society due 
to its division into warring classes, and the class struggle between them becomes the main 
driving force of history. Conflicts are associated with the opposite interests of social 
groups and originate in property relations and its distribution. K. Marx did not consider 
himself a "pioneer" Phenomena of the class struggle: " I do not own the merit that I 
discovered the existence of classes in modern society, nor that I discovered their struggle 
among themselves. Bourgeois historians long before me laid out the historical 
development of this class struggle, and bourgeois economists - the economic anatomy of 
classes "13(Marx, 1962, pp. 424-427). And although K. Marx himself limits the novelty of 
his proof of many provisions connected with the existence of classes and their gradual 
destruction, the completeness and depth of his description and analysis of the class 
struggle provided him with a priority in many researchers on this topic. Even in the 70's 
and 80's of our century K. Marx continued to be considered not just a famous, but the 
most significant theorist of the conflict, and his ideas had and continue to have an impact 
on many ideas of modern conflictology. As N. Smelser points out, "the theory of conflict 
was formed mainly based on the works of Karl Marx" 14. 
The merits of K. Marx are seen not so much in the nomination of any specific 
ideas or solutions to problems, but in creating the "sociology of the class struggle" 15, that 
his ideas "throw a direct challenge to the assumptions attributed to functionalism, and 
serve as an intellectual springboard for a conflict alternative to sociological theorizing "16. 
Another classic, whose name in the history of conflictology usually adjoins the 
name of Marx, is the German philosopher G. Simmel, whose scientific heritage is so 
highly valued that he is sometimes considered one of the founders of modern sociology. 
                                                          
 
 
15  B. Coppieters, "Conclusions: The Caucasus as a Security Complex", in: B. Coppieters (ed.), 
Contested Borders in the Caucasus, op.cit., p. 196 
16 Svante E. Cornell, “The Unruly Caucasus”, Current History, October 1997 
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 G. Simmel like Marx, believed that conflict in society is inevitable, and 
considered one of its main forms of conflict between the individual and society 17(The 
Sociology of Georg Simmel, 1950). Simmel is credited with the authorship of the term 
"sociology of conflict", and the priority in its foundation. In contrast to Marx, Simmel 
showed an interest in a broader spectrum of Conflict phenomena, describing conflicts 
between ethnic groups, between different generations of people and cultures, and 
between men and women, etc. But the main difference between the sociology of the 
Simmel conflict, from the ideas of Marx, is the belief that conflict can lead to social 
integration and, providing a way out of hostility, strengthen social solidarity. Conflict, 
according to Simmel, is not always and does not necessarily lead to destruction; On the 
contrary, it can fulfill the most important functions of preserving social relations and 
social systems.  
Simmel formulated several provisions related to the functions of the conflict 
relating to the parties to the conflict, as well as the social whole, within which the 
conflict is developing. Despite the "sociological origin" of Simmel's ideas, the conflict is 
understood, not just as a clash of interests, but more psychologically, as an expression of 
hostility inherent in people and their relations. Attraction to hostility Simmel considers, 
in turn, as a pair opposite of the need for sympathy. He speaks of "natural hostility 
between mankind", which is "the basis of human relations, along with another - sympathy 
between people."  
Simmel attributes the instinct of the struggle to a priori character, referring to the 
ease with which, in his opinion, there is animosity between people, which grows into a 
struggle in its most destructive manifestations. During the consideration of historical facts 
and ethnographic". It seems that people never loved each other because of things so small 
and insignificant as those for which they hate one another"18. Thus, Simmel is called an 
idealist, who assesses social life, including its conflictual forms, in positive tones. 
Although many scholars were inclined to view the conflict as one of the central 
phenomena characteristic of social systems, the priority in attempts to understand its 
positive functions in the life of society is traditionally given by Simmel. It is believed that 
Simmel's ideas had a huge impact on American sociology and, first of all, on the work of 
                                                          
17 Robert O.  Freedman, "Russian Policy-Making and Caspian Sea Oil", Analysis of Current Events, 
vol. 9, no. 2, February 1997, p. 6 
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L. Cozer. Despite the above-mentioned leading role of Marx and Simmel in creating the 
basis of sociological conflictology, thanks to which they are deservedly called the first 
generation of its classics, their ideas and developments are not limited to the actual 
phenomenon of the conflict and rather belong to the general field of conflict problems. 19 
Marx writes about the contradictions and confrontation of parts of the social 
system, about the inevitability of struggle, doom class society on the confrontation, which 
for the time being, can be hidden. In this context, many of Marx's provisions correspond 
more to the concept of struggle than conflict in its modern sense. (However, Marx 
himself, is recognized by Western sociology as an outstanding theoretician in the field of 
conflict, writes precisely about the struggle - class, economic, political, etc.). 
What has been said to a large extent applies to the ideas of Simmel. The 
affirmation of the priori character of the struggle brings his position closer to the ideas of 
the social Darwinists, with their central concept of struggle. Simmel's descriptions, based 
on concrete historical, ethnographic, and political facts, often use the concept of conflict, 
rather in a metaphorical sense. It is important, however, to note that Simmel introduced a 
distinction between the concepts of struggle and conflict. According to J. Turner on the 
basis of the analysis of Simmel's numerous statements, the latter views the conflict as a 
kind of variable whose intensity forms a continuum with poles "competition" and 
"struggle", and "competition is associated with a more orderly mutual struggle of parties, 
leading to their mutual isolation,  and struggle means more chaotic, direct battle.20 Simmel 
believes that the conflict can change its severity and therefore have different 
consequences for the society social whole. Thanks to the novelty of Simmel's ideas, his 
work proved to be a significant step forward in the development of the proper conflict 
problem. 
 
R. Darendorf and L. Cozer: The beginning of conflictology 
 
Followers of Marx and Simmel and modern "classics" of conflictology are the 
German sociologist R. Darendorf and the American scientist L. Cozer, whose ideas have 
                                                          
19 Samuel Huntington "The Clash of Civilizations", Multipolar, Politicized World, source: 
http://lib.rus.ec/b/79038 
20 Jared Feinberg, “GUAM: Creating Perceptions in the Caucasus”, Summer Digest, Weekly Defense 
Monitor, Center for Defense Information, 1998 
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become the conceptual basis of modern Paradigms of conflict. According to J. Turner, 
they continue to develop two main directions, set by the "ancestors": Darendorf represents 
the dialectical theory of conflict in the tradition of the dialectical approach of Marx, and 
Cozer - the conflict functionalism that develops Simmel's ideas. 
The most prominent contemporary sociologist, who adheres to the dialectical 
theory of conflict is Ralph Dahrendorf. According to Darendorf, social conflict has always 
been and will be inherent in any society by virtue of inevitable difference of interests. 
However, in a post-industrial society, which was investigated by Darendorf, the main 
contradiction of social systems is moving, in his opinion, from the economic plane, from 
the sphere of property relations to the domain of domination-subordination relations, and 
the main conflict is associated with the redistribution of power. At the same time, the 
dynamics of its emergence in essence repeats the logic of Marx's arguments about the 
dialectics of the development of the conflict: the objective opposition of the interests of 
the parties, the realization of this opposition, the emergence of social organizations, etc.  
Darendorf analyzes in detail the conditions for the emergence of conflicts, the 
factors that determine their severity, Possible consequences, etc. The work of Darendorf 
rightly allows us to consider it as one of the modern classics of conflictology. At the same 
time, according to critics, the concept of "conflict", along with such basic concepts for 
Darendorf as "violence", "domination and submission" and "dialectics", is used rhetorically 
21. (We should say that this is a common reproach addressed to conflict experts.) 
Darendorf tries to apply his arguments to a wide range of social conflicts. In his texts, "the 
conflict between entrepreneurs and trade unions" is adjacent to the conflict "between East 
and West"22, regarding which he notes: "At this point the meaning of the taken as the 
basis for a broad definition of the conflict. The form of the collision, which in everyday 
language is called "conflict" (however, as the so-called "class struggle"), is here only one 
form of a wider phenomenon of conflict, namely, the form of extreme or significant 
violence (and perhaps also intensity). "  
Although Cozer’s first works are imbued with a protest against the discrimination 
of the conflict as a phenomenon neglected by traditional functionalist constructs, he 
subsequently carefully places the conflict in his scheme of the organization of society. 
                                                          
21 Neal Ascherson, Black Sea, Hill and Wang: New York, 1995, p. 245 
22 Terry D. Adams. Caspian Oil and Gas Development and the Black Sea Region: An Overview. In: 
Europe’s Black Sea Dimension. Brussels, CEPS, 2002, pp. 47-52, 60-68. 
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L. Cozer: the image of society 
1. The social world can be viewed as a system of differently interrelated parts. 
2. In any social system in various ways, there is a lack of balance, tension, and 
conflicting interests.  
3. The processes occurring in the component parts of the system and between 
them, under certain conditions, contribute to the preservation, modification, increase or 
decrease of the integration and "adaptability" of the system. 
4. It can also be imagined that many of the processes that are commonly believed 
to destroy the system (for example, violence, disagreements, deviations, and conflicts), 
under certain conditions, strengthen the foundations of system integration, as well as its 
"adaptability" to environmental conditions 23. 
The definition of conflict belonging to L. Coser is one of the most common in 
Western science: "Social conflict can be defined as a struggle for values or claims to status, 
power or limited resources in which the goals of the conflicting parties are not only the 
achievement of the desired, but also the neutralization, damage or elimination of the rival 
24".  It is applicable and actually used in relation to a wide range of conflict phenomena - 
from interstate to interpersonal. As essential for the further consideration of the moments 
of this definition. 
First, the reduction of the conflict to one of the forms of struggle, and secondly, 
the negative nature of the objectives associated with the impact on the opposing side, the 
mildest of which is its neutralization. Of all the "classics" of conflictology, Cozer develops 
the most multifaceted and comprehensive view of conflicts: he writes about the 
conditions and factors of the emergence of conflicts, their severity, duration, and 
functions. It was the latter who took the first place in Cozer's theoretical system, giving 
grounds for the designation of his whole concept as "conflictual Functionalism ".   
By developing and refining the ideas of Simmel, Cozer in small measure changed 
the view of science on conflicts. In his opinion, the recognition of the conflict as an 
integral characteristic of social relations does not contradict the task of ensuring stability 
and sustainability of the existing social system. Cozer’s interests are focused not so much 
                                                          
23 On this, see Ghia Nodia, 'Waiting for the Russian Bear', in: War Report, June 1995, no. 34, pp. 
39-40. 
24 Neal Ascherson, Black Sea, Hill and Wang: New York, 1995, p. 245 
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on analyzing the sources of conflict and their emergence in social systems, as on its 
functions. His first major work on conflicts was called "The Functions of Social Conflict" 
(1956). This book truly played a historical role in the design and fate of conflictology, and 
Cozer's development of Simmel's ideas about the positive functions of the conflict is 
rightly regarded as one of the highest achievements of conflictology. 
 The merits of the "second generation" of the classics of conflictology are not 
limited to the development of the ideas of Karl Marx and G. Simmel and the description 
of new aspects of conflict phenomenology. The work of R. Darendorf and L. Cozer 
created an opportunity for scientific study of conflicts primarily due to a more rigorous 
definition of the problem fields of their research. The concept of conflict begins to 
separate from the concept of struggle, acquires a more specific content and a more specific 
description. Conflict ceases to be abstract (as in the descriptions of the "first generation") 
phenomenon, it acquires specific phenomenology and specific framework of its existence 
in social space. Ideas about the positive functions of the conflict are opposed to the 
discrimination of the phenomenon of conflict and its unambiguous interpretation as a 
harmful, dangerous, evidencing "pathology", "illness" Social organism. They prepared the 
ground for the establishment of the basic principles of modern conflictology - the 
recognition of conflicts as a natural and natural characteristic of social relations, the 
possibility of conflicts in various, including constructive forms, and the assertion of the 
principle possibility of conflict management.25 
The Conflict could appear in studies as a starting point for theoretical analysis, an 
intermediate stage of scientific constructions, illustrative material, etc. Conflictology is a 
complex scientific discipline that studies nature, essence, the causes of conflicts, the laws 
of their functioning and development, ways to overcome conflicts. Conflictology cannot 
be attributed to one block of scientific disciplines, it integrates knowledge from 
philosophy, history, sociology, law, political science, psychology, ethnology, ethnography, 
biology, geography, economics, and other disciplines studying various aspects of human 
activity.  
Conflictological studies are also based on mathematical modeling and modern 
means of information processing. The emergence of conflictology as a scientific discipline 
                                                          
25 Samuel Huntington "The Clash of Civilizations", Multipolar, Politicized World, source: 
http://lib.rus.ec/b/79038 
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was influenced by the largest sociological studies of the second half of the XIX - first half 
of the XX century. -TO. Marx, M. Weber, E. Durkheim, philosophical and psychological 
concepts of Freud, E. Fromm, and others. These thinkers and scholars explained the 
nature of social processes and the nature of mankind differently, therefore conflictology 
was initially formed as a set of scientific schools with different philosophical- 
Methodological grounds.26 
Ethnoconflictology as a branch of social science with an independent subject of 
study began to develop quite late. Ethnic conflict attracted the attention of scientists after 
the investigation of class, labor, and interstate conflicts. One of its leaders, American 
Donald Horowitz, noted that neither statesmen nor social scientists were ready for the 
growing role of the ethnic factor. The problem of belated formation of discipline is in 
many respects in the specifics of the subject of study. So, for example, the specific 
conditions of conflict are significantly different even in the same (not to mention 
different) regions. For example, the national liberation struggle against the colonialists is 
qualitatively different from Inter-tribal clashes occurring in the same geographical area. 
Different motives may be the mechanisms of participation in conflicts of different ethnic 
groups. 
 Therefore, in studies on ethnoconflictology, an analysis of specific conflict 
situations usually takes place with the study of specific causes, factors, conditions, and 
mechanisms of conflict.  A comparative study of ethnic conflicts shows that in their 
evolution there are repetitive features and stages, and this allows us to identify certain 
patterns within similar types of conflicts.  
Some researchers believe that social conflicts are a threat, the danger of the 
collapse of society. Other scholars insist on the conflict contained in the positive social 
content. Thus, known modern conflictologist Lewis Coser writes: "The conflict prevents 
the ossification of social systems, causing a desire for renewal and creativity."  Another 
German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf argues that conflicts are essential as a factor in the 
overall process of social changes. 
Regarding the ethnic conflict, especially its territorial version, more convincing is 
the position of the structural and functional methodology, which is considering the 
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conflict as dysfunctional, adverse event in the life of society, which is a kind of obstacle in 
solving the problems of social life of people of different nationalities.  
These conflicts are not so much "for renewal and creativity" as the cause stasis, 
cast society back in his development, entail blood, human casualties, destruction, 
economic decline, poverty, and famine. Redeem broke out of ethnic conflict is extremely 
difficult, it can last for months, years, be faded out and then flare up with renewed vigor. 
Different understanding of the phenomenon of ethnicity allows different interpretation of 
ethnic conflicts. By a multi-ethnic composition of the population of the former USSR and 
present new states any internal conflict takes an ethnic overtone.  
Ethnicity usually serves as a border conflict in situations where there is inequality 
in the social, political, legal, and cultural spheres. So many conflicts that occurred in the 
Soviet and post-Soviet periods in the country, are of ethnic character. We should also note 
that one of the forms of conflicts often includes the other and undergoes transformation, 
ethnic or political camouflage.27 V.A Tishkov gives a definition of ethnic conflict: "Under 
the ethnic conflict we mean a certain level of organized political action, social 
movements, riots, secessionist speeches and even civil war, in which the confrontation 
takes place through the ethnic community".  
Note that the ethnic and ethno-territorial problems of modern Russia do not 
represent an exceptional phenomenon. They have numerous counterparts in the modern 
world, and in the history of mankind. However, in Russia, they have their own specifics, 
due to both the peculiarities of the present stage experienced by the country and the 
peculiarities of Russia's geopolitical position in the changing device civilization of 
mankind. 
 
 
Studying the nature of ethnic conflicts 
 
Firstly, we should say that, ethnicity is one of the earliest forms of the social 
organization of society, which appeared long before classes, estates, Political associations, 
                                                          
27 Beissinger, Mark, R. Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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etc. Ethnic conflicts are the oldest form of social Conflicts that accompany the whole of 
human history.  
Secondly, that ethnicity is not the subject of free choice. In most of cases, people 
"Chooses" his ethnicity once for a lifetime in the process of socialization, which with rare 
exceptions is not conscious. Ethnic self-identification, therefore, is an astrictive type of 
social identification, which significantly increases the emotional saturation of ethnic 
conflict. It is common for people, when giving themselves over to the power of ethnic 
feelings, people act in conflict situations contrary to common sense, elementary 
calculation and not only doesn’t improve, but Often aggravate their situation with such 
actions. In some ethnoconflictological schools, this is treated as an irrational component 
of ethnic conflict.  
Thirdly, as ethnos’s act territorially Organized structures, ethnic conflicts are 
especially acute if their objects are of a territorial nature or territorial origin (possession of 
territory, land, wealth of its subsoil, territorial structure of the state and Other).  
Fourthly, ethnic conflicts have an amazing ability to involve in their orbit a 
variety of fragments of social reality.  Since ethnic conflict can include Objects of other 
types of conflicts, in an empirical study it is almost impossible to detect it in its pure form. 
It is common for a conflict that, in the early stages of the conflict, was dominated by 
economic or other contradictions, and then grew into an ethnic conflict and vice versa. 
 
 
Theories about ethnic conflicts 
 
Among the most well-known theories of ethnic conflict there are several.   
The ethnic stratification theory. J. Rothschild was asked to consider the ethnic 
group and the state as a subject of ethno-political conflict. According to the scientist, 
progress and activity of ethno-political movements depend on the economic, political, and 
ideological resources that can handle group. In addition, the group must be considered 
with its social and cultural characteristics. The socio-psychological theory of ethnic 
conflict by D. Horowitz is focused on the social and psychological dynamics. In his 
understanding, ethnicity has a special dynamic in view of the fact that it is associated with 
36 
 
the collective emotions.28 This leads to the fact that rational political and economic 
interests of the group can retreat into the background, and a crucial role in provoking the 
escalation of the conflict and begin to play the emotional factors. In the dynamics of the 
ethnic conflict can be traced the action of two mechanisms of behavior-: socio-
psychological and institutional. Ethnic conflict is due to a group of emotional response, 
which is based on group solidarity as members of the group trying to protect some 
common values, often have a symbolic character. Then an emotional response and group 
solidarity transformed into a public activity, furnished positions, and claims, which are 
created for the implementation of the relevant structures.29 
The large-scale attempt to analyze the ethnic conflict was made by T. Gurr in the 
work of "Minorities as a risk group." 30This Work was based on the study of political 
behavior of ethnic groups in the period from 1945 to 1989. The key provisions of Gurr’s 
concept is the assertion that the ethno-political action is motivated by a deep-seated 
resentment of people, t which is accentuated and promoted by ethnic group leaders and 
entrepreneurs. 31Out of this grew the concept theory of "basic human needs" that 
supposedly underlies the conflict and among these needs appears the desire to group 
integrity and to collective self-determination. The critique of these theories and 
approaches has been given at the time, and none of them we do not consider the universal 
and even sufficient for the analysis of contemporary conflict difficulties. Ethnic (often 
used synonymous definition - ethno-political) conflict - is a special form of social 
conflicts, with ability to engage in its orbit subject areas and objects of other types of 
conflicts and in its pure form is uncommon.  
Meanwhile, the experience of world history has shown that these conflicts could 
acquire significant and that any one of them at the same time has a political component. 
According to German anthropologist G. Schlee, the totality of views and positions related 
                                                          
28 Tir, Jaroslav. 2010. Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory and Territorial Conflict. The 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 413-425. 
29 Smith, A. (1993): “The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism”, pp. 28-29. 
30 Coding decisions based on expert analyses found in: Monahan, James. “The Former Soviet 
Union’s Diverse  
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“EthnoNationalism, Islam, and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder.” (New York: 
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to the definition of ethnicity as a cause of "splits and disintegration" can be reduced to the 
following statements: 
1) Ethnic differences are the root cause of the ethnic conflict; 
2) The contradiction between the customs of different nations reflect ancient, 
inherited and deeply rooted antagonisms; 
3) Ethnicity is universal, i.e. Anyone implying for any member of the people; 
4) Ethnicity astrictive, i.e., as a rule, a person cannot change his ethnicity; 
5) Ethnic communities are associated with a specific territory and seek the 
national sovereignty. 
However, almost any of the following statements can be challenged. Disagreeing 
with statements about the meaning of ethnic differences in the occurrence and escalation 
of ethno-political conflicts, attempts to explain their origin deep historically conditioned, 
Schlee cites the example of Yugoslavia. It is believed that the Yugoslav crisis is a classic 
example of ethno-political conflict of our time. In this regard, the most important 
situations is in Bosnia, which Mr. Schlee calls "Yugoslavia in miniature". Studies of pre-
war time have shown that the gradual disappearance of Slavic ethnicities, was a process of 
forming a single Yugoslav people.  
This process had a different intensity in different parts of the country, but it was 
obvious. In Bosnia, most of the population until the 1990s did not give significant 
importance to the ethnic factor. However, ethnicity per se was imposed on politicians 
local Serbs, Croats and Muslims, and perceived cultural differences have become the real 
basis not only to separate communities, but also for their violent confrontation during the 
civil war. 32 
The underlying causes of today's ethnic conflicts are discrimination and the 
absence of development of democratic practices and institutions, that would allow to 
solve the problem through negotiation and compromise, but not less common causes of 
ethno-political conflicts are ethnic separatism, irredentism, the struggle for the legal status 
of the group, striving for the attainment of group autonomy, the struggle for the interests 
of the community or sectarian religious movement. In addition to the manipulation of the 
cultural differences and political mobilization of ethnicity, which are engaged in fighting 
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for power and policy resources cannot lose sight of the ethnic conflict, which feed on the 
historical memory of past injustices, often mobilized in dramatic form, to become the 
backbone of modern hatred and readiness to participate in the conflict. The updated 
memory of Stalin's deportation of the Chechens, as well as the Caucasian war, were the 
most important mobilizing factor for members of the armed struggle in Chechnya, was a 
conflict primarily about contemporary issues and at the same time it was an occasion to 
demonstrate the virtues of modern "freedom fighters “.  
Thus, we define the ethnic conflict as a form of civil war in the domestic or trans-
levels, in which at least one party is organized and operates based on ethnicity or on 
behalf of the ethnic community. Under the ethno-political conflict, we understand the 
struggle of various social groups, which are organized along ethnic lines, and this 
principle becomes the basis of their ideological and political confrontation.33 
Each conflict has its own peculiarities, but there are grounds to allow 
generalizations and typology of existing species. And although we are not supporters of 
rigid definitions and typologies, considering them as signs of a weak methodology, 
however, in our opinion, it is possible to identify some types of ethnic conflicts. This is 
primarily the classification of the spheres of public life, when distinguished political, 
ethnic conflicts, economic conflicts, ethnic and cultural conflicts, etc. But many of them 
cannot be unequivocally attributed to an area of social life, as they relate to both the 
economy and politics, and culture. Possible classification of the subjects or objects in 
addition to the classification by "areas" and as an independent method of classification, 
especially in cases where the conflicts were clearly defined by "Intersectoral" character for 
example, secessionist or irredentist conflicts. 
 The experience of the USSR and Russia showed that in turning, crisis era old 
ethnic hierarchy is crumbling, and the weakening of the dominant groups allows 
minority communities, especially ethnic, work to change their status, receive a variety of 
preferences in the field of culture, access to resources and power. And ethnic elites often 
try to force these processes under the slogan of "justice", knowing that the time factor can 
play a crucial need to quickly determine what "piece of cake" they will get.  
                                                          
33 See James Hughes, “Managing Secession Potential   in the Russian Federation”, in James Hughes 
and Gwendolyn Sasse (eds), Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in 
Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 42-43 
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All this leads to the politicization of ethnicity, to the growth of ethno-nationalism 
and increased conflicts in the sphere of interethnic relations. Actualization of ethnicity in 
the last period of Soviet history and in the first years of the new Russian state was 
expressed not only in greatly increased interest in the native language, ethnic culture, the 
history, but mainly in the requirements to create a state guarantee for the preservation 
and development of cultural identity of ethnic groups. Expression of these requirements 
was the main ethno-national humanitarian intelligentsia, which not only gave the ethnic 
claims argumentation and design in the form of programs, declarations, proclamations, 
etc., but also was the main organizer of the ethno-political movements that sought 
implementation of programs put forward in life.  
It is important to note that with a few exceptions, national movements and 
organizations in the former USSR and Russia emerged in 1988-1991 gg., I.e., between the 
deepest political and socio-economic crisis of the previous social system. 
 
The typology of ethnic conflicts 
 
Each conflict is an independent socio-historical event, it can reveal the properties, 
traits and signs that are inherent in other ethnic conflicts. Identifying these common signs 
- an important element of scientific research, allowing to move to more complex stages of 
scientific search, such as, for example, analogy, prediction, conflict modeling. As the basis 
for the typology we propose the following. 
1. The classification of ethnic conflicts in the spheres of public life is very 
common in both foreign and domestic science. There are political ethnic conflicts, 
conflicts in economic life, in the spiritual sphere, etc. "Sphere" typology is not 
comprehensive and clear, since most Ethnic conflicts have an "interspheral" character. 
2. Classification by objects. It can act both as a continuation of the previous 
classification, and as an independent model, especially when the subjects of conflict have 
a clearly expressed "intersospheric" character. Such are the conflicts that have developed, 
For example, around the problem of the state language, territory and its economic 
resources, domestic ethnic conflicts. 
3. Classification by subject-carriers. Highlight the conflict between single-order 
and different orders. The first type is, for example, Ossetian-Ingush conflict, the conflict 
40 
 
between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian citizens of the Crimea, as well as many 
international conflicts. Another type of conflict involves differently ordered subjects, for 
example, an ethnic minority or a non-titular people, on the one hand, and the titular 
people or its state structures, on the other. Typical examples of such conflicts are the 
Russian-Chechen and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts. Relativity of this classification is 
obvious, nevertheless, it is quite often found in studies on ethno-conflictology. 
More meaningful is the classification of the subjects of the conflict from the point 
of view of their institutionalization. There are times when both parties to the conflict 
institutionalized, i.e. State or otherwise politically framed, and in this case the interethnic 
conflict acquires the features of the international.34 As H. Elmer rightly notes, "ethnic 
relations within the country have much in common with international relations." Some 
similarities can be seen in the ways violent actions. War often resembles an extended 
ethnic conflict, and ethnic conflict is a local war.  
The main difference is that even protracted wars end eventually with a ceasefire 
and peace talks. Serious ethnic conflicts may not have a solution and continue for 
hundreds and thousands of years, only for a certain time turning into a stage of respite “ 
A special and quite common case of such conflict is the institutionalization of one 
carrier subject and the non-institutionalization of the other. In this case, the struggle of 
the state against, for example, one of ethnic minorities can be perceived as a struggle of 
the title ethnos against this minority, there is mutual hatred and alienation, although only 
a small part of the institutionalized ethnos (for example, the army, the police) takes part 
in the struggle against another people.35 
In addition, ethnic conflicts can be classified on such grounds as the distinctive 
features of the conflict environment, the features of its dynamics and many other 
features.36 
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The Ethnic Past and Myths of Ethnogenesis in Transcaucasia 
 
Today on the territory of the former USSR the real and potential ethnic 
conflicts threaten the existence of nations and give rise to dangerous destructive 
processes. Emerging conflicts on various occasions consistently take the form of ethnic 
confrontations.37 
However, analysis shows that the purely ethnic conflicts at first sight is not 
always reducible to the real clash of ethnic groups.  For example, observers noted with 
surprise, that the division of the people in the Georgian-Abkhazian events or in 
Transnistria does not always happen on a purely ethnic line, similarly in the Israeli-
Arab conflict on the side of the first volunteers fought the Arabs, citizens of Israel, as a 
part of the Palestinian delegation were Jews in the peace talks. These facts indicate that 
the real conflict cannot be reduced to a conflict of nationalities, although perhaps   
perceived   by   the   parties   to   them   as   ethnic.  Consequently, demand 
explanations question: why such conflicts are perceived exactly as ethnic, or anything 
in the eyes of their members acquire ethnic overtones and their descriptions used 
ethnic vocabulary? To solve this problem seems important first to consider the concept 
of "ethnicity". 
Human history includes ethnic group as an essential aspect of the development 
of the nation. The specifics of the ethnic group (as the tribe) is that, people belonging 
to it see their relationship as natural. Mankind gradually overcomes the limitations of 
ethnic groups and forms the nation.  The last is the result of a new culture, 
overcoming the idea of naturalness, bringing people together in a common and 
challenging ideas about determining the value of individual rights, the rule of law, the 
civil society, which alone can provide rights of the individual.  
Historically developed nations can be formed based on the predominance of an 
ethnic group, but nevertheless they are realized as socio-cultural education such as 
public as having a common historical destiny. In our popular understanding nation is 
an ethnic community, formed based on ethnic, tribal values. At the beginning of human 
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history, people have been merged into the local community of different types: clan, 
tribe, patriarchal family, ethnicity. All of them were a certain unity of the human 
relations and culture. 
It is essential that ethnicity is not strictly identified with the territory, as 
during historical development, ethnic groups moved and mixed their territories. It is 
also important to remember that the formation of nations is highly controversial step, 
which may be interrupted in devastating conflict. The fact of the emergence of the 
state as a  social institution on ethnic, tribal basis carries the risk of outbreaks of inter-
ethnic conflicts, both within states and between them.     
Ethnicity becomes a private citizen matter. The formation of nations is 
possible only at a certain stage of development of society, at a certain level of 
development of cities, urban culture, with the development of not only the market 
but also abstract thinking, the ability to understand the value of  abstract rights, law, 
money, values of an autonomous personality, self-worth. In particular the situation of 
the culture of each ethnic group, always carries with it some measure of correlation 
between the poles of the opposition "ethnic values, national values." It can give rise 
to crisis situations that "in a society characterized primarily blurring of interests; 
their uncertainty, on the one hand, and on the other a very complex nature of their 
understanding and awareness " All of the direct causes and motives of ethnic conflicts, 
is always clothed in the form of culture relevant stakeholders, in the form of 
perceptions about the conditions, means, goals, regardless of the nature, content, 
causes of conflict. Hence, the desire to paint the conflict. in ethnic cultural colors- 
evidence of the influence of the powerful mass of archaic cultural layers.  
Accordingly, the significance of these concepts in the real conflict can be as 
invalid long-term, apparently normal relations between ethnic groups instantly 
destroyed in moments of crisis of any kind, since it may be in the corresponding 
culture of conflict resolution is seen beating on the way, expulsion ethnic group. 
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Caucasus and "Caucasians": the cultural construction of the region and regional 
identity 
 
Today, in the territory of the former USSR, current and potential ethnic conflicts 
are threatening the existence of nations and giving rise to dangerous destructive processes. 
Constantly-emerging conflicts take the form of ethnic confrontations or, at the very least, 
show a desire to identify participants as being of a particular ethnicity. The collapse of the 
USSR and the socialist world system was the most important event of modern times and 
occurred for several reasons. Ethno-political processes occupy an important place amongst 
these.38 
In modern science, it is understood that, in conflict, there is a collision between 
distinct and sometimes opposing interests, actions, attitudes, political parties, social 
organisations, and socio-political and socio-economic systems. Conflicts differ from region 
to region, as well as in level and how relations are managed on an ongoing basis. Factors 
that vary may be economic, social, political (external and internal), territorial, inter-
confessional, and linguistic, etc. 
The Caucasus has historically been one of the major regions of the world. 
Attention is drawn to its unique geographical location, which connects Europe and Asia. 
Since ancient times, this region has been linguistically, ethnically, religiously, and 
culturally diverse.  
All of this has had an important influence on the social development of the 
Caucasian people. Many books have been written about the Caucasus and Caucasians and 
many books will be written in the future. This is because of the linguistic and cultural 
mosaic of the Caucasus, as well as current events.  Historically, the Georgians have always 
had a great interest in the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity of their neighbours, and 
still do today. The Georgian chronicler, Leonti Mroveli, spoke about the common origin 
of several Caucasian ethnic groups. It is well known that the data about the history of the 
Caucasian people is mostly gathered from Georgian sources. 
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First, we note that the Caucasus is a big region located on the boundary of Europe 
and Asia. If we create artificial boundaries it amounts to an area today which is more than 
467,964 square kilometres. If we add to this the geographical area of the real Caucasus, 
which is in Turkey and Iran (the north-eastern villages of Turkey and the extreme 
northern regions of north-western Iran), the area exceeds 580,000 square kilometres. 
According to modern scientific data, the North Caucasus belongs to Europe, while the 
South Caucasus belongs to Asia. One very important feature characterises the Caucasus: 
throughout history, it has remained ethnically and culturally very colourful. We should 
not forget that, due to its geographical location, the Caucasus was (and still is) of interest 
to various empires.  
When we are talking about Caucasian civilisation, we should understand what is 
meant by this term. As well as “culture”, “civilisation” has many definitions and, in 
science, there is no generally accepted interpretation of the concept/term. Despite this, 
the opinion of scientists is consistent on several points about “civilisation.” At the heart of 
this term is the Latin word “civils” meaning “citizen” or “state”. Philosophical dictionaries 
and encyclopaedias usually define the concept of “civilisation” as follows: the unity of the 
material and spiritual achievements of society. Several factors caused the ethnic diversity 
of the Caucasus: its location at the turn of Europe and Asia; the movement of people to 
the north and south; the mountainous nature of the region; and the diversity of the local 
nature. Some of the ethnic groups were very small and their settlement areas were within 
one or two villages. Georgians, Armenians, Azeris and even “dvuhtreh” ethnic groups 
were mostly mountain residents. 39 
The ethnic situation in the Caucasus has changed, especially over the last 200 
years, during which Russia has seized the region. The collapse of the Soviet Empire had 
negative consequences for the ethno-demographic situation of the region. In addition to 
the autochthonous ethnic groups in the Caucasus, there is a long history of non-native 
ethnic groups who have migrated there over time, who have turned into indigenous 
Caucasians and still live there. 
Therefore, the Caucasus is one of the most multi-ethnic regions of the world: 
small territories, consisting of ethnic groups of different origins, exist side by side; most 
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are the oldest indigenous people of the Caucasus, while others migrated to the region at 
different periods in history.  
The multi-ethnic Caucasus has been conditioned by its geographical location, 
climatic conditions, and its capturing of different empires of the region. Even though 
there are many works on the history of Caucasian ethnicity, the issue is undeniably still 
relevant and requires further research, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Empire, 
and other political world events have led to a new migratory movement of ethnic groups 
in the Caucasus.  
Indigenous ethnic groups who lived in the mountains of the North Caucasus in 
the early middle ages are considered to be the ancestors of the Nakh-Dagestani and 
Abkhazian-Circassian peoples, who are often mixed together.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the “socialist camp” led to a fundamental 
reshaping of the world’s political map, marking the emergence of many new sovereign 
states. Hasty adoption of the “acts of independence” was carried out without considering 
the possible effect that changes to territory and status would have on autonomous 
republics. This led to armed clashes and local conflicts in some regions, one of which was 
the Georgian-Abkhazian (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Abkhazia) war 
of 1992-1993. 40 
In summarising these conflicts, we should also point out that there were several 
external players who, in one way or another, affected the political “game” in troubled 
regions. According to experts, when the ethno-political situation along the Russian 
borders escalated, its main purpose was to provoke the South Caucasus countries into 
reacting against the reckless actions of the United States and others. Important factors 
here are, on the one hand, the parallel solution of the Kosovo problem, which is 
impossible not to compare with the situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On the 
other hand, the year in which these two ethnic problems arose — which involved Russian 
citizens — was also an election year in Russia.  
In general, we can talk about the poor performance of non-military methods of 
conflict settlement in all three ethno-political situations. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are 
unrecognised states, Georgia has not revised its relationships in practice, and Nagorno-
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Karabakh is in the process of a settlement which is likely to anticipate a scenario like 
former Georgian autonomy. 
Despite the urgency of the problem for modern historical science and 
international processes, this topic remains poorly understood in terms of its history and 
new trends. Identifying the causes and prerequisites of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict has 
been widely discussed, by both domestic and foreign researchers. The historical roots of 
the conflict have been analysed in the works of V.A. Shnirelman, D. Malysheva, N.N. 
Aqaba, G.P. Lezhava, Coppieters, Nodia, G. Zhorzholiani, K.B. Barbaryan, S. Markedonov, 
and others.  
   Multi-ethnic   Caucasus   was   conditioned   by   its   geographical   location, 
climatic conditions, and the desire to capture the different empires of the region. 
Even though there are many works on the history of Caucasian ethnicity, undeniably, 
the problem is still relevant and requires further research, especially since the collapse 
of the Soviet Empire and other political processes taking place in the world, led to 
new migratory movement of ethnic groups in the Caucasus.41   
   The Caucasus region is heterogeneous and religious-confessional 
perspective. Empires of conquest ambitions for the region and expressed their desire 
to extend their religion here. A certain exception in this regard were only 
Mongolians, they do not seek to ensure their ideological conquest. The collapse of 
the Mongols and their mixing with different peoples, probably, to a certain extent 
been conditioned by this fact. This time our goal is not a review of religious and 
confessional picture of the Caucasus.  
   We should note that in recent years the most frequent cases of distortion of 
history and ethnology of the Caucasus, are all sorts of myths about it. We have 
the facts assigning newly arrived ethnic groups other people's cultural heritage, 
history and achievements once lived in the Caucasus and disappeared indigenous 
ethnic groups. In the Caucasus today live, up to fifty people, each of which has its 
own original culture and language. This region, which connects Europe and Asia, 
even in ancient times was inhabited by many ethnic groups. In confirmation of this 
can result in the reduction of the Greek geographer Strabo (. 64/63 BCE -. 23/24 
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years BC...) That in the Black Sea, in Dioscurias (modern Sukhumi) gathered 
merchants from all mountain regions of the Caucasus, the former representatives of 
about seventy people living here (Latyshev1947: 209-210).42  
It is worth also to recall the words of the Arab Geographer Ibn alFakih 
alHamadani from the middle of IX century and showing that in the Caucasus 
Mountains are living 72 people, speaking a completely different language 
(Karaulov1902: 15, 17).43 Arab author called the Caucasus "mountain of languages." 
This ethnic diversity typical for this Caucasus, although this does not mean that for 
centuries these regions has not undergone certain changes. 44 
Migration and other processes and upheavals that have taken place around the 
world and especially in Eurasia and the Middle East, had a significant influence on the 
processes taking place in the Caucasus. The mixing of peoples led to the emergence of 
new ethnic groups; many ancient ethnic groups have sunk into oblivion, becoming a 
part of history, is enough to recall, for example, the missing people of Caucasian 
Albania.  
    After the collapse of the Soviet Union's tendency to reduce the number of 
Russian ethnic group in the North Caucasus remains. Thus, from ancient times to today 
ethno-demographic point of view, the Caucasus is constantly changing. All the events 
that took place in the Eurasian region and the Near East, certainly reflected the ethnic 
dynamics of this region.            
Throughout the long history of the Caucasus many ethnic groups settled and 
many of them are gone. Russian state paid dearly for the conquest of the Caucasus, it 
has shed a lot of blood of indigenous Caucasian ethnic groups, many of who were 
forced to leave their ancestral lands, Russia has made ethnic diversity in the region, 
however, it won on the Caucasus at a certain time at last peace. For example, the 
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relative calm and fell on favorable conditions for the development of ethnic Georgians 
in the XIX-XX centuries (after termination devastating raids of the North Caucasus 
mountaineers), but in the same period narrowed area of the settlement of the Georgian 
ethnos; places of historical settlement of the Georgian occupied by other ethnic groups. 
Home of Russian policy in the Caucasus error consisted precisely in the fact that 
Russia had here their support in the face of "privileged people", for which she 
expected and which in some way help the implementation of its imperial purposes. 
 
Ethnopolitical problems in the Caucasus 
 
The study of the ethnic problem in the South Caucasus is extremely relevant, 
because there is a real threat to Russia's national security, its Integrity and sovereignty.  
The Caucasus region (especially the South Caucasus) is considered a very 
important geostrategic space, where it has the functions and boundaries of the front of the 
clash of civilizations in the meridian section (neo-Atlanticists and neo-Eurasians) and the 
geo-economic bridge (Although in the context of economic and social opposition, in the 
meridian section, the neomondialists and the Islamists-integrates). In this respect, it is 
very important to note the prospects for the transformation of the Caucasus from 
Confrontational model in the so-called "peaceful island". 
Recently, more studies have appeared on the problems of the settlement of ethno-
political, socio-economic, national-cultural, and economic problems in the Caucasus.45 
Different views are emerging on the problems of the ethnopolitical settlement in 
the Transcaucasia. The geopolitical situation in the Transcaucasia and its development are 
currently characterized by a clash in the region of a number of interstate and interethnic 
interests, the preservation of hotbeds of armed conflicts and tensions, the unstable nature 
of the emergence of new independent states in this region of the world, with continuing 
rivalry and struggle at the interethnic, regional and global levels for redistribution Spheres 
of influence and control over the resources of the region [23]. It is necessary to consider 
ethnic nationalism, which is inherent in the mass.46 
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According to A.M Temirbulatov, the regional security system in the Caucasus 
should be developed in three main directions: 
- political aspect and security; 
- the economy; 
- the sphere of law and the creation of a democratic society. 
It is the synthesis of these three areas that will allow us to achieve the necessary 
unity in the region.47 
The South Caucasus has always been of interest to big powers. Here their interests 
often collided: this happened historically. Political realism consists in integrating 
organically into the political processes taking place in the Caucasian region. At the same 
time, ensuring the basic national interests requires a correct definition and consistent 
implementation of priority tasks, aimed primarily at protecting national security and 
economic development of the country. 
 
Geography of interethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space 
 
The Caucasian region takes its name from the Caucasian mountain range. The 
Caucasian ridge is a kind of dividing line between the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia 
(the South Caucasus). The Great Caucasus is a historical and cultural geographical area 
bounded by the Black Sea in the west, the Caspian Sea in the east, north by Russia and 
Iran and Turkey - in the south. Today, the Caucasus includes four states recognized by the 
international community. This is Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia And Georgia.  
The South Caucasus is a territory inhabited by many ethnic groups that, during 
the Soviet era, resided within the three socialist republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and 
Georgia, both within autonomous republics and regions, and outside such frameworks.  
The first important interethnic conflict in the region is the territory and its status, 
the second is the power. The problem of access to power is expressed in the region already 
at the sub-ethnic level, since generic, clan groups persist in the structure of many 
Caucasian ethnic groups. The next most important object of conflicts in the south 
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Caucasus is land.48 . In the past few years, there has been a collapse of security in the 
Caucasus region in both areas. " With the words of an expert from the London Institute of 
Peace and the war of Thomas de Waal is difficult not to agree.  
The concepts of "the Caucasus" and "conflicts" (as well as the "Caucasus" And 
"war", "Caucasus" and "refugees") are closely related to late Soviet and post-Soviet history. 
Of the eight-armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space, six have occurred in the Caucasus 
region: Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Georgian-Ossetian 
And the Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts, the civil war in Georgia in 1993, the Ossetian-Ingush 
and the Russian-Chechen conflicts (the last two - on the territory of the Russian 
Federation).  
Currently, in conflict situations, the land does not yet appear as the main object of 
the dispute, but it is so potentially in many latent conflicts.49 The reasons that conditioned 
the actualization of ethnic conflicts in the territory of the former USSR were manifested 
to the full in the south Caucasus, while a few factors acting in the region, which give this 
process a special specificity and great acuity, acted.50  
First, it is the increased importance of ethnic identification in the self-awareness 
of the Caucasian ethnic groups compared to other types of social identification. This 
situation is typical for regions with a complex ethnic structure and incomplete processes 
of nation-building.  
Secondly, this is the legacy of national-territorial redistribution. Nowhere else 
within the limits of present-day Russia has such many changes in the national-territorial 
structure as in the south Caucasus been affected, and these changes concerned changes in 
borders as well as changes in the status of national-territorial entities.  
Thirdly, these are the features of the mentality of the mountain peoples of the 
Caucasus, who for centuries have been oriented toward "resolving" conflicts by force. The 
cult of weapons and forces, conditioned by the historical and geographical peculiarities of 
the region, formed a specific culture of the conflict among the peoples of the Caucasus, in 
which the force's outcome is a priority.  
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Fourthly, it is a relatively late addition of the south Caucasus to Russia in 
comparison with other areas that are an ethnic homeland or historically formed areas of 
population settlement. 
Fifthly, these are the consequences of deportations and mass resettlement of 
peoples. 
Sixthly, this is the absence of the conceptually developed "Caucasian policy" of the 
new Russian state.  
Ethnoterritorial conflicts can be divided into two large groups. The first of these is 
the territorial claims of some ethnic groups to others. The second is territorial separatism, 
i.e. The requirement to separate one territory whose population represents a stable one-
ethnic array, from an integral state or state entity perceived as the statehood of another 
people.  
Territorial separatism has three main forms: secession - separation to create or 
recreate its own national state; Irredentism - the separation of part of the territory of one 
state with the aim of joining a neighboring state; Enosis - separation of the territory to 
join the "mother" state, that is, a state with a one-ethnic population. The most common 
form of separatism is secession. Foreign ethno-conflictologists studied this phenomenon in 
sufficient details. There are several concepts explaining the causes and mechanism of this 
kind of ethno-territorial conflict, including, in relation to Russian conditions.  
The first concept is based on the fact that the modernization processes (they cover 
the countries of the former socialist camp and many countries of the third world), 
exacerbate the ethnic sentiments of people and strengthen the requirements for self-
determination.  
The second concept is called the concept of "internal colonialism" and its main 
idea is the assertion that in the multi-ethnic states some peoples oppress and exploit 
others, in this connection the only way to resolve the conflict situation is to create its own 
independent state.51 
The third concept has developed in the realm of the "realistic" school in 
conflictology and its supporters argue that behind the ideological struggle for the right of 
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nations self-determination lies in the struggle of certain sections of society for control 
over resources located on the disputed territory.  
The fourth concept, which can be referred to as "procedural", does not seek to 
identify any single-type reasons for the emergence of the requirements of secession, but 
focuses on the study of the mechanism for the deployment of the conflict towards 
secession. As a rule, the movement for secession is designed to be supported from the 
outside, primarily by states interested in changing the balance of forces in the region, on 
the part of peoples close in ethnic, cultural, or religious aspects.  
However, such a calculation turned out to be shallow, since the regional interests 
of Iran and Turkey, as well as some other Muslim states, do not include an acute 
confrontation with Russia.52 
 A special case of separatism is irredentism - the separation of territory is usually 
on the ethnic principle with the aim of joining the neighboring state. Since the borders of 
states do not coincide with the boundaries of ethnoses, the potential for irredentism in the 
world is great, however, irredentist movements turned out to be much less common than 
secessionist ones. This is explained by the fact that irredentism inevitably leads to the 
transformation of the intra-state ethnic conflict into an interstate conflict.  
Another type of separatism is enosis, which represents the possibility of reuniting 
an ethnic minority with a state-organized single-ethnic majority. A typical example of an 
attempted enosis is the demand of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh for the 
separation of this territory from Azerbaijan and its annexation to Armenia, the Ossetian 
population of South Ossetia, the secession from Georgia and accession to North Ossetia, 
From a formal and logical point of view, ethno-territorial conflict can be defined as a kind 
of social conflict, the subjects of which are social groups that differ in ethnicity, and the 
causes of contradictions - territorial dispute.  
Since, as noted above, the ethnic conflict can "master" objects and objects of other 
types of conflicts, it is practically impossible to find an ethnic conflict in a social process, 
especially ethno-territorial conflict, in pure form (however, like other types of conflicts), 
and the identification of these types of conflicts is carried out based on the definition of 
the main line of schism in society.  
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So, it is not unusual for a conflict, in the early stages of which economic or other 
contradictions prevailed, to develop into an ethnic conflict and vice versa. Sometimes 
such transformations are a consequence of the purposeful management of the conflict.53 
Nevertheless, among the main and most dangerous manifestations of political instability, 
undoubtedly, there are territorial disputes and claims, possessing, in the times of global 
geopolitical shifts, a colossal destructive potential.  
It was during the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the formation of the national 
statehood of the former union republics, the number of ethno-territorial disputes grew 
substantially, and many of them moved from the hidden phase to the active one. The term 
"ethnoterritorial conflict" is interpreted in a broad sense as any claim to the territory by 
the party of the dispute.  
Ethnoterritorial conflicts can take forms more and less acute, civilized, and 
uncivilized, peaceful, and non-peaceful. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility 
and legitimacy of using this term in a narrower sense, when "conflicts" mean only the 
most acute forms of confrontation. But since a significant part of ethnic conflicts in the 
post-Soviet space develops precisely as ethno-territorial conflicts or has clear signs of 
such, the most pressing problem has been the systematization of information on 
ethnoterritorial claims and disputes and the creation of a corresponding data bank. 
Estimates of ethnoconflictologists, one way or another, preserve the relevance of about 
140 territorial claims8. Not ethnical and not all territorial conflicts pertain to ethno-
territorial, but precisely those that are at the junction of these two large groups of 
conflicts. They are both ethnic and territorial.   
   
Typology of conflicts 
The collapse of the Soviet Union was accompanied by a large number of conflicts, 
some of which went into the armed phase (Civil war in Tajikistan, the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-
Ossetian, Russian-Chechen, Ossetian-Ingush, Moldovan-Transnistrian conflicts), And 
some confined themselves to clashes or tensions in the relationship. For example, after the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan unilaterally conducted mining of the border strip 
on the borders with Kyrgyzstan and tajikistan.  
In the early 1990s, in many republics of the Russian North Caucasus, attempts 
were made to divide ethnicity (Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia). 
According to the comment of the Russian ethnologist Valery Tishkov, "An extremely 
important lesson is growing understanding that the division of States by themselves does 
not solve the most important issues of economic and Socio-cultural prosperity, and even 
more, the self-determination of peoples on the ethnic Basis. The payment for the sections, 
including human sacrifices and material destruction, is much greater than in the case of 
the selection of a strategy for improving governance, including the solution of problems of 
interethnic relations based on internal self-determination and a democratic governance 
system ". Nevertheless, the most violent conflicts of the 1990’s Europe fell to the Balkans 
and the post-Soviet space. In this regard, it is extremely important to understand the 
general and special features of the genesis of these conflicts, as well as in the possibilities 
of post-conflict settlement. 54 
Most researchers agree that ethnic (interethnic) conflict is a particular case of 
social conflict, while possessing specific features. These include the nature of the subjects 
(the conflicting groups are formed on ethnic grounds) and the emotionally-irrational 
character of Conflict. Valery Tishkov characterizes conflicts as any form of "civil, political 
or armed confrontation in which the parties or one of the parties are mobilized, operate or 
suffer based on ethnic differences ". According to Zinaida Sikevich, "ethnic conflict" 
should be understood as such a social situation, which is due to "The discrepancy between 
the interests and goals of individual ethnic groups within a single ethnic space or ethnic 
group, on the one hand, and the state on the other"55 
In the latter case, the subjects of the conflict and the deep objectives of their 
political activity are tightly bound in the definition, no matter what declarations they are 
covering up and in whatever forms the ethnic conflict manifests itself. The Norwegian 
researcher Dan Smith notes such an important aspect of the conflict as the struggle for 
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power or access to economic resources, which has an "ethnic mask". In this case, ethnicity 
acts as a tool for mobilizing a conflicting society, as well as for legitimizing the violence 
used during the confrontation (the protection of one's ethnicity is viewed as an 
"acceptable price" for its own victims and the victims of the opponents).  
According to Smith, "the metaphor of the ethnic mask" is designed to draw 
attention to this particular strategy of political mobilization, and does not at all cast doubt 
on the reality of the sense of ethnic identity or diminish its significance, be it the time of 
conflict or outside him. For example, there is no doubt that the Chechens who oppose 
Russia in the wars of the 1990s have a deep and distinct sense of their ethnicity. " And yet, 
not only ethnic feelings, but also "rivalry over power between the new and old political 
elites, largely explains the transition of tensions between Chechnya and Russia in military 
operations in 1994. "  
However, the phenomenon of "ethnic mask" is inherent in other interethnic 
conflicts (the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is not least connected with the transition from 
shadow to legal private ownership of the Black Sea objects).56 But the main problem, 
according to Smith, is "the removal of the ethnic mask," since the consolidated group 
identity based on resentment, discontent and sacrifice is difficult to correct. Nevertheless, 
today we can fix two approaches to the definition of the phenomenon of interethnic 
conflict.57  At narrow sense, interethnic conflict can be considered a social confrontation, 
originally motivated by ethnic (Religious) reasons. In a broad sense, inter-ethnic (inter-
confessional) conflict is a confrontation in which opposing groups belong to various 
ethnic (religious groups).  
At the same time, ethnic (religious) belonging can be constructed, understood, and 
interpreted differently, and ethnic motivation may initially not be present, or be weakly 
expressed. A narrow understanding of the interethnic conflict, on the one hand, avoids 
the "inflation" of the concept itself, but, on the other hand, removes from the analytical 
field the stage of the development of the conflict, when it cannot yet be completely 
described as a formalized confrontation. Meanwhile, underestimation of these stages of 
conflicts (let's call them protoconflicts), often regarded as banal hooliganism or "domestic 
phenomenon," has significant Political consequences. The subsequent bloody war 
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between Armenians and Azerbaijanis Because of Nagorno-Karabakh, refuted such 
statements.  
In this regard, the classification and typology of interethnic conflicts is extremely 
important. Even now, there is no unified classification of interethnic conflicts. According 
to the form of flow, it is customary to distinguish between actualized ("open") and non- 
and latent ("hidden") conflicts. Some authors draw attention to the fact that a special 
category of inter-ethnic confrontation is an armed conflict (this definition may coincide 
with the notion of an "open" conflict).  
According to the famous Norwegian researcher Dan Smith, this is "open clash 
with the use of weapons between two or more parties led from the center, an ongoing for 
some time in a dispute over control of the territory or its Management ". To specify the 
concept of "armed conflict", scientists from the Department for Peace and Conflict Studies 
of the University Uppsala (Sweden) proposed a quantitative criterion (25 deaths per war 
per year) and a qualitative criterion (state participation in a conflict, at least on one side). 
58 
Meanwhile, in the post-Soviet space, virtually all armed interethnic 
confrontations were the result of unresolved multi-year latent conflicts. The Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh began with the "war of petitions and rallies", 
and only then grew into a large ethnic military confrontation. Georgian-Abkhazian And 
the Georgian-Ossetian conflicts initially developed as politico-legal (status) disputes. All 
interethnic conflicts of the post-Soviet space were originally formed and developed as 
internal state.  
Armenian-Azerbaijani, Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-Ossetian, Russian-
Chechen conflicts in the late Soviet period developed as conflicts between the leadership 
of the union and autonomous republics, as confrontation Principles of territorial integrity 
and the right to ethno-national self-determination. 59The Ossetian-Ingush conflict, on the 
one hand, was a conflict of various ethnic groups, and, on the other, a territorial dispute. 
As for latent conflicts, the conflicting parties in them and before and after the dissolution 
of the USSR were representatives of various ethnic groups (Georgians and Armenians, 
Karachais and Circassians, Kabardians and Balkars, Laks and Kumyks).  
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was 
transformed into interstate. However, according to Russian diplomat Vladimir Kazimirov, 
"the specificity of the Karabakh conflict is, that there are at least two and a half sides in it. 
60 "31 Of course, there were two fighting parties in the hostilities (the formations of the 
Karabakh Armenians together with the regular parts of the Republic of Armenia were one 
of them), but there were three politically (Baku-Stepanakert-Yerevan). Thus, the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was considered (at least in the Azerbaijani interpretation) 
not only as a struggle between the two states, but also as a fight against "Karabakh 
separatism".  
The withdrawal of the national republics from the Soviet Union provoked the 
secessionist sentiments of the former autonomies. The Georgian-Ossetian, Georgian-
Abkhazian, Russian-Chechen conflicts became a confrontation between the central state 
power and separatist entities. At the same time, the opposing sides equally used the 
definition of „separatist “. For the leaders of breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
separatist in 1989-1991. Georgia appeared, coming from the USSR, and thereby provide an 
opportunity for ethno-national self-determination of the Ossetians and Abkhazians. 
 For more than 20 years Nagorno Karabakh has been a point of special 
ethnopolitical tension in the South Caucasus. The status of this territory over the last 
century has undergone many changes within the framework of abolished and newly 
created state formations, which was often associated with armed confrontation of the 
population with third forces. The last conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which developed 
into full-scale hostilities in 1992, remains unresolved until now and although the active 
use of armed forces by the parties was terminated in May 1994.  
Until now, none of the interethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus is settled.61 Conflict 
settlement in karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, the Priorian district of the Republic of 
North Ossetia did not become an irreversible process. On the contrary, since 2004, we can 
talk About the "defrosting" of certain conflicts in the Caucasus, that is, attempts to change 
the existing balance of power and the legal status quo with the use of force. This led to 
two military clashes in the South Ossetia (August 2004 and the so-called "five-day war" in 
                                                          
60 Christoph Zurcher. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the 
Caucasus. (New York: New York University Press, 2007), pp.13. 
61 Saideman, Stephen M. 2001. The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and 
International Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. 
58 
 
August 2008), the escalation of violence in Abkhazia (in 2006-2008). Because of the 
"defrosting" of the two conflicts, a radical change occurred in the geopolitical landscape of 
not only South Caucasus, but also the entire post-Soviet space. Independence of two De 
facto states - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - was recognized by Russia (August 26, 2008) 
and with certain nuances by Nicaragua (September 5, 2008), Venezuela (September 10, 
2009) and Nauru (December 15-16, 2009.)   
Therefore, Russia as the mediator and the peacemaker, not only by fact, but also 
legally, became the guarantor of the self-determination of the two former autonomies of 
the Georgian SSR. Thus, for the first time since 1991, a precedent was created for the 
revision of state borders between the republics of the former Soviet Union.62 Against the 
backdrop of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the situation in the zone of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict looks like a local story (there are no radical changes in the status quo 
that would affect the parties to the conflict and the parties concerned). 63 
However, here, in the beginning of 2006, an increase in the number of shootings 
on the ceasefire line (or "front line", as the band of the conflicting parties in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan are called) was recorded. In March 2008, there was the largest violation of the 
ceasefire, beginning with the truce reached in May 1994 between the conflicting parties. 
It was the Caucasus that became a kind of "supplier" of both unrecognized (de facto) state 
entities in the post-Soviet space - such as Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, 
and self-proclaimed republics that existed for a few days and months to several years. 64 
From the four currently existing de facto post-Soviet states, three are located in 
the Caucasus region. At the same time, two of them - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - in 
August 2008 became partially recognized (their Independence is not recognized by the 
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UN and other international institutions, but recognized by the Russian Federation as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council with the right of veto, as well as a 
member of the "nuclear club". 65At the same time, the ideological base of de facto states 
and self-proclaimed republics was different (in most cases - Ethnic nationalism, as well as 
Islamic fundamentalism of the Salafi type).  
Today's Caucasus is one of the most militarized regions in the world. The 
independent states of the South Caucasus have a military potential comparable to the 
potential of an average European country. The number of the Azerbaijani army is 
determined in 95 thousand people, the Armenian - in 53 thousand (with a population of 3 
million people), the Georgian - about 30 thousand people.  
In addition to the military machines of recognized states, there are armed forces of 
De facto states. In Abkhazia, there are 5 thousand people, in South Ossetia - 3 thousand 
people (not including reservists). In Nagorno-Karabakh (whose army is integrated with 
the armed forces Armenia) is about 18-20 thousand people. Prior to 2008, Russian 
peacekeepers (acting there under different mandates) were also in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Since August of 2008, their status has changed, negotiations with the leadership 
of de facto States on the establishment of Russian military bases on their territory.  
Most of the conflicts ("open" And "hidden") on the territory of the Caucasus is 
closely connected with conflicts in the former republics of the Soviet Transcaucasia, and 
vice versa. In this regard, we can talk on the phenomenon of "related conflicts", the 
resolution of which can be the most successful only in a complex. The Armenian-
Azerbaijani confrontation over Nagorno-Karabakh led to a significant displacement of 
Armenian refugees to the territory of the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories.  
According to official data, from 1989 to 2001, the number of Armenians increased 
by 42.52% (by 244,783 people, that is, 3.7% of its national composition). Today, 
Armenians are 12% of Tuapse's population, 15% of Sochi, and 38% of Adler. Thus, the 
"Armenian issue" has become one of the most important socio-political factors in the 
Krasnodar territory, and anti-Armenian (migrant-phobic) rhetoric is one of the ways of 
political legitimization of the regional elite, writing off its own mistakes for migrant 
“aliens.” 
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One of the vivid examples of "connected" ethnic conflicts is the "Ossetian 
problem". The Georgian-Ossetian conflict has become the first interethnic confrontation 
in post-Soviet Georgia overgrown in a large-scale armed confrontation in January 1991 - 
July 1992. This conflict had a significant impact on the course and results of the first 
inter-ethnic conflict in the territory of the Russian Federation - Ossetian-Ingush. The 
military phase of the latter occurred in October-November 1992.  
Because of the escalation of the Georgian-Ossetian Confrontation in North Ossetia 
in the early 1990s, arrived about 43 thousand refugees from South Ossetia and from hole 
Georgia. Refugees contributed to the radicalization of ethno-nationalistic sentiments in 
the North Ossetian society. At the same time Leaders of North Ossetia and North Ossetian 
nationalists were involved in another ethnic conflict, Ossetian-Ingush. To a large extent, 
refugees from South Ossetia became the mass supporters of the radicals of North Ossetia, 
who demanded the preservation of the "territorial integrity" of their republic. The result 
was-  40 thousand (according to Ingush data - more than 70 thousand) of internally 
displaced persons - Ingush. The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict contributed to the 
consolidation of the Adygeyan ethnonational movements (the "Circassian world"), in 
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Adygea, as well as the activation of the 
Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, who played their significant role in 
1992-1993 in Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. And today the "Circassian world" is one of the 
most important participants (although Often not declaring their participation) in 
Georgian-Abkhaz confrontation. 
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             Chapter Two 
 
 
 
Ethnopolitical Conflict in the South Caucasus 
 
More than twenty years ago, in December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. This 
event led to the formation of fifteen independent states, each of which during this time 
passed a complex path of political construction and international legitimization. Some of 
them have managed, in just two decades, to go from the Soviet republics to the NATO 
member states and the EU (the Baltic states), and some have struggled to avoid turning 
into "failed states" (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan).  
However, one of the most important consequences of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was the emergence of entities that also declared their sovereignty and were even 
able to defend it during armed confrontations with the former Soviet republics, but they 
did not receive international recognition or were recognized by a limited number of UN 
member states. Such are Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. 
 
 
South Ossetia – political Geography 
The Republic of South Ossetia is located in the southern foothills of the Caucasus 
Mountains. In the north, it borders with one of the constituent entities of the Russian 
Federation - the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania; A kind of "window" in Russia is the 
Roki tunnel. South Ossetia is surrounded by Georgia from the southern, eastern, and 
western sides. The area of the republic is 3.84 thousand square meters. Km.  The capital - 
Tskhinvali (Tskhinvali). There is no consensus on the exact population of South Ossetia. 
Moreover, the available estimates are highly politicized depending on the position taken 
in relation to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. 
According to the data of the All-Union Population Census (1989), 98,527 people 
lived on the territory of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, of which 63.2 thousand 
Ossetians, 28.5 thousand Georgians, Russians, 0.9 thousand people - representatives of 
various Jewish ethnic groups. 
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As a result of the Georgian-Ossetian ethnopolitical conflict, the population of 
South Ossetia declined. However, it is extremely difficult to adequately assess the 
dynamics of these changes. Unlike Abkhazia, which conducted "population accounting" in 
2003 and a census in February 2011, in South Ossetia after 1989 there was no own census. 
Its conduct was discussed on the eve of the 2009 parliamentary elections. However, in 
practice this idea was not implemented. So, in the presidential election in South Ossetia in 
2006, 55,000 surnames were added to the electoral lists, and this is even though not all the 
territory of the South Ossetian AO was under the control of Tskhinvali at that time. 
During the parliamentary elections, the number of voters was slightly more than 60 
thousand people. The UN Report on Georgia, states that before the August 2008 war in 
South Ossetia. 83 thousand people lived (of which 60 thousand - in the territories 
controlled by Tskhinvali). The report of the PACE Committee on Migration named the 
figure of 50 thousand people. This estimate was related to the period after the "Five-Day 
War". 
The population census in Georgia in 2002 affected only those territories of the 
former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, which Tbilisi came under control after the 
cessation of armed Confrontation in 1992. There, the Georgian statistics recorded 7,730 
inhabitants.66 
 Today, according to the administration of the Republic of South Ossetia, 72 
thousand people live on its territory. The Georgian authorities call the figure of 8 
thousand people, and various international experts and human rights defenders determine 
the number of residents of the republic in 20 -30 thousand people. So, human rights 
activist Varvara Pakhomenko in her research, based on the data of election commissions, 
information on migration of refugees and the number of schoolchildren, in 2009 
determined the number of residents of the republic within 26-32 thousand people, of 
which about half lives in Tskhinvali. 
According to the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia, it is "a sovereign 
democratic legal state created because of the self-determination of the people of the 
Republic of South Ossetia". As of mid-2011, South Ossetia's independence was recognized 
                                                          
66 Coding decisions based on expert analyses found in: Minahan, James. “The Former Soviet Union’s 
Diverse Peoples: A References Sourcebook.” (Santa Barbara:ABC-CLIO), 2004. Gammer, Moshe. 
“EthnoNationalism, Islam, and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder.” (New York: 
Routledge), 2008. 
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by five states (Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Tuvalu). From the point of view of 
Georgian legislation, South Ossetia, unlike Abkhazia, is not regarded as an independent 
autonomous entity. The Georgian law mentions only "the former South Ossetian 
Autonomous Region". The South Ossetian autonomy was liquidated by the Georgian 
authorities a year before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The decision was made on 
December 11, 1990 by the Supreme Council of Georgia. In accordance with the 
administrative-territorial division of Georgia, the territory on which the republic is 
located belongs to the territories of such regions as Shida-Kartli, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, 
Imereti, Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo-Svaneti. In accordance with the Law of Georgia 
"On the Occupied Territories" (Article 2, paragraph "B") South Ossetia is defined as the 
"Tskhinvali region" (the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast). " 67 
The same definition is also present in other official documents issued by the 
Georgian authorities. So, in April 2007 the Parliament of Georgia adopted the law "On the 
creation of appropriate conditions for the settlement of the conflict in the former South 
Ossetian Autonomous Region". The definition of "Tskhinvali region" / "former South 
Ossetian Autonomous Region "was used in the" report of the government of Georgia on 
the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Georgia "(January 2010).   
Until August 2008, "Temporary Administrative and territorial unit of the 
Tskhinvali region was in the village of Kurta in the territory of the former South Ossetian 
Autonomous Region, which was controlled by the Georgian authorities. The head of the 
"Interim Administration" takes part in the "Geneva Discussions "as part of the Georgian 
delegation, he is the only legitimate representative of the "occupied Tskhinvali region ". 
 
 
 
The Georgian-Ossetian conflict 
In August 2008, many years of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict resulted in the 
"five-day war". For 17 years, this is the third armed confrontation between Georgia and 
the Republic of South Ossetia, - de jure recognized as part of the Georgian state (including 
by Russia until August 26, 2008).  If in the period of the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-
                                                          
67 Hooman Peimani, Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus, (Santa Barbara: 
ABC_CLIO, 2009) 
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1993, we dealt with the amateur performance of individual servicemen of the Russian 
Federation, this time the actions of the Russian army were not simply supported at the 
official level. The Kremlin described them as an operation to "force Georgia to peace", 
designed to save the Ossetian people from a large-scale humanitarian disaster.  
Unlike previous Georgian-Ossetian armed confrontations (1991-1992, 1992-1993, 
2004), the US and the European Union countries are actively involved in the current 
conflict. Activity was demonstrated by Ukraine, which tried to contain the actions of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet during the military operation against Georgia. For the first time, 
Tbilisi fought against separatist formations (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) simultaneously - 
"on two fronts." Developments in South Ossetia and around it, have become almost the 
main issue on the international agenda. In the first day of the "five-day war" The UN 
Security Council met three times to discuss the situation in the Caucasus.  
The Georgian-Ossetian conflict was the first inter-ethnic confrontation in post-
Soviet Georgia, overgrown in a large-scale armed clash. South Ossetian Autonomous 
Region in the Georgian SSR - the historical predecessor of the unrecognized state 
formation Republic of South Ossetia - was formed on April 20, 1922. Its territory was 
6.5% of the territory of Georgia (3.84 thousand square kilometers).  
According to the data of the All-Union Population Census of 1989, 98.5 thousand 
people lived in the South Ossetian Autonomous District. Of these, 63.2 thousand were 
Ossetians, 28.5 thousand were Georgians, 2.1 thousand were Russians, and 0.9 thousand 
were representatives of Jewish ethnic groups. The number of Ossetians in Georgia in 1989 
was 165 thousand (about 3% of the population). About 100 thousand Ossetians lived in 
the interior regions of Georgia (the largest were the Ossetian communities In Tbilisi, Gori, 
Rustavi). The legal status of South Ossetia in the pre-crisis period was regulated by the 
Law on the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, which was adopted in 1980. 
In its development, the conflict went through several stages - from a local (even 
non-regional) confrontation, little known and of little interest to the international 
community, to an event of international significance.  
The first stage (1988-1989) can be called ideological. During this period, the 
opposing sides formed the fundamental ethnopolitical mythologems of the future conflict. 
For example, Georgian historians and journalists began to talk about Ossetians as "aliens 
on the Georgian land", "natives of the North Caucasus", and Ossetians updated the theme 
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of "Alanian fraternity" (in the modern Ossetian historical and political narrative Alans are 
regarded as the ancestors of Ossetians). 
The second stage (1989-1991) - Political and legal. For two years, the Georgian 
and Ossetian side were waging a lawmaking ("statutory") war against each other. On 20 
September 1989, draft laws of the Georgian SSR were published, infringing the rights of 
the South Ossetian AO. Less than two months later, on November 10, At the session of 
People's Deputies was accepted the decision of transformation of the South Ossetian 
Autonomous Oblast into an autonomous republic within Georgia.  
This action in Tbilisi was perceived extremely negatively, as South Ossetia raised 
its status unilaterally. On November 16, 1989, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of 
the Georgian SSR abolished the decision of the South Ossetian Regional Council. A week 
later, many thousands of anti-Ossetian Georgian nationalists’ marches went to Tskhinvali 
and the first victims appeared. Then the key event for the escalation of the conflict took 
place.  
On December 11, 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia decided to abolish the 
autonomous status of South Ossetia. Almost simultaneously, the authorities of the Soviet 
Union announced the regime of emergency in the South Ossetian autonomy, and the 
Georgian leadership began its blockade.  
The third stage is the armed struggle between Georgia and South Ossetia (January 
1991 - July 1992). On January 6, 1991, the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of 
Internal Affairs left Tskhinvali for barracks, the city includes a 6,000-strong detachment 
of Georgian militants, who appeared among the civilians. During the military operations, 
the capital of South Ossetia was stormed three times (February and March 1991, June 
1992). North Ossetia (a constituent entity of the Russian Federation in the North 
Caucasus) was involved in the conflict, where about 43,000 refugees from South Ossetia 
and the interior regions of Georgia arrived. At the same time, the North Ossetian actions 
were not directly controlled by the Kremlin.  
Moreover, the condition of signing the Federative Agreement put up support (in 
one form or another) of Moscow to South Ossetia. At the end of May 1992, North Ossetia 
blocked the gas pipeline leading to Georgia. June 24, 1992, Presidents of Russia and 
Georgia, Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze signed Dagomys (Sochi) agreements on 
the principles of the settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. July 14 begins a 
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peacekeeping operation. The Russian, Georgian and North Ossetian peacekeeping 
battalions were introduced, a Joint Control Commission was created (representatives of 
the Russian Federation, Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia) on the observance of the 
ceasefire. As a result of armed confrontation, 100 villages were burned, more than a 
thousand people were killed. Thus, the armed conflict was "frozen".  
So, begins the fourth stage, which lasted until May 2004. Unlike Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia did not know the large-scale ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population. Until 
August 2008, the joint residence of Georgians and Ossetians was preserved here. In the 
Constitution of the unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia, the Georgian language was 
named as a minority language. Shootings, blockades, and provocations ceased, a relative 
peace was achieved.  
Until 2004, there was a direct bus service between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, there 
were markets (Ergneti), where Georgians and Ossetians traded together. We should note 
that in post-war conditions the basis of the economy of the territory with the "deferred 
status" was contraband, in which representatives of both ethnic groups were involved. But 
this shadow economy firmly tied South Ossetia to Georgia, it, albeit in an informal way, 
formed the trust of two conflicting communities.  
A notable role in the conflict settlement was played by the president of North 
Ossetia, Alexander Dzasokhov (elected in 1998), who had direct informal contacts with a 
colleague from the former Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee Eduard 
Shevardnadze. All this made possible to defuse the situation. Moreover, over 12 years, a 
significant positive potential has been gained in the process of peaceful settlement. 
First, the Georgian and Russian battalions carried the peacekeeping mission 
together. Secondly, important documents were signed to ensure the rehabilitation of the 
conflict area. Among them, the Memorandum of Measures on the Security and mutual 
trust between parties in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict of May 16, 1996 and the Russian-
Georgian intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the restoration of the economy 
in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and the return of refugees on December 3, 
2000. 
The fifth stage (2004-2008) can be described as a "defrost" of the conflict. It began 
with attempts by official Tbilisi to reconsider the balance of power in South Ossetia and 
the political and legal format of the settlement. The Rose Revolution in Georgia (October-
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November 2003), a staggering victory (97% of the vote) in the presidential election of 
Mikhail Saakashvili (January 2004) occurred, as in the early 1990s, based on mobilizing a 
"patriotic" resource. In the speeches of Saakashvili and his colleagues sounded ideas of re-
creation of a united Georgia and revenge for "national humiliation" in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  
On May 31, 2004, without the coordination of actions with the Joint Control 
Commission (JCC), special forces of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (300 people) 
were deployed under the pretext of combating smuggling into the territory of South 
Ossetia. These actions were regarded by the members of the JCC as a violation of the 
Dagomys agreements. From the Georgian side, accusations were made of Russian 
peacekeepers in ethnic engagement, as well as criminal activities. On July 20, 2004, the 
Georgian president publicly stated that he did not rule out the possibility of denouncing 
the Dagomys agreements: "If the agreements on the territory of the Tskhinvali region do 
not allow the lifting of the Georgian flag, I am ready to secede from these agreements."  
With this statement, Saakashvili demonstrated that he was striving to achieve three goals: 
- to internationalize the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, to connect the United States, 
the European countries to its settlement; 
- reformat the conflict from Georgian-Ossetian into Georgian-Russian and present 
it as a manifestation of Russian neo-imperialism; 
- abandon the exclusive role of Russia as a guarantor of peace in the region. 
It was the implementation of these goals that became the quintessence of the fifth 
stage of Georgian-Ossetian conflict. On August 8-19, 2004, a second war came to South 
Ossetia. In this military confrontation, not only small arms were used, but also artillery. 
And although by the end of the month the parties managed to separate for several days, 
August (the fateful time in the conflict) in 2004 marked the beginning of a new wave of 
shelling, attacks, provocations and overlaps of vital communications.  
Since then, the tactic of "petty military foul" has become a daily reality in South 
Ossetia. This brief war (forgotten especially against the backdrop of the "hot August" of 
2008) has become to some extent a turning point in Russian politics in the region. Until 
2004, Moscow was striving for objectivity and neutrality, preserving the status quo as the 
best way out. After 2004, Russia (realizing the relationship of the situation in South 
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Ossetia with the security of the entire North Caucasus) was taking the side of the 
unrecognized republic. 
In the years 2004-2006, the Georgian parliament adopted several resolutions that 
recognized the Russian peacekeeping mission as "negative," and the actions of the Russian 
Federation were assessed as "an open annexation." In the autumn of 2006, Tbilisi launched 
the project of "alternative South Ossetia", making its "banner" the former Prime Minister 
and Minister of Defense of the unrecognized republic of Dmitry Sanakoev. The goal of 
this project was to reformat the negotiation process (giving up direct dialogue with 
Tskhinvali).  
In March 2007, Tbilisi creates in the territory of South Ossetia "A temporary 
administrative unit". This decision put an end to the negotiations between Georgia and 
the unrecognized republic. Tbilisi is attempting international legitimization of Sanakoyev 
(he participates in forums in Brussels and Strasbourg, he is viewed as a "constructive" 
representative of the Ossetian side, unlike Eduard Kokoity). 
 The thawing of the policy of "defrosting" was the re-subordination of the 
Georgian peacekeeping battalion to the Georgian Defense Ministry (formerly it was 
subordinated to the command of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces), as well as repeated 
statements of the Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili on the need 
to withdraw from the existing formats for a peaceful settlement. The negotiations 
between the conflicting parties ceased. 
In 2008, Moscow also contributed to the "thawing" of conflicts in Georgia. On 
March 21, the State Duma adopted a statement outlining two conditions for the possible 
recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia's accession to 
NATO, a military operation against two unrecognized republics). After that, in April, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the federal government to provide 
"substantive assistance" to the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
This mission among other things, presupposed the establishment of virtually 
direct diplomatic contacts between Moscow and Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. Immediately 
followed by a tough reaction from the West, for which territorial integrity of Georgia as 
one of its priorities. 
By August 7, 2008, the status quo in South Ossetia was violated. During the 
clashes of 2004, about 70 people died, and in subsequent years the number of victims on 
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both sides (according to various estimates) was 100 people. In August 2008, the quantity 
went into quality. The tactic of "increasing" the level of violence led to the storming of 
Tskhinvali and a tough response from Russia (which, it seems, was not counted either in 
Tbilisi or in the West). Thus, Saakashvili's military-political adventure and Russia's direct 
intervention in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, were prepared by all the logic of the 
previous stage of "defrosting Conflict ". During the "five-day war" South Ossetia with the 
help of the Russian Federation established its control over the territories of the former 
South Ossetian Autonomous District, which since the early 1990s and until 2008 was 
under the authority of Tbilisi (Akhalgori region, Liakhvsky corridor). About 15,000 ethnic 
Georgians were forced to flee South Ossetia. 
August 26, 2008 Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia. On 
September 17 of the same year, the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance between Russia and South Ossetia was signed (ratification in the State Duma 
was held on October 29), and on October 24 the Russian ambassador to Tskhinvali was 
appointed. In early 2009, the institution of the plenipotentiary representative of the 
President of South Ossetia in Russia was transformed into an embassy. 
At the same time, except Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru admitted the 
independence of South Ossetia. The United States, the EU countries, the UN, the OSCE, 
the Council of Europe, PACE, NATO are still considering South Ossetia as an integral part 
of Georgia. At the same time, representatives of South Ossetia can participate in 
multilateral consultations on stability and security in the Caucasus (known as the Geneva 
Process or the Geneva talks) that began on October 15, 2008. Representatives of the 
Russian Federation, the United States, the European Union, United Nations, OSCE, 
Georgia. South Ossetian and Abkhazian delegations are not considered official diplomatic 
missions, but they participate in the negotiation process on a wide range of humanitarian 
and security issues.  
From the all abovementioned, Georgian-South Ossetian relations from 1991 to 
2008 had the widest consequences, not only for the security of the Caucasus region, but 
also as a factor of political bargaining over the broadest spectrum of Georgia's interactions 
with Russia, many Western countries, and international organizations. 
Georgia, which had the opportunity to make political concessions in the 1990s. Its 
autonomies, could avoid separatist tendencies in the region, prevent bloodshed and 
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preserve territorial integrity. South Ossetia, in turn, could realize the right of peoples to 
self-determination in the context of internal development, i.e. Freely determine the ways 
of their political, Socio-economic development within the framework of a unified 
Georgia, but in the conditions of broad autonomy.68 With this approach, it would be 
possible to avoid a significant number of dead and injured on both sides.  
The policy of Russia in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict had a significant 
impact on the outcome of the relationship between Georgia and South Ossetia, and 
resulted in the formation on the political map of the world of two new Partially 
recognized states. The reasons for this were the change of the political course from the 
support of Georgia's territorial integrity to the sympathy for the self-proclaimed post-
Soviet territories, as well as the changed international situation related to the recognition 
of Kosovo's independence, the NATO enlargement in the east direction and anti-Russian 
sentiments in a number of post-Soviet states of the Caucasus region. 
In general, the situation around South Ossetia continues to be among the 
unsettled for the international community and represents a potential source of tension in 
the South Caucasus region. 
 
 
Abkhazia - Political geography 
 
The Republic of Abkhazia is located in northwestern part of the southern slope of 
the main Caucasian Range, south-eastern coast of the Black Sea. Its area is 8.7 thousand 
square kilometers, which is slightly less than the territory of Kosovo (10.877 thousand 
square kilometers). The capital is Sukhumi (Sukhum). In the northeast, Abkhazia borders 
on Russia (the Black Sea coast of the Krasnodar Territory), in the south-west – from 
Georgia (the Samegrelo region). There are serious differences regarding the population of 
the republic.  
According to the latest All-Union Population Census (1989) conducted on the eve 
of the disintegration of the USSR and the Georgian-Abkhaz armed conflict (1992-1993), 
the territory of the Abkhaz ASSR resided 525,061 people (9.7% of the population of the 
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entire Georgian SSR), of which 239,872 Georgians (45.7% of the population), 93,267 
Abkhazians (17.8%), 76,541 Armenians (14.6%), 74,913 Russians (14.3% %), 14.700 
Greeks (2.8%). However, a reservation is necessary. By Georgians, we mean the general 
designation of the Kartvelian ethnic groups adopted in state statistics, that is, the 
Georgians, the Mingrelians and the Svans.69 
In the Soviet census of 1926, all these three ethnic groups were counted 
separately, and 41,000 Megrelians, 19,900 Georgians and 6,600 Svan were recorded. In 
subsequent censuses, a general indication of ethnicity for Kartvelian Ethnic groups. 70 
As a result, The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict of 1992-1993, the population of 
Abkhazia has decreased almost threefold. According to the preliminary data of the 
population census conducted from February 21 to 28, 2011, 242,862 people. However, as a 
result of the final processing of the database, a little more than 2,000 repetitions were 
excluded. 
In accordance with the final census data, the population of Abkhazia is 240. 705 
people. Representatives of 91 ethnic groups reside in the republic. The most numerous are 
Abkhazians - 122. 069 people (50.71%), Russians - 22. 077 people (9.17%), Armenians - 
41. 864 people (17.39%), Georgians - 43. 166 people (17.93%). 3.201 people (1.33%) signed 
up as Megrelians. According to the Georgian statisticians, the population of Abkhazia is 
even smaller. It amounted about 179 thousand people in 2003 and 178 thousand people in 
2005. 
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia (Apsny), it is "a 
sovereign, democratic legal state, historically affirmed by the people's right to free self-
determination." As of June 2011, Abkhazia's independence was recognized by six States 
(Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu, Tuvalu). On September 17, 2008, Russia 
and Abkhazia signed the document on the friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance, 
which presupposed the Russian military and political presence in the republic. From the 
point of view of the Georgian legislation, Abkhazia is an autonomous republic within the 
Georgian state, its inalienable part. Georgian law emphasizes that "Georgia is an 
                                                          
69 Coding decisions based on expert analyses found in: Minahan, James. “The Former Soviet Union’s 
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Routledge), 2008. 
70 Coding based on Zurcher, Christoph. “The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and 
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independent, unified and indivisible state, as confirmed by the referendum held on March 
31, 1991. 
Throughout the country, including the Abkhaz ASSR and the former South 
Ossetian Autonomous Region, and the Act on the restoration of State Independence of 
Georgia of April 9, 1991 ". Article 8 proclaims the Abkhaz language as the state language 
on the territory of Abkhazia, and Article 5 establishes a representation from Abkhazia in 
the upper chamber of the Georgian parliament of the Senate "after Creation on the whole 
territory of Georgia of the proper conditions and the formation of local self-government 
bodies ". 
In accordance with the Law of Georgia "On the occupied territories" (article 2), 
the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia is a region that was subjected to illegal occupation 
by the Russian Federation, and the "government of the Autonomous Republic of 
Abkhazia", which is currently in Georgia, is the only legitimate authority in Georgia's 
view Power in Abkhazia. 
 
 
The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict 
 
The "Abkhazian problem" without exaggeration became the main "political 
trauma" of post-Soviet Georgia. The struggle of the Georgian national democrats for 
secession of Georgia from the USSR in the late 1980s, practically coincided with the 
aspirations of the Abkhaz for ethno-national self-determination.  
The most important event in the recent history of Georgia was a rally on April 9, 
1989 on Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi (overtaken with the use of the forces of the 
Transcaucasian Military District) – which was a response to the all-Abkhaz assembly in 
the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhazian princedom) on March 18, 
1989. The meeting demanded that the Central Committee of the CPSU review the status 
of Abkhazia in the composition of the Georgian SSR.  
Unlike Georgian-Ossetian conflict, actualized during the period of "perestroika", 
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict had deep historical roots. Abkhazians (self-name 
"Apsua") is an ethnos, close in language to the Adygeyan peoples of the North-Western 
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Caucasus.71 By the beginning of the XIX century. The Abkhazian princedom was under 
the formal protectorate of the Ottoman Empire.72 In 1810, the incorporation of the 
principality into the Russian Empire began. Until 1864, it enjoyed actual autonomy.  
Because of the anti-Russian uprising in 1866 (caused by the abolition of the 
Abkhazian principality and the transition to general imperial authority) and the events of 
the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Significant groups of Abkhaz were forced to 
emigrate outside the Russian Empire, at the end of XIX - early XX centuries. The Sukhumi 
district was a part of the Kutaisi province, and then subordinated to the Russian Caucasian 
administration in Tiflis73. In 1904-1917 years. Gagra and adjacent areas were part of the 
Sochi district of the Black Sea province. Thus, in the prerevolutionary period, the 
territory of today's Abkhazia was divided among various administrative-territorial entities 
of the Russian Empire.  
After the collapse of the Russian Empire and the formation on its territory of new 
independent states, including the Democratic Republic of Georgia, the "Abkhazian issue" 
became the point of collision between the White Guard armed forces of the South of 
Russia under the command of Anton Denikin and independent Georgia 
. In the summer of 1918, Abkhazia was included in the Georgian state. This 
process was accompanied by the entry of Georgian troops into the territory of Abkhazia 
and the dispersal of the Abkhaz People's Council. The hard nationalism of the Menshevik 
government of Georgia contributed to the Bolshevization of Abkhazia. In March 1921, the 
Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia was proclaimed. In December of the same year, she 
entered into a union agreement in the composition of Georgia - already a Soviet one. In 
1931, the Abkhaz ASSR was created within the Georgian 55 SSR. Under Stalin, the 
Georgian Republican leadership held a strict policy of discrimination against the Abkhaz 
population. In the years 1937-1938, but subsequently, in 1945-1946 discriminatory 
measures against the Abkhazian population were significantly relaxed, media appeared in 
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the Abkhaz language, national education was revived. However, the policy of ethnic 
discrimination has borne its negative results.  Moreover, the economic policy of the 
Georgian SSR in 1960s-1980s, based on mass attraction, was aimed at changing the ethno-
demographic balance in favor of the Abkhaz population. And if in 1959 there were 158 
221 Georgians living on the territory of Abkhazia (Abkhazians - 61,193), in 1970 - 
213,322 Georgians (Abkhazians - 83,907) 44. In 1979, Georgians constituted 43.8% of the 
population of the autonomy. "The policy of repression of the Abkhaz language and 
culture, carried out by absolutely specific persons of Georgian nationality (and not only 
by high officials, but also by ordinary performers), formed a generalized" enemy image "in 
relation to the mass of Georgian settlers who also possessed Social privileges, states 
modern Georgian researcher Gia Nodia74. 
The Abkhazian population began to connect their hopes for ethno-national self-
determination with the withdrawal from Georgia. In 1957, 1967, and in the years 1977, 
Representatives of the Abkhaz ethno-national intelligentsia prepared appeals to the 
leadership of the Soviet Union for requests for secession from the Georgian SSR and 
membership in the RSFSR (or the formation of an independent Abkhazian SSR).  
At the end of 1977, the so-called "Letter 130" was sent to the allied authorities 
(signatories were representatives of the Abkhazian intelligentsia).75 This was not the first 
surge of mass discontent in Abkhazia. The authors of the "Letters 130" raised the issue of 
the withdrawal of the Abkhazian SSR from the Georgia n SSR with the subsequent 
constitutional consolidation of this secession. On February 22, 1978, this appeal became 
the subject of consideration at the Abkhaz bureau of the regional committee called "On 
the wrong views and slanderous fabrications contained in a collective letter of December 
10, 1977". However, the decision of the regional committee caused a harsh reaction of the 
population.  
On March 29, 1978, a gathering of residents of the village of Bzyb and several 
villages of Gudautsky district in support of "Letters 130". 76Moreover, the demand of the 
meeting was to (it was also put forward during the mass actions of 1967) to end the 
migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (this was encouraged by the 
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authorities in Tbilisi). In 1978, when The Constitution of the Abkhazian SSR adopted a 
compromise solution, the Abkhaz language along with the Georgian and Russian became 
state on the territory of the autonomy. At the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Georgia (June 27, 1978), the then first secretary, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, spoke out against the "excesses" of the Georgian Communists in the 
"Abkhaz question."  
Thus, the "Russian factor" in the Abkhaz movement arose long before the modern 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The Abkhaz leaders repeatedly proclaimed their unity with 
the peoples of the North Caucasus, and therefore appealed in their demands (more to the 
authorities of the USSR) about the desirability of including their autonomous republic in 
the composition of Russia (which included seven North-Caucasian autonomies). With the 
beginning of the ethno-national self-determination of Georgians during the "perestroika" 
period, the "Abkhazian issue" also aggravated. 
In March 1989, in Village Lyhny Gudautsky district was held a 30-thousand 
gathering, which was announced on the need to return Abkhazia "political, economic and 
cultural sovereignty within the Leninist idea of a federation". Since 1989, until today, the 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict of modern times has gone through several stages. 
The first stage (March 1989 - July 1992) - political and legal. Unlike South Ossetia, 
the conflict did not begin with an ideological justification of mutual ethnic claims, but as a 
dispute on the legality (illegitimacy) of the entry of Abkhazia in the composition of 
Georgia and the legal justification (unreasonableness) of the ethno-national self-
determination of Georgia and Abkhazia.  
At the first stage, the struggle was not so much between Tbilisi and Sukhumi as 
between the Abkhaz and Georgian communities in Abkhazia itself. The Georgian-
Abkhazian confrontation was also more ethnic than mosaic in comparison with South 
Ossetia. About 5 thousand representatives from the Armenian, Russian And the Greek 
communities of Abkhazia.77 Abkhaz nationalists drew public attention to the fact that 
opponents "Georgianization" of Abkhazia is not only ethnic Abkhazians, but also 
Russians, Armenians, Greeks. For the ideological and the legal basis for the national self-
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determination of Abkhazia was made by the leader of the Russian community of 
Abkhazia, the historian and archaeologist Yuri Voronov.  
It is wrong to talk about Abkhaz separatism in 1989 and early 1992. At this time, 
the Georgians themselves acted as separatists in relation to the USSR. While the Abkhaz 
counteracted the Georgian national radicals, and defended the existing at that time a 
single union state. 
The second stage (July 1992 - July 1994) - military-political. A fence between the 
first and the second stage was the decision of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia to abolish 
the Constitution of the Abkhaz ASSR in 1978 and the restoration of the Constitutional 
Project of 1925. 
The abolition of the legal framework for Abkhazia's entry into Georgia and the 
response of the Georgian authorities - the introduction of troops of the State Council of 
Georgia into the territory of Abkhazia - marked the beginning of a major armed Collision. 
The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict from inter-ethnic confrontation in the territory of 
Abkhazia grows into a military clash between the Georgian state and the rebel territory. 
Since that time, the Abkhazian national movements main goal was to secede from the 
independent Georgia. In the fall of 1993, Georgia suffered a military defeat and in fact 
loses its control over a significant part of the territory of Abkhazia. Only "Abkhazian 
Svaneti" (Kodori Gorge) remained until August 2008, outside Sukhumi's control. 
On 14 May 1994, the conflicting parties, with the participation of Russia, signed 
the Moscow agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation Forces. In July 1994, a peacekeeping 
operation of Russian forces began on the territory of Abkhazia. It became the boundary 
between the second and the third stage of the conflict. Since the operation was carried out 
under the mandate of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, it was assumed, in addition 
to Russian military units, the participation of contingents of other member countries of 
the Commonwealth.  
However, before the actual completion of the operation In August 2008, it was 
carried out only by the Russian peacekeeping contingent.58 Peacekeepers were deployed 
in a "security zone" on a 12-kilometer territory on both sides of the Inguri River, in the 
Gali district of Abkhazia and in the Zugdidi district of Georgia. On July 21, 1994, the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution No. 937 on the definition of the format of the 
Organization of the Oversight Mission in Georgia (UNMIH). The mandate of UNMIH was 
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built on the basis of the Moscow agreements. Resolution No. 937 underlined "the key 
importance of progress in the negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations and 
with the help of Russia as an intermediary". 
During military operations, 4,000 Georgians (1,000 people were missing) and more 
than 3,000 Abkhazians perished. The losses of Abkhazia's economy from the conflict 
amounted to 10.7 billion US dollars. Until the mid-1990s, on the territory of the republic, 
remained many mines, which claimed the lives of 700 people. About 250 thousand 
Georgians (almost half of the pre-war population) were forced to flee Abkhazia, but later 
about 55-60 thousand returned In the Gali district in the eastern part of the republic 
(before the war it was the most Georgian-populated, the return of refugees did not occur 
to other regions).78 
The third stage (July 1994 - July 2006) - diplomatic, during which attempts were 
made to resolve the consequences of the Georgian-Abkhaz armed confrontation. These 
attempts were made, first, in the UN format. The first round of negotiations between the 
conflicting parties under the auspices of the United Nations was held on November 28 - 
December 1, 1993 (hence its name - the "Geneva process", which should not be confused 
with the October 2008 consultations on stability and security in the Caucasus).  
Since 1997, the special representative of the Secretary General the UN 
coordinating the "Geneva Process" and the work of UNMIH, opened its office in Tbilisi. In 
1993, the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General for Georgia was established 
(initially, the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, France). In 1997, he began 
his work of the Coordination Council and the three working groups on the non-use of 
violence, the return of temporarily displaced persons and economic problems within the 
framework of the "Geneva Process". The last meeting of the Coordination Council took 
place in May 2006 after almost a five-year break. This break was caused by an 
exacerbation Ethno-political situation in the Kodori Gorge in autumn 2001. However, 
after the Georgian military units entered the upper Kodori Gorge (demilitarized zone, 
under the terms of this document) in violation of the Moscow agreements of 1994, the 
Coordination Council was no longer functioning. In 2002, the German draft diplomat 
Dieter Boden presented the peace project of eight items "Basic Principles for the 
Distribution of Powers between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" (the "Boden Plan"), which 
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envisaged the creation of a sovereign Abkhazia within the single federal state of Georgia. 
The conflicting parties did not adopt the plan. 
Secondly, Russia made independent attempts to resolve the conflict. Since late 
1994, unofficially and since 1996, officially, the Russian Federation, together with 
Georgia, has in fact initiated the introduction of harsh socio-economic sanctions against 
Abkhazia. These actions were legalized by the decision of the Council of Heads of State of 
the CIS "On measures to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia" of January 19, 1996. 
Faced with the Chechen separatist challenge, Moscow initially supported Tbilisi's 
intentions to restore Georgia's territorial integrity. In 1997, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation, Yevgeny Primakov, proposed for the negotiation process the 
formula "common state" and tried to convince him of the need for its adoption by 
Sukhumi. However, the attempts of the Georgian leadership to unilaterally change the 
existing status quo and "defreeze the conflict" (May 1998, Gali district, October 2001, 
Kodori gorge) changed the position of Russian diplomacy unilaterally, without 
considering the interests of the Russian Federation. Already in 1999-2000. Moscow 
significantly weakened the sanctions regime against Abkhazia (but finally abolished them 
only in March 2008).  
In March 2003, the presidents of the Russian Federation and Georgia Vladimir 
Putin and Eduard Shevardnadze signed the Sochi agreements, which envisage the creation 
of three working groups: on the return of refugees initially to the Gali district, the 
restoration of the Sochi-Tbilisi railway line through Abkhazia and the renovation of the 
Inguri hydroelectric power station. However, the subsequent "Rose Revolution" and the 
coming to power of President Saakashvili in Georgia (January 2004) made the 
implementation of these agreements impossible. In May 2004, the Georgian president 
said: "We will return Abkhazia in my presidential term". 
Since that time, the negotiation process began to degrade steadily. During the ten 
years of negotiations, the initial positions of the Georgian (The territorial integrity of 
Georgia and the return of all refugees to the entire territory of Abkhazia) and the Abkhaz 
side (the independence of Abkhazia with the return of only those who did not participate 
in military operations against the Abkhaz forces) did not undergo significant changes. 
Compromise political formulas were not found. The conflicting parties managed to 
establish a constructive partnership only in the process of exploitation of the Inguri 
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hydroelectric power station (the largest energy facility in the entire Caucasus region, built 
in 1977; 60% of the generated electricity goes to Georgia; 40% to Abkhazia).  
The fourth stage (July 2006 - 2008) is an attempt to "unfreeze" the Georgian-
Abkhaz conflict. The border between the third and fourth stages was the Kodori 
operation of Mikhail Saakashvili. From that moment, the process of negotiations between 
the parties of the conflict was finally stopped. The Georgian authorities tried to change 
the format of the negotiation process by presenting the so-called "government of 
Abkhazia in exile" (consisting of ethnic Georgians) as the sole legitimate representative of 
the republic. 79What Concerns the authorities of the Abkhazian de facto state, the 
Georgian president did his best to present them exclusively as Russian puppets. According 
to the Georgian President (July 16, 2006), "These are not ethnic conflicts (confrontations 
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. - CM.). These are political conflicts imposed on us. They 
relate to the attempts of the post-Soviet forces, the remnants of the old Soviet imperialist 
thinking, to gain control over at least some of the neighboring territories ... ".  
In the years 2007-2008, The Georgian authorities undertook a whole series of 
military and political provocations (including military flights) in Abkhazia, which 
violently violated the Moscow agreements of 1994. In turn, Russia also violated the statute 
by introducing at the end of May 2008 into the territory of Abkhazia a unit of the railway 
troops (not Stipulated by the 1994 Agreements) and destroying Georgian unmanned 
vehicles (April 2008). During the military operations in South Ossetia on August 9, 2008, 
the Abkhaz armed forces opened the "second front" and, without encountering harsh 
resistance, took control on the Kodori Gorge. August 26th in 2008, the Russian Federation 
recognized the independence of Abkhazia, and on August 30, 2008, Georgia secede from 
the 1994 Moscow Agreements.  
After August 2008, a new, fifth stage of the conflict begins. Its fundamental 
difference is recognition of the national independence of Abkhazia of the Russian 
Federation and Nicaragua and the beginning of diplomatic consultations on overcoming 
the consequences of the "five-day war". Like South Ossetia, Abkhazia is represented at the 
Geneva consultations on security and stability in the Caucasus.  
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However - this is an unofficial representation, because the United States, the EU, 
and its individual members, as well as the UN, OSCE, NATO, the Council of Europe do 
not recognize the independence of Abkhazia. At the same time, we cannot fail to note 
more frequent visits (in comparison with South Ossetia) of various European diplomats, 
UN officials in Abkhazia. At an informal level, diplomats from various countries recognize 
the existence of certain prerequisites for the development of Abkhaz statehood (in 
Difference from South Ossetia). Russia has established diplomatic relations with 
Abkhazia, has appointed its ambassador to Sukhumi. Currently, preparations are being 
made for the establishment of the territory of Abkhazia the naval base of the Black Sea 
Fleet (in Ochamchira) and the air base (in Gudauta).80 
Moreover, in our opinion, given the change in the political climate and the regime 
in Georgia, it is possible for Russia dialogue and cooperation at the regional and 
international levels. In our view, the restoration of the EAS of Russia and Georgia is 
beneficial for both states. important conditions are the restoration of trust and mutual 
understanding between the peoples of the former Georgian SSR, the rejection of the 
policy of provocation, awareness of their own national interests based on experience of 
history and modernity and plans. 
One of the components of Russia's national interests is the creation of a space for 
peaceful dialogue in the Caucasus complex ethnopolitical problems. 81Having in its 
composition such a complex and explosive region as the North Caucasus, it is extremely 
necessary for Russia. Peace in the Caucasus is a complex problem, political, economic, 
cultural. The Caucasus is a space of unrealized economic opportunities, a crossroads 
between Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. In the confrontation in the Caucasus, there 
will never be winners, no people will benefit from this. Therefore, restoration is so 
important Dialogue and cooperation between Russia and Georgia, between their 
historically and culturally close peoples.82 
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Nagorno-Karabakh Republic: Political Geography 
 
The dynamics of the Karabakh conflict, which led to the creation of a new 
unrecognized state entity - the Nagorno Karabakh Republic based on its results in the 
South Caucasus, clearly fits into the world logic of the processes of national construction 
and the emergence of new de facto state entities. Such ethnopolitical conflicts are not 
unique either for the South Caucasus (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), nor for the post-
Soviet space (Transnistria), nor for the region of the Far East and the Mediterranean 
(North Cyprus), nor for the Balkans (Kosovo), nor for other regions of the world (Eritrea, 
Bangladesh, Aceh, etc.).  
The long-term state of "no peace, no war" around Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
inability of the conflicting parties and mediators for the second decade to achieve a final 
settlement are due not only to the complex geopolitical background and regional rivalry 
of superpowers. This is primarily a result of the lack of will and desire for a settlement 
among the conflicting parties themselves. For all its specificity, the Karabakh conflict 
clearly fits into many "classical" ethnopolitical and / or ethnoterritorial conflicts associated 
with the processes of national construction and ethnic disengagement.  
From the number of ethno-territorial conflicts, namely secessionist and irredentist 
conflicts, accompanied by the emergence of new De facto states, are considered in 
political science as the extreme and most fierce form of the development of the 
ethnopolitical conflict. In such a conflict, "a compromise solution is impossible in 
principle; Conflict can be either suppressed by force, or as a result it will lead to the 
destruction of the original poly-ethnic society through its dissolution into two new 
societies or transformation into a fundamentally different society after the emigration 
(deportation) of a conflict-free minority.83 
Accordingly, with reference to the Karabakh conflict, it is necessary to consider 
the world experience of attempts to resolve this kind of complex ethnopolitical conflicts 
that have passed through an active military phase. Such ethnopolitical and ethno-
territorial conflicts have almost never been resolved through a parity compromise 
agreement, equally satisfying all sides.  
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The world history of the last century practically does not know such examples, 
except for very exotic cases when conflicts did not reach such bitterness, had a small area 
or were not priority for the conflicting parties. Conversely, widely advertised compromise 
agreements, which in their time caused a worldwide resonance and support of a 
significant part of the conflicting parties, often led only to more bloody outbreaks of 
violence, after which the conflict continued to develop, but in even more difficult 
circumstances.  
A classic example is the Oslo Accords of 1993 on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, which not only did not lead to the achievement of the long-awaited peace in the 
land of Palestine, but became the prologue to the death of the chief architect of the peace 
process, Yitzhak Rabin, a new round of the intifada, Militants on Israel, the Lebanon War 
of 2006, the Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in late 2008, and the democratic entry 
of Hamas into the Gaza Strip. Too often Such an idealistic and "compromise" settlement 
based on the "ideafix" "the desire for peace without understanding the realities of the 
peace process led to very different results than originally planned." 
In all other cases, ethnopolitical and territorial conflicts, especially those 
connected with secession and ethnic delimitation of the parties, had only a very small set 
of scenarios that led (or, to the contrary, still never led) to a final decision or Long-term 
peace. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 
 
The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) is in the southeastern part of the Lesser 
Caucasus in the eastern part of the Karabakh plateau and on the Karabakh plain, which 
forms the bulk of the Kura-Araks lowland. Most of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory is 
marked by a severely cut mountain relief (The low parts are the eastern parts of the two 
regions - Mardakert and Martuninsky). The capital of the NKR is the city of Stepanakert. 
The NKR stands out especially among other unrecognized entities. The historical 
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precursor of the NKR was The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) within 
the Azerbaijan SSR with an area of 4.4 thousand square meters. Km. At the same time, the 
territory declared by the NKR at the time of the proclamation included, in addition to the 
former NKAR, the Shaumyan district with an area of 701 square meters that was not part 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Because of the war with Azerbaijan in 
1991-1994. The NKR lost control over the Shahumyan district, as well as on parts of the 
Mardakert and Martuni districts (a total of 327 square kilometers).84 
The authorities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic are considering these 
territories as "occupied by Azerbaijan". For today The NKR authorities control 92.5% of 
the territory of the former NKAR, after that the armed forces of the unrecognized 
republic, with the support of Armenia, occupied the territories of the 5 adjacent regions of 
Azerbaijan (Lachin, Kelbajar, Kubatly, Zangelan and Dzhebrail), and 2 districts partially 
(Agdam and Fizuli). This is 8% of the territory of Azerbaijan.85 
Outside the former NKAO, the NKR authorities with the support of Yerevan 
control the land area of 7.4 thousand square kilometers. In Karabakh and Armenia these 
territories are called a "security belt" (or "Security zone"). More rarely - "liberated 
territories" (this definition is used mainly by politicians and political scientists in the 
NKR). Consequently, today, under the control of the NKR, there were altogether 13.4% of 
the territory that is considered by official Baku and the international community 
Azerbaijan. According to Kimitaka Matsuzato's just remark, "most of the newly acquired 
territory of the NKR is covered by mountains and Sparsely populated.  
True, these mountains have an important strategic importance - the Lachin 
corridor connects Karabakh with Armenia, and in the northern part of this mountainous 
area, there are water sources serving both Karabakh and Azerbaijan. " Lachin provides an 
effective link between Yerevan and Stepanakert (Economy, military sphere, international 
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contacts). That is why the importance of the Lachin corridor is also high in the 
negotiation process on the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.86  
Thus, the third point of the "basic principles" proposed by the mediating countries 
in the negotiations concerns the establishment of a "corridor, linking Armenia and 
Karabakh. " Let's add to this the output of the NKR and Armenia to the Iranian border. 
Meanwhile, other occupied territories do not have the same meaning that they are often 
attributed to Azerbaijani media and political statements. So, despite the control over 
Agdam, the capital of the NKR Stepanakert was within reach of Azerbaijani army missiles, 
which was the reason for the actual shutdown of the airport, located near Stepanakert. 
The economic role of the newly acquired territories is also low, and their economic 
development is extremely slow. 
According to the latest All-Union Population Census of 1989, 189,029 people lived 
in the territory of the NKAR, of which 145,450 Armenians, 40,632 Azerbaijanis and 2,417 
representatives of Slavic ethnic groups (Russians and Ukrainians). In addition, 21,500 
people resided in the Shahumyan district (in September 1991, which was part of the 
NKR), of which 17,000 were Armenians, 3,500 were Azerbaijanis and 1, - Russian and 
Ukrainian).  
The census data caused reasonable doubts among the statisticians, since it was 
conducted at the height of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, when between the two 
union republics, as well as between various settlements of the Nagorno Karabakh 
Autonomous Region - Stepanakert, massive movements and exchanges of population took 
place. In Azerbaijan in October 1990, an additional census was conducted in 51 
settlements of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, populated by ethnic 
Azerbaijanis. It recorded 46 thousand Azerbaijanis (Or 24%).  
However, according to both the all-Union and alternative Azerbaijani census, the 
number of the Azerbaijani community did not exceed a quarter of the total population of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. The Karabakh conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh led to a serious change in the ethno-demographic situation in the NKR. Unlike 
all other unrecognized entities on the territory of the former USSR, the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic is almost monoethnic. According to the 2005 census, 137,737 people 
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lived in Karabakh, of which 137.380 were Armenians (that is, 99.74%), Russians - 171 
(0.1%), Greeks - 22 people (0.02%), Ukrainians – 21 (0.02%), Georgians - 12 (0.01%) and 
Azerbaijanis - 6 (0.05%).  
In 2009, the population of the NKR was 141.1 thousand people. In accordance 
with the Constitution, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (Artsakh), is a "sovereign, 
democratic, legal, social state". Given the geopolitical features of the existence of the NKR 
(occupation of Azerbaijani territories outside the NKAR and loss of lands of the former 
NKAO and Shahumyan district), Article 142 of the Constitution defines its sovereignty as 
follows: "Until the restoration of the integrity of the state territory of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic and the specification of borders, public power is exercised in the 
territory actually under the jurisdiction of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. " 
The NKR to date has not been recognized by any of the UN member states, 
including Armenia. The statehood of Nagorno-Karabakh is recognized only by other 
unrecognized entities of the post-Soviet space. At the same time, official Yerevan supports 
the ethnopolitical self-determination of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, financially, 
diplomatically, and militarily supports the unrecognized republic.  
The circulation of the national currency of the Republic of Armenia (dram) is 
carried out on the territory of the NKR, and the Karabakhians have Armenian and foreign 
passports for moving around the world. At the same time, the Armenian Diaspora and 
lobbying structures in the US, Russia, and European states play an important role in 
reporting the position of the NKR to the world community. With their help, the NKR 
diplomatic service carries out wide international activities, has a network of 
representative offices abroad (USA, France, Germany, Australia, countries of the Middle 
East, Russia, Armenia). 87 
The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is the only unrecognized entity on the territory 
of the former USSR, which receives funding from the US Congress to implement social 
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projects88. From the point of view of the Azerbaijani authorities, the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict is the result of aggression and territorial expansion by Armenia. Thus, the 
problem is interpreted as an interstate conflict, and not the result of ethno-political self-
determination of the Armenian community of Karabakh.  
The Nagorno-Karabakh autonomy was abolished by the Azerbaijani authorities on 
the eve of the collapse of the USSR. On October 18, 1991, the Constitutional Act of 
Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan was adopted, and on November 26 of the 
same year the "Resolution on the abolition of the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh" was 
issued. At the same time, the official Baku gave the capital of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Region Stepanakert the Turkic name of Khankendi.89 Before that, the 
Azerbaijani authorities decided to unite the two neighboring regions of the republic - 
Shahumyan and Kasum Ismayilovsky - into one Goranboy region (decision of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani SSR of January 14, 1991). According 
to Article 7 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, it is a "secular unitary republic". Azerbaijan 
Basic Law Does not imply any kind of political and legal subjectness for Nagorno-
Karabakh, although in December 1998 an autonomous republican status with limited 
powers was granted to Nakhichevan. 
According to Bruno Coppieters, "in open form, the Azerbaijani government did 
not offer to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh problem on a federal basis. His proposal to give 
Nagorno-Karabakh "the highest level of autonomy" does not go beyond some form of 
decentralization or Transfer of authority to the subordinate level ".  
 Azerbaijan took a step towards the middle of the bridge from this position and 
said that they are ready for flexibility, having in mind various models of self-government 
for the population in the Karabakh region within the Azerbaijan Republic. That is, 
flexibility within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. " Unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan does 
not have a special power structure - the government or parliament "in exile" - which Baku 
would consider as a legitimate representative of the interests of Nagorno-Karabakh. At the 
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same time, the authorities see their main partner as "the Azerbaijani community Nagorno-
Karabakh region of the Azerbaijan Republic ", established on March 24, 1992. 
 In 2006 the community was registered with the Ministry of Justice as a public 
association, and its first congress was held in Baku on June 5, On August 31 of the same 
year Ilham Aliyev issued a presidential decree "On measures to improve the material and 
technical Support of the Public Association" The Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Region of the Republic of Azerbaijan ". Over the past several years, the 
Azerbaijani authorities have intensified contacts between the leaders of this organization 
and embassies accredited in Baku. On December 16, 2009, the community prepared a 
letter to US President Barack Obama with a protest against the allocation of funds to the 
"Karabakh separatists" through official channels. 
The complex dynamics of the negotiation process and peaceful settlement will 
directly influence the prospects for the preservation of the statehood of the unrecognized 
Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this does not mean that the representatives of the NKR 
themselves will play the role of passive contemplatives in this movement. The readiness of 
the "great powers" to turn the provision about "intermediate status" into something legally 
working and binding, or, on the contrary, to leave it as an unimportant fiction, depends 
on the quality of management institutions, legislation, and acceptance of decisions by the 
elite of the republic. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
The role and interest of global and regional players In South Caucasus 
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    The geopolitical role of the South Caucasus is really unique - both in terms of its 
potential and geographic location. Such an intermediate position of the South Caucasus 
determines its unique opportunities both in implementing the plans for the 
modernization of the Middle East (BSW) and in establishing a constructive dialogue, with 
Europe. It must also be taken into account, that the South Caucasian republics, formerly 
part of the Soviet Union, are secular states that are much closer in their "state mentality" 
to Western countries, than their southern neighbors. Their population is far less religious 
than the population of many countries of the Near and Middle East, they are largely 
associated with European culture and European values, and therefore these countries can 
serve as a kind of dampener, that is, to some extent weaken the influence of religious 
fanaticism and extremism, out of the southern countries of the region, to prevent the 
spread of Extremist and fundamentalist ideas and trends and, ultimately, to make a 
tangible contribution to the modernization of the WBG countries, to the realization of 
this geopolitical project of global significance. 
      In addition, the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, which are 
increasingly regarded as the northern extremity of the Middle East, are much easier to 
"democratize" than the rest of the region, especially since most of them were and continue 
to be countries with sufficiently developed democratic institutions, that awere close  to 
Western models over the past 15 years of independent existence. And these countries, like 
their western patrons and sponsors count, can and should serve with the support of their 
"democratic image" by Western governments and the media (as is observed, in particular, 
with regard to Georgia) is a vivid example for "difficult" countries. In the direction of 
"west-east", the South Caucasus is often regarded as the central part of the so-called, 
Mediterranean-Black Sea - which includes the Balkan states, the countries of South-
Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus proper and the countries of Central Asia. In 
particular, the problems of this extended belt, representing the southern part of the 
Europe, is subject of serious research and was discussed at a number of international 
conferences of recent years, with the participation of the Institute of Europe of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Strategic Assessments and Analysis, the 
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Rostov State University, representatives of the analytical centers of the South Caucasus 
and Central Asia, the Balkan countries and countries of South-Eastern Europe.90 
     And one more feature of the South Caucasus, which carries an important 
geopolitical load. It’s not a secret that certain forces in the West consider the South 
Caucasus as the part of the "sanitary cordon" (the "iron bridge") from the Baltic to the 
Caspian and, further, to the Chinese border that is trying to build around Russia and 
thereby neutralize its attempts to restore, at least in part, its former influence. But what 
does this lead to? First of all, to the growth of Russia's fears for its territorial integrity. It is 
difficult to separate the South Caucasus from the republics of the North Caucasus that are 
part of the Russian Federation. A serious irritant for Russia in this respect may be not only 
the activation of the separatist forces in the North Caucasus republics, heated from the 
outside, but also the extension of similar processes to other republics of the Southern and 
Central Federal Districts of Russia.  
       Historically, Russia has always been very influential in all the countries of the 
South Caucasus. This concerns both civilizational influence and economy, social and 
cultural spheres. With the help of Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia  became 
industrialized countries, with high-tech and competitive industrial potential, which made 
a significant contribution to the overall industrial potential of the USSR, with a developed 
agrarian sector. They created an advanced system of education, training of scientific and 
Engineering and technical personnel, health, social security, national culture. Fraternal, 
friendly ties between the peoples of the Russian Federation and the Caucasian peoples 
were far away not an empty sound. Even today they play a significant role in the mutual 
relations of our peoples. But at the same time, the implementation of plans to build 
"bridges", "cordons" and other defensive objects of geopolitical architecture on the 
western and southern borders of Russia, the involvement of the states of the South 
Caucasus and other CIS countries in the military-political bloc of NATO, inevitably 
require appropriate processing of their population and this process, as a rule, is 
accompanied by the formation of the image of Russia, if not as hostile, in any case, an 
unfriendly country.  
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    In the countries of the South Caucasus, this unfriendly strategy towards Russia 
has been intensified and continues to be amplified by those mistakes, in relation to the 
Caucasian policy in general and the individual republics, in particular those that were 
committed in the time of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and many of which retain their 
destructive impact today. 
Without adequate ideological processing of the population, without the support of 
the majority of citizens of anti-Russian motives in the policy pursued by the ruling elite of 
the state, all these "obstructing" Russian imperial policies and "constructions" and 
functions will cost nothing. After all, for Russia it is dangerous not only Georgia's 
membership in NATO, but the main danger is that the Georgian army (primarily) and the 
Georgian people are deliberately taught (and already accustomed, judging by the results of 
opinion polls) to the idea that Russia is the main enemy of Georgia.  
      It is clear that in addition to the threat of violation of Russia's territorial 
integrity, attempts to create a "cordon sanitaire" around it carry a different, even more 
real threat: isolation of the country from historically formed areas of its vital interests, an 
artificial break of ties with the countries of the so-called near abroad, weakening of the 
country's political and economic independence and undermining its sovereignty. And in 
this sense, sovereignty, among other things, is "a synonym for competitiveness." So the 
"construction" of similar "defensive fortifications" around Russia in the form of planting 
pro-Western and unfriendly regimes in neighboring countries carries, in themselves, in 
addition to geopolitical, also the geo-economic burden. It should be emphasized, that this 
is not just a question of the pro-Western orientation of the states of the South Caucasus. 
In the Russian political elite, at least in the greater part, like representatives of the Russian 
authorities, the cooperation of the states of the South Caucasus with the West is by no 
means regarded as a manifestation of hostility toward Russia. At the end, the Russian 
authorities have a firm understanding that there is no alternative to cooperation with 
Western countries, with the European Union and NATO, that the confrontational path 
with the West for modern Russia, as well as for the states of the South Caucasus, is 
unacceptable.91 
     It is on this, in the last two decades that Russia's policy is being built in relation 
to the United States and European countries, the pan-European and Euro-Atlantic 
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institutions. But we are talking about the unacceptability of such a pro-Western policy, 
which they are trying to build on an anti-Russian foundation, as is observed, in particular, 
in the policy of the current leadership of Georgia. 92Azerbaijan and Armenia also in their 
official foreign policy actively cooperate with Western countries and institutions, 
including with NATO, but not on Russia, but maintaining normal, friendly ties with it 
and trying to resolve the emerging bilateral problems calmly, without unnecessary 
hysteria and without Anti-Russian information attacks on political or diplomatic 
channels. 93 
      The geopolitical significance of the South Caucasus is also indisputable. Events 
that unfold around Kosovo and go far beyond the framework of the Balkan region.94 An 
important international precedent is being created in Kosovo, it can affect not only the 
situation that is developing around the self-proclaimed republics of the South Caucasus, 
but, ultimately, it can contribute to new geopolitical cataclysms and a new redistribution 
of the world, the positive things that the states of Europe have achieved after the "cold 
war". The South Caucasus in this sense can become one of the main catalysts of these 
destabilizing processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geo-economic role of the region 
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     The South Caucasus is also a notable region in the world economic system. Its 
economic potential allows us to assert that the region will by no means be a passive 
consumer in the world economy system, but it is capable of contributing to the world 
economy, the world's scientific and production potential. 
    The geo-economic role of the region is determined by its energy Value.95 First 
of all, it concerns the Caspian oil and gas reserves - Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, the 
Caspian states of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan96. Caspian oil 
and gas are also called upon to ensure the diversification of hydrocarbon supplies to 
Europe. In addition, due to its favorable geographical position, in fact, in the center of the 
Eurasian continent, the region has unique communication capabilities.97 Its transport 
communications - existing and projected - connect the North and South, West and East. 
Those who control the South Caucasus will have the opportunity not only to gain 
considerable profits and secure one of the leading places in transcontinental 
transportation, but also to solve in their own interests many political tasks. 
     It is also important that the region is located between two Seas - Black in the 
west (Georgia) and Caspian in the east (Azerbaijan). There are well-equipped ports and a 
corresponding port and shore structure, which allows for the handling of bulk and dry 
cargoes, as well as container transportation. Another important feature of the region is 
that countries of the  South Caucasus has a significantly developed industrial and scientific 
potential, sufficiently professional staff, a developed system of education and training.98 
Especially it concerns to such countries as Georgia and Armenia. Azerbaijan, whose 
economy for many years was and is today the oil sector and who prepared and supplied oil 
workers for many oil-bearing regions of the Soviet Union, managed to save a significant 
part of them and in this respect is in a  better position. 
 
 
Geostrategic significance of the South Caucasus 
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It should also be noted that the geostrategic significance of the SouthCaucasus, 
first of all, in connection with the plans implemented by Washington "Democratization" 
of the Middle East (which, as the international practice of recent years shows, not only 
does not exclude the use of military force, but also rely on it - Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and 
other "naughty" regimes). Another important factor is the provision of naval control over 
the waters of the Black and Caspian seas.99 Over the Black Sea, the United States and other 
NATO countries have already established their almost total control, especially considering 
the unenviable position of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In the Caspian Sea, where recently 
the Caspian Flotilla of the Soviet Navy dominated the USSR, such control was established 
over a significant part of the water area. At the same time, the geostrategic aspect of the 
Caspian Sea is that today there are naval groups of all five Caspian states - in addition to 
Azerbaijan, as well as Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran. And, thus, which for 
centuries has been peaceful, the Caspian Sea has real chances to become potentially even 
more conflict-dangerous than the Black Sea.100 
     Geo-strategic "arguments" in assessing the South Caucasus are also the threat of 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the fight against international terrorism, a barrier to 
the influence of Moscow and Beijing, which Washington is trying to build, and which 
does not exclude, among other things, the adoption of military measures.101 Among the 
preparatory measures for such a plan are, in particular: the operational development of 
the theater of operations and the development of its operational infrastructure, the 
maintenance of military factions, military bases and facilities in the countries of the 
region, partly on an ongoing basis, in part by creating the possibility for rapid deployment 
of military groupings, reconnaissance of territories and airspace of neighboring states 
using technical means located in the countries of the South Caucasus, as well as increasing 
this cooperation with NATO, which has the ultimate goal of including all the states of the 
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region as members of this military alliance "with global responsibility," as it positions 
itself at present and appropriately builds its policy and military strategy.102 
 
 
       US National Interests and Strategies 
 
 
While analyzing the activity of the USA in the South Caucasus, it is necessary to 
mention three main factors, that determine the political line of the United States and are 
its driving force.  
First of all,  region has a noticeable lack of a coherent policy of both the US and 
the West as a whole. One of the most revealing examples of recent times is NATO's 
expansion in the South Caucasus, which is accompanied by a shortage of planning, 
inappropriate preparation and a lack of political will, as can be seen in Georgia's desire to 
join NATO.  
    The second defining aspect of US activities in the South Caucasus is the fact 
that, within the framework of Western policy, it is restrained and limited by the 
competing interests of various Western players. This can be clearly seen in the example of 
a characteristic conflict of national interests of the EU member states and the United 
States, as well as between individual EU countries. Although, the presence of competing 
national interests is a natural phenomenon, that reflects the often conflicting political 
priorities of various Western players, this situation as a whole, limited the effectiveness of 
the activities of both the West and the United States, and impeded the establishment of a 
real, long-term consistency, at the strategic level of Western policy.  
    The third and most actual factor of activity - US has become more dynamic and 
active involvement of the West as a bloc. In the South Caucasus, this new level of 
dynamic activity is particularly reflected in the creation of the Eastern Partnership 
initiative after the war in Georgia in 2008. In the same time, this more frequent activity of 
the US was boosted by the new EU priorities, aimed at expanding Europe's involvement, 
its investments and activism, especially after the United States has recently begun to move 
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away from a direct role in this region, reducing its activity and being in search of 
multilateral, cooperative approach towards the South Caucasus. 
 The United States is one of the most influential external players in the South 
Caucasus. Between Washington and Moscow all these years, there was the most acute 
rivalry for the South Caucasus as a sphere of influence. And, judging by the results of this 
rivalry, Moscow is still a losing party in it. Already today, in the South Caucasus, the 
influence of the United States is noticeably stronger than that of the Russian. Even 
Armenia, which is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and positions 
itself as Russia's strategic partner in the South Caucasus, is unlikely in this context can be 
considered an exception, although so far the pro-Western attitude in its policy does not 
show itself as noticeably as, for example, in Georgia. Georgia and Azerbaijan have little to 
lose - the strategic interests of Baku as one of the main "oil producers" of the Caspian 
region are increasingly reorienting to the West, and, as mentioned above, the country is 
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the passive Russian policy towards the country 
that occupied it.103 Thus, if Moscow's role in recent years has declined in all countries of 
the South Caucasus, the influence of the "western" team of players at the head of the 
United States, on the contrary, systematically increased. "We must strengthen our global 
alliances as the nucleus of a new global compact, the League of Democracies, which can 
use the enormous influence of more than one hundred democratic nations, around the 
world to promote our values and protect our joint interests.104 
   The countries of the South Caucasus are viewed in the United States as the main 
geopolitical springboard, a reference area that is used in the interests of implementing the 
plans for democratic reform of the WBG states, and in fact - to strengthen US influence in 
the Caspian-Black Sea region (including Central Asia), important for their national 
security. But in order to effectively fulfill this function, the countries of the South 
Caucasus themselves had to become the primary targets of modernization. Here, 
according to Washington's plan, it is necessary to strengthen the institutions of 
democracy and civil society, to ensure the corresponding rights and freedoms, taking as 
the benchmark Western, primarily American, models. In these areas, the activities of the 
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United States and interstate associations in which the influence of Washington is 
indisputable (the same GUAM)105. In addition to expanding and deepening contacts with 
official authorities, supporting numerous non-governmental organizations, there is a 
purposeful work with the opposition in these countries, which, must be admitted, is 
bearing fruit.  
A number of works by Western analysts are disappointed by the results of 
democratic reforms in the post-Soviet states, including the South Caucasus. In the South 
Caucasus states themselves, the opinion is strengthened that a "formalized" democracy, for 
example, introduced in Georgia and Azerbaijan, is just a cover for solving the problems of 
the energy and globalist order for the US and Europe. At the same time, this "imitation" 
democracy actually suits both the US and local ruling circles. Another important US 
interest in the South Caucasus is energy, Caspian sources of oil. Caspian oil is designed to 
ensure the diversification of oil supplies to Europe, by passing Russia. 106This means that 
the control over the crane, opening the supply of Caspian oil to the EU countries, will be 
carried out by Washington.107 If we add that control over a significant part of the Middle 
East, oil will also be in the hands of American companies, then the independent policies 
of some EU countries (as it was, for example, with respect to the war in Iraq) will be 
restrained by serious economic restrictions. Oil and gas of the Caspian Sea in the hands of 
Washington, is also an effective coercive means for consolidating Euro-Atlantic unity 
with the dominant role of the United States.  
If during the "cold war" this dominant role was determined by  so-called Soviet 
threat, now it is replaced by threats related to the energy security of Europe, which, as a 
rule, is linked with the policy of Russia. 108 But the US is not the only player in the 
struggle for oil resources in the region. In this struggle, the European Union and other 
major world powers - Russia, China – participate too. It involves regional countries like 
Turkey, Iran, Ukraine, etc.  
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     Consequently, we can expect further aggravation of the political struggle over 
Caspian oil, and this struggle will be supported by military, financial and other 
resources.109 Accordingly, the role of the countries of the South Caucasus in the 
geopolitical alignment of world forces and the special importance will be the formation by 
the American "sponsors" of new political elites in the countries of the South Caucasus, 
taking under control specific political figures that can become guarantors of the policy of 
reorienting their states and in the future firm retention of the pro-American course. This 
process is given a course, and it is in development. In this connection, attention is drawn 
to the strengthening of comprador principles in the official oligarchy of the South 
Caucasus states, strengthening its ties with transnational corporations (TNCs), and large 
business of the West. This is the reason for the coincidence of the positions of the ruling 
forces in the countries of the South Caucasus with American approaches, on many issues 
of geopolitics, regional policy, activation of GUAM, etc.  
    One should also take into account the fact that the South Caucasus can serve for 
Washington as a kind of "test" polygon (after the Balkans and Kosovo), during which all 
these years the plans of reorganizing the political systems of countries and replacing those 
regimes whose policies do not fit into the predetermined framework of the 
"modernization" of the world, does not differ in loyalty to Washington, or is disagreeable 
to it with something else. In this respect, the South Caucasus could serve as a good 
example for other countries of the reformist activity of Americans in the territory of the 
former USSR. Undeniable for the United States and military-strategic importance of the 
South Caucasus: not only as a convenient and reliable bridgehead in the event of a 
possible forceful impact on the "obstinate" BBV regimes and further expansion into 
Central Asia, but also as an outpost to contain "Russian expansion" and Moscow's 
influence in the south.  
     The US and Turkey show special activity in the military sphere of cooperation 
with Georgia, which took control over the reform and Re-equipment of the Georgian 
armed forces and for two years prepared four battalions for the Georgian army. Turkey 
has undertaken to prepare and fully staff the infantry brigade, which is located in 
Akhaltsikhe and Gori.110 
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In the military strategic plans of the United States, the South Caucasus plays an 
increasingly important role.  The Caucasus is the ideal air corridor between the European 
bases of the United States and their Afghan grouping. It is clear that the same corridor, as 
well as the operational infrastructure of the South Caucasian states, will be used in any 
operations - military, humanitarian and others, which the US and its armed forces can 
conduct in the bordering the South Caucasus or Nearby regions.111 
     The American ruling elite still holds the conviction, that from the point of 
view of universal and regional security, it is impossible to separate the North Caucasus 
from the Southern one. Consequently, any system of regional security, which the US 
neoconservatives hope will be built under the auspices of the United States or NATO, 
must in one way or another cover the North Caucasus, which for obvious reasons is 
unacceptable for Russia. But it should be noted that there are certain disagreements in the 
United States, between various executive authorities regarding the policy pursued in the 
South Caucasus region: on some issues the positions of the State Department and the 
Ministry of Defense differ. 
 
 
 General characteristics of the US policy 
 
    In order to achieve a detailed analysis of the United States policy, it is necessary 
to examine the basis of the United States strategic view of the region, with particular 
reference to a number of interests that determine US policy in the South Caucasus.112 The 
foundation and common bases of United States activities in each of the three South 
Caucasus countries, were laid down in the initial period of independence in the 1990s, 
due to a number of trends and is particularly pronounced in four specific areas: 
- Support for democratization and political reform, despite serious 
disruptions in the conduct of elections in each country; 
- Promise to support and assist in reforms aimed at transition to a 
market economy and privatization; 
- The growing emphasis on security and anti-terrorism issues; 
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- Comprehensive efforts in the field of conflict resolution and 
mediation. 
    It is interesting to note that these four main areas of interest also reflect a wide 
range of different and even contradictory political goals among Western players. At the 
same time, there are common interests reflected in the policies of the United States. 
 
 
Similar interests 
 
     Since the recognition of the independence of the three South Caucasus states 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) that arose in the process of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, western political lines as a whole reflected three main tasks or spheres of 
similar interests. Basically, they were focused on the common interests of the US and EU 
with respect to politics, development processes and geopolitical issues. The first collective 
goal tended to reflect a general policy line that was geared towards supporting 
democratization, political reforms, as well as economic reforms aimed at the transition to 
a market economy. The movement towards the solution of these problems was carried out 
in tandem of the EU and the USA.  
    The second sphere of similar interests represented in the framework of the 
transitional period described above, was the development process. At the same time, the 
United States pursued a policy line aimed at strengthening independence and supporting 
statehood with an additional element of conflict resolution and diplomatic mediation. In 
this early period, the general emphasis on the geopolitical context of the South Caucasus 
was the third collective goal. 
    This geopolitical plan was the strategic goal of providing and supporting 
alternative transit routes for the export of oil and gas from the region, in order to 
circumvent and isolate Iran, as well as to overcome the inherent in this region, 
dependence on the Russian pipeline network and energy infrastructure.113 Thus, in 
general, the driving force of Western activity in the South Caucasus political principles, 
proclaimed by America to strengthen the sovereignty and support of the independence of 
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these "young states" in the era of change, and search for ways to reduce their dependence 
on Russia and help to overcome the legacy of the Soviet regime.  
 
 
Forecast of priorities in US policy 
 
     When you look at the main trends in the policy of the United States and their 
activity in the South Caucasus, it becomes apparent that the current policy faces a number 
of menacing challenges. The first of these is the obvious danger of the "frozen" conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, as Azerbaijan is increasingly targeting an escalation of tension and 
using separate military attacks as a means political blackmail in order to put pressure on 
international community. Azerbaijan is irritated by the lack of real progress in the peace 
process, as well as diplomatic activity between Turkey and Armenia, which in the eyes of 
Azerbaijan looks like a betrayal of Turkey. The next daunting challenge in the region is 
the approaching series of elections and political changes in Armenia and in Georgia for 
the United States, the South Caucasus has returned to its more traditional role in the 
second plan of strategic relations between America and Russia. This happened for two 
main reasons. 
     First, the war in Georgia and the subsequent tension in the relations between 
Washington and Moscow led to the resumption of the view of the South Caucasus as a 
region that can not be viewed outside the context of Russian-American relations.114 
    This perspective has lowered the strategic importance of the region. At the 
same time, hand in hand with this process is a more important strategic calculation aimed 
at balancing Russia's renewed offensive position with the geopolitical need for reliable 
cooperation with Russia in accordance with US needs in Afghanistan and Iran. In view of 
Washington's desire to "nullify" bilateral relations with Russia, this meant a veiled 
recognition of Russia's interests in the "near abroad", which strengthened Moscow's view 
of the region as its "sphere of interests."115  
      This development was also reflected in the US approach, which allowed the 
issue of Georgia to be brought to the periphery as an issue on which Washington and 
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Moscow "remained at their opinions", but that at the same time allowed both sides to 
advance on issues not related to Georgia, avoiding the problems with Georgia. 116This 
country for the benefit of solving larger strategic issues. The next central factor that led to 
the rise of Russia's position in the structure of US political priorities in the region was the 
growth of security issues and the preference for stability. 117Previous efforts in support of 
democracy and face of the region's vulnerability to pressure and threats from Russia. The 
US security priorities were related to the need for access to the airspace of the region and 
facilitating the conduct of military operations in Afghanistan with the help of Russia. 118At 
the same time, it should be noted that the result was a shift in interests in relation to the 
previous decade, within which the priorities for use of reliable energy pipelines and 
transit routes have been replaced by a new need for transit routes and access to air 
corridors. 119The overall result of such changes in the US political line, is a kind of 
strategic exit from the region with Washington's lesser leading role in actively engaging 
in local interests and concentrating on broader strategic objectives.120 
      At the same time, while changes in US policy initiated, their departure from 
active and direct activities in the region, the EU was faced with the possibility and 
pressing need to expand its activities in the South Caucasus. After a difficult and tedious 
"exam on suitability "to the ceasefire in the war in Georgia was led by European activity. 
Despite the fact that most of the diplomatic actions were carried out by France, rather 
than by the EU institutions, the perception of European mediation as an effective 
participation was in general an important exam for the EU.  
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     However, in order to maintain such a successful and broad activities in the 
region, the European Union needs to improve the EU's notoriously controversial strategy, 
as a number of leading country participants tend to follow their national political lines, 
which compete with each other and sometimes contradict each other. These discrepancies 
are particularly noticeable in relations with Russia’s energy policy issues. Nevertheless, 
the EU has the characteristic advantage provided by the EU Action Plans and the Eastern 
Partnership, each of which contributed to the gradual accumulation of political capital in 
the region.121 
     Despite this, the future of the EU's activities in the South Caucasus region 
depends to a large extent on the EU itself, which is already at a crossroads between a more 
convenient situation involving competing national political strategies and a difficult 
process to achieve a single political line for Strategic activity. To date, there is reason to be 
optimistic about a more active involvement of the EU in the region, since it is impossible 
in further to ignore or diminish the significance of EU objectives aimed at assuming the 
leading role in the development of security and stability in the South Caucasus, which to a 
large extent remains "a region Risk ". 
        Thus, we can draw four main conclusions regarding the US and the South 
Caucasus: 
- Elections in this region have been and continue to be conducted under the 
influence of force, not politics. Political leadership is largely determined by selection, not 
by elections; 
- Legality is the key factor determining the achievement of lasting security and 
stability; 
- The strategic stability of these regions in the lesser degree is determined by 
geopolitics and More - politics and economy, with local issues and interests playing a 
dominant role; 
- Institutions play a significant role; Individual activity can be useful, but it is not 
enough for true democratization; It is not necessary to look for another externally 
oriented to the West, a reformist-minded leader to provide support (for example, 
Saakashvili's model in Georgia). 
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Hence, the key to the future is in the hands of the states of the South Caucasus. 
And while there is The need to prevent regional isolation and the need for active work, 
the achievement of true stability and security depends on the rule of law and local politics 
and the economy, and to a much lesser extent on the "big" geopolitics.122 
 
 
Divergences in interests 
 
       Nevertheless, at the same time, political lines, as well as Western activities, 
were characterized by differences in interests between the US and the EU, which was 
particularly vividly reflected in America's policy towards listed above to three countries. 
In this context, the activity of the West was also determined by a set of differing 
advantages for each of the western players, especially for the US, who as a result pursued a 
special line in each of the three states. In a broad sense, US policy toward Armenia was 
largely determined by the significant influence of large and well-organized Armenian 
diasporas in the US (and to a lesser extent in Europe). During the early period of 
independence in the 1990s, the US policy towards Armenia was concentrated in three 
main areas: 
 
 humanitarian assistance, mainly in the field of earthquake 
response; 
 assistance in the conduct of processes, democratization and 
political reform, as well as poverty reduction and economic reforms, and, finally; 
  efforts aimed at settlement, mediation and possible resolution; 
 
 
 
 
Azerbaijan and the United States 
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     Azerbaijan-US relations are developing in the Several dimensions. Azerbaijan is 
present in the context of Russian-American relations, and today they are on the verge of 
remilitarization and competition in the military-political sphere. Azerbaijan's role in this 
bloc should be discussed separately. In general, the competition between the US and 
Russia in the post-Soviet space has a very negative impact on the overall situation in the 
region. 
     Between themselves, the United States and Russia find a common language, but 
their actions on Post-Soviet space show that the powers profess different views and 
concepts of development. Russian-US relations today are deeply asymmetric, the 
difference in their potentials is too great. At the same time, Russia is a country of 
European civilization, therefore it’s role in the context of Azerbaijan's western choice is to 
compensate for the consequences of distortions and at times unjustified pressure, rendered 
to Azerbaijan by partners in the West. 
     The most obvious example is the compensation of pressure on Iran. It is 
obvious that the war in neighboring Iran is unprofitable for Azerbaijan, where is the 
largest Azerbaijani community. Russia, in turn, is the most active supporter of the 
peaceful resolution of this crisis. In this example, we see the second dimension of the 
Azerbaijani-American relations: in a broader context. This can be called the art of 
maneuvering a small country, sandwiched between the conflicting aspirations of bellicose 
powers. But dont Forget the other factor of the relations between Baku and Washington - 
with all the distortions of American policy in the Middle East, Azerbaijan finds the 
answers to its aspirations, recognition and respect as an independent country in the 
United States. Baku's own foreign policy line looks quite independent within the 
framework of freedom that does not cross the borders of American interests.  
     The multi-vector nature of Azerbaijan allows building equal relationships with 
interested players and understanding them in case of pressure from one of the parties. 
Another problem that needs to be considered is clarifying the specifics Azerbaijani 
relations. Even if the United States were an ideal monopoly on world power, that is, a 
monopolist that "everyone loves", it is unlikely that other countries would not try to 
undermine this monopoly. Given this ambiguity, there can not be any one-sided choice in 
favor of one geopolitical model. Azerbaijan chooses only certain elements for itself, 
avoiding the close embrace of one superpower. Yes, a unipolar world is unjust, but a 
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multipolar world can be more dangerous and unstable, but the historical pendulum has 
swung precisely towards multiplicity. In such conditions, the rate on one leader is 
doomed to failure. Therefore, when starting to describe the specifics of bilateral relations, 
it should be said that the American vector for Azerbaijan is one of the essential, but not 
the only one among many. 
      The US established diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan in early 1992. At that 
time, the uncertainty of the future of Azerbaijan,possible withdrawal along the "Iranian" 
path of development was considered in the United States as a serious danger.  
    Since the return of Heydar Aliyev to the power of Azerbaijan races Washington 
was seen through the prism of the interests of American oil companies as a supplier of 
small quantities of oil. Serious relations began after the first official visit of Heydar Aliyev 
(July 27 - August 6, 1997), during which the Azerbaijani leader visited Washington, New 
York, Houston and Chicago. Just the same day, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, 
speaking at Johns Hopkins University with the speech "American Politics in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia," outlined the milestones American policy. It is believed that it was at 
that time (that was the second term of the presidency of Bill Clinton) that the US congress 
announced The Caspian-Black Sea region is a zone of its national interests; Owls. Under 
the US President, the post of special adviser was established on the Caspian region. 
Developing a strategy in the region several research centers began to be engaged. The US 
proceeded from the fact that the oil strategy is a good way to expand the range of 
mechanisms for military penetration and political influence in the region. The arrival of 
George W. Bush and the statements of his administration officials showed that the US was 
determined to defend more rigidly and to enforce their interests in the world, including 
with the help of the armed forces.  
        The challenges of September 11 confirmed them in this choice. So, according 
to the views of the head of the US State Department Condoleezza Rice, the US military 
has a three-fold responsibility. In her opinion, the American army is the only army in the 
world that can prevent a "big war", which means a "global strategic conflict" at key points 
such as the Persian Gulf with its 40% of the world's oil reserves.123 
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      Accordingly, the US can not stand aloof from local conflicts that threaten to 
turn into larger-scale wars in "zones of vital strategic interests," and the armed forces can 
be used to help prevent "localized large-scale violence". 
 
Changes in US activities in the South Caucasus have recently been reflected in 
four general trends: 
- A broader and more sustained level of direct support aimed at 
democratization and the processes of political reforms, especially after the Rose 
Revolution in Georgia, despite violations in the conduct of elections in each of the 
other states of the region; 
- A more assertive policy aimed at curbing Russia's influence in this 
region with a parallel search for areas for cooperation where and when possible, 
for example, within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by 
France, Russia and the USA) acting as a single intermediary In the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict; 
- A more pronounced focus on security and antiterror, with the 
initial priority in energy and transit pipelines being replaced by the need for "air 
corridors" and the use of airspace for military purposes, as well as the emergence 
of a number of new bilateral security partnerships that are also among the 
strategic Priorities of the West; 
- And an attempt to "build bridges" and use the new opportunities 
that are emerging in the region, which is especially noticeable with the example 
of the explicit development of new diplomatic initiatives in the relations between 
Armenia and Turkey. 
         Against the background of the shift in the US priorities, the South Caucasus 
region also continued to receive assistance in carrying out reforms aimed at building a 
market economy and conducting privatization processes. In addition, the region continues 
to be the central goal of efforts aimed at resolving Conflicts, and mediation efforts. 
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However, by 2010, Western policy began to follow a more complex plan, developing in 
three main areas.124 
          First, the EU began to follow a political line that takes into account more 
nuances that complement direct activities within the framework of the Eastern 
Partnership. This policy line, including the identification of key strategic partners in the 
former Soviet space, was modified to achieve an even more detailed and complex 
approach, defined as the principle "more for more and less for less ". The purpose of this 
approach is to create a new range of incentives aimed at supporting and encouraging 
improvements in the economic and political reforms in the three states of the South 
Caucasus. For the EU, this activity was also due to the strategic recognition of the need for 
stabilization and security on the European periphery. Washington welcomed such a 
course of events, Since the US wanted a more direct role for the EU in the region, along 
with the EU's more significant contribution to geopolitical "burden sharing" in the South 
Caucasus.125 
        The next new direction is rooted in a renewed focus on conflict prevention. 
It reflects the approach to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh under the motto "back to 
basics", which was aimed at preventing war or resuming hostilities in the situation of 
Azerbaijan's growing threats to turn to weapons or a "military solution" of problems in 
Karabakh.126 Here the US welcomed the new initiative of Russia to resolve the conflict in 
Karabakh, which was based on Moscow's desire not only to assume the leading diplomatic 
role of an influential state in this region, but also to show that after the war with Georgia 
in August 2008, Russia is able to play a positive role in establishing security and stability 
in this region.127At the same time, from the position of the United States, such a 
significant cooperation of Russia within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group could 
only strengthen the US desire to "nullify" its relations with Russia.128 
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        Finally, the third new direction of Western policy is based on changes in US 
political priorities aimed at making more direct demands on the leaders of the states of the 
region to achieve greater progress in the processes of democratization and economic 
reforms. Such a more confrontational policy could already be observed in each of the 
capitals of the three states, when the US ambassadors to Tbilisi and Baku took a course to 
more actively make demands to the authorities of Georgia and Azerbaijan.  
     Nevertheless, at the same time, the United States was increasingly encouraging 
and even demanding greater European activity in the region, while trying to apply a less 
confrontational approach to Russia's interests and influence, which was part of a larger 
reformatting of the relationship between USA and Russia. However, this development 
was not only a prudent adjustment of the political line, but also reflected the position 
weakness of America. 129More specifically, at the moment, the region lacks clear, 
consistent political principles of the United States. Thus, the region of the South Caucasus 
as a whole Is regarded as a region of secondary importance that does not have immediate 
priority. The typical weakness of the "excessively expanded" American presence in this 
region is due to several reasons.130 
        First, the US is distracted and busy with other priorities, primarily the 
economic downturn in the country and the consequences of the global financial crisis. In 
addition, many officials responsible for the region continue to be distracted by other tasks 
and priorities. This includes looking at the region as a the periphery of US-Russian 
relations and the need to address the problems associated with Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
 
Russian interests and strategies in the South Caucasus 
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For 20 years of their independent existence has undergone a complex evolution 
that largely reflects the different stages of the emergence of post-communist Russia as a 
new state, a change in the views of its leaders on the place and role of the country in the 
world and the region. This policy has been influenced by a wide range of various factors - 
ideological, military-strategic, economic. It was influenced by differences in views 
between group and departmental interests within the ruling elite of Russia, changes in its 
foreign policy priorities at both the global and regional levels. These differences were felt 
mainly in the first half of the 1990s.131 
An important role in accelerating the collapse of the Soviet Union, As is known, 
played numerous Ethno-political conflicts in the south of the country - in the republics of 
Central Asia and Transcaucasia (that was the name of the South Caucasus at that time).132 
They had a strong influence on the formation of the foreign policy line of the leadership 
of post-communist Russia in the first years of its existence. Preserving the stability of the 
country and protecting its territorial integrity from potential threats that might Come 
from the South, by discarding the imperial heritage, became one of the most important 
priorities of Russia's international policy, ensuring its national security. 
      The South Caucasus has long attracted leading European powers - Great 
Britain, France and Germany, which for many decades, since the XIX century, had strong 
positions here, which did not prevent them from sharply competing with each other. 
     Today, the number of so-called extra-regional players in the South Caucasus 
(especially if we take into account the Caspian countries in general, that is, some Central 
Asian countries) has grown significantly and has become larger than in other regions of 
the world: practically all the leading centers forces of the modern world. This feature 
once again shows the importance and the uniqueness of the South Caucasus in the global 
geopolitical situation. Russia is closely connected with the countries of the region with 
long-standing historical, economic, cultural ties. It is quite legitimate to talk about vital 
for Russia interests in the South Caucasus. But at the same time, it should be noted that 
Moscow did not have  an integral, long-term policy for the South Caucasus under the new 
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conditions, when it is necessary to compete for influence with many extra-regional 
powers and other centers of power, actively and, most importantly, have clear goals in the 
region.133 
        To some extent, the inertia of the past plays a negative role in this. At one 
time, Russia came to the Caucasus in wars with Iran and Turkey, and this was not only a 
struggle for spheres of influence, but power expansion to expand the Russian Empire, 
which was justified by the need to create a kind of security belt on the southern borders. 
For many decades, new territories have become an organic geopolitical part of Russia.  
     The revolutionary events of the beginning of the twentieth century and the 
subsequent Soviet period made their own adjustments-the former national outskirts of the 
Russian Empire acquired the same, albeit truncated, forms of statehood, and became an 
equal part of the vast federation. It is impossible not to see the logical progressive 
movement of history, which brought these states, which grew up on the Russian socio-
cultural and economic foundation, to an independent existence. And today Russia is 
fighting in this geopolitical space not to conquer its former lands, but to preserve and 
strengthen its influence in the Caucasus.134 The difference is principled, and it requires a 
new policy from the Russian authorities in the Caucasus, which has not yet been 
observed.  Among the Russian political elite there is even an opinion that the problems of 
the Caucasus for today's Russia are an unnecessary headache. And many Caucasian 
politicians consider panacea from all problems to be integration into Western structures 
and distancing from Russia. 
     The fallibility of such views is obvious. The Caucasus is a "bridge" unique in its 
geopolitical parameters, connecting the North and South, Asia and Europe, Islam and 
Christianity.135 This can be a boon for the peoples of the Caucasus and Russia, but can be 
used to harm them if the Caucasus remains the arena of rivalry.136 Today, the South 
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Caucasus is a space of intersection between geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the 
Russian Federation and the United States, the European Union, NATO, regional states - 
Turkey, Iran and others. Unfortunately, recently the tendency of rivalry is noticeable 
prevails over reasonable cooperation. So, with the advent of Saakashvili's regime, 
Georgia's relations with the Russian Federation have sharply deteriorated.137 
      With Armenia, Russia builds relations of strategic partnership, which is 
enshrined in the 1997 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Moscow actually supported 
Yerevan during the war because of Karabakh. And today, which is a sin to conceal, 
officially recognizing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation 
contributes to the growth of the military potential of Armenia, which occupies a 
significant part of Azerbaijan. Yerevan is supplied with Russian weapons at preferential 
prices, here is the military base of the Russian Federation. Close ties are maintained 
between the political and business elites of the two countries. A significant part of 
industrial enterprises, 80% of the republic's energy sector is controlled by Russian 
companies. The influential Armenian foreign diaspora, which is forced to reckon not only 
in Moscow, but also in Paris and Washington, contributes to all this. 
     But it is also worth noting that references to influential lobbying forces in 
solving complex interstate problems are not enough to convince those against whom the 
policy of such bilateral friendly unions is acting unwillingly. In this case, we are talking 
about Azerbaijan, whose political elite in its majority views the strategic alliance between 
Moscow and Yerevan as supporting the aggressive course of Armenia against Azerbaijan, a 
country potentially friendly to Russia. So, many representatives of the political class of 
Azerbaijan urge Russian diplomacy to decide what is more important for it - the national 
interests of the Russian state or the lobbying capabilities of the Armenians? After all, in 
fact, the territorial claims of Armenia create a difficult tangle of problems, the 
consequence of which is the increasingly noticeable policy of alienation pursued by Baku 
in relation to Moscow. Relations with Azerbaijan, to which the Moscow's position on 
Nagorno-Karabakh had and continues to exert a cooling influence, remained rather tense 
during the 1990s. Only under Putin's presidency they have improved somewhat. A 
number of acute problems were resolved, such as the status of the Caspian Sea, Gabala 
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radar station, more than 4 times - up to $ 1 billion - turnover has increased. The 
improvement of relations was not prevented by the pro-Western orientation of Baku 
based on Turkey, the course towards rapprochement with NATO. But the problem of the 
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan remains a stumbling block in interstate relations.138 On 
the whole, it should be noted that Russia's clear strategic goal in the region has not yet 
been outlined, its interests have not been determined, without which it is impossible to 
talk about a thought-out foreign policy strategy.139 Moscow did not seem to notice that a 
new political elite and civil society were formed in the countries of the South Caucasus, 
far from the stereotypes of the past. Relations with Russia are recognized as important, 
but already far from being a priority. It is characteristic that in all countries of the South 
Caucasus there are no more or less influential pro-Russian parties or Social movements.140 
In addition, the Russian-speaking stratum and the part of the national elites that was 
brought up in the political culture of the times of the USSR. Moscow indifferently looks at 
the fact that the Russian language has ceased to be a state language, and loses its prospects 
as a language of communication between our peoples. A generation of citizens has grown 
up in Azerbaijan, for which the Russian language sounds as incomprehensible as German 
or Farsi.  
         Underestimation of all these processes is one of the main mistakes of Russian 
policy in the region and the reason for the decreasing influence of Moscow in the 
countries of the South Caucasus. So, the population of Georgia in recent years, especially 
during the years of M. Saakashvili, actually began to take a hostile attitude towards Russia, 
blaming him in Split the country and support the "separatist regimes" of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, and earlier - the "corrupt regime" . 141The results of the plebiscite held in 
Georgia in January 2008, along with the presidential elections, when almost 70% of the 
voters who voted in it voted for the country's accession to NATO, say, in particular, that 
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the anti-Russian position of the government is supported by a large part of the population 
of the republic.142  
     Thus, from the very beginning, with respect to Moscow, security 
considerations dominated the new states of the South Caucasus. In th is sense, the initial 
situation, in which the new Russia turned out, strongly resembled the positioning of the 
Russian Empire to the region of Transcaucasia in the 19th - early 20th centuries. 
        The Russian presence in the South Caucasus and the political influence on 
the situation in the region were initially carried out by supporting those parties in ethnic 
and interstate conflicts, whose victory was deemed to be more in line with Russia's long-
term interests both in the world as a whole and in the region . Such an approach was 
largely conditioned by the general ideology of Russian foreign policy in that period. In the 
Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry in the early 1990s, it was believed that it was necessary 
to support those post-communist countries and political regimes that were ready to move 
hand in hand with Russia towards a democratic future, resolutely breaking with the 
Soviet past. In this context, it seemed quite natural that Moscow, as the conflict between 
the central government of the country and Abkhazia was on the rise in Georgia, took the 
side of official Tbilisi, after Shevardnazde came to power there. The name of this 
politician in the then ruling circles of Russia was linked with the prospects of Georgia's 
democratic development and close bilateral cooperation for the benefit of both peoples. 
On the contrary, in respect of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in Moscow, a 180-turn 
Degrees compared with the policy of the former USSR. In this conflict, since its inception 
in 1988, the Soviet leadership secretly supported Azerbaijan.143 It believed that this 
republic adheres to more conservative and acceptable for Moscow attitudes towards 
preserving the Union, unlike Armenia, where liberal-democratic forces began to 
dominate, whose views and actions objectively undermined the state integrity of the 
USSR. Initially, the leadership of post-communist Russia by inertia also supported 
Azerbaijan.144 
    However, in the second half of Russian politics a radical turn took place. The 
government of President Boris Yeltsin came to the conclusion that the support of a 
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democratic Armenia should become a priority.145 Moreover, in the ruling circles of Russia, 
looking at the expanding cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey,  expressed growing 
concern over the possible strengthening of Ankara's influence not only in the South 
Caucasus states, but also in the Russian North Caucasus. Prospects for Turkey's influence, 
a country where the military played a key role in politics, in Moscow wasn’t linked with 
the opportunities for democratic progress in the South Caucasus. 
     After the transition of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to the military stage in 
August 1992, radical changes also took place in Russian politics, in relation to this 
problem. Ethnic movements gained strength in the republics of the North Caucasus, and 
they were supported by local elites, mainly representing the former communist 
nomenclature of the region. In this regard, the threat of Russia's territorial integrity, 
stemming from growing ethno-separatism.146 
First of all in the republics with the Circassian component, was assessed very 
highly, especially by the Russian military. The beginning of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict 
provided a unique opportunity to direct the destructive energy of the Circassian ethnic 
movement towards the neighboring state. Therefore, Moscow did not interfere with the 
flow of volunteers from the North Caucasus, especially from the Circassian republics, 
which went to the aid of the ethnically close Abkhazian people. Among the volunteers 
were residents of other regions of Russia, Cossacks. In the future, despite the fact that 
Moscow officially adhered to neutrality in this conflict, as it grew, pro-Abkhazian 
position of Russia intensified. The decisive role in this played the line of the MO. And 
although the Foreign Ministry tried to maintain the territorial integrity of Georgia by 
inertia, the position of the country's political leadership gradually was inclined in favor of 
the line of generals and support of the Abkhazian government V. Ardzinba. 
      However, in the future, during the interethnic conflicts that have unfolded in 
the countries of the South Caucasus, Russia has substantially corrected its position. The 
political leadership of the country came to the conclusion that, in the face of unfinished 
conflicts, peacekeeping would be the most effective form of preserving Russian influence 
and presence in the region. At that time, the international situation contributed to the 
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realization of this choice. The United States of America (USA) and the European 
Community at that time actively supported the domestic political Line of President Boris 
Yeltsin and his government, aimed at building democracy in Russia and a market 
economy.  
     Therefore, the Western powers generally favored that the Russian Federation 
assume a significant share of the responsibility for ensuring stability in the post-Soviet 
space. 147In many ways, thanks to the  dominant role of the West in world politics, this 
attitude was supported by international institutions - the United Nations (UN) and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the summer of 1992, the 
Joint Control Commission (JCC) was created to maintain peace in the zone of the 
Georgian-Ossetian conflict. After the signing in Moscow in May 1994. The Georgian-
Abkhaz agreement on a cease-fire and the division of troops, Russian units under the flag 
of the peacekeepers of the commonwealth of independent states (CIS) took positions on 
both sides of conflict lines. This peacekeeping operation was sanctioned by the UN, which 
every 5 years extended the status of Russian peacekeepers. Russia became part of the 
OSCE Minsk Group (MG), established in 1992, to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
A new strategic vision of Moscow's tasks Foreign policy towards the South Caucasus Was 
due to several factors.148 
      Firstly, in the Kremlin and departments that were involved in the formulation 
and implementation of the foreign policy course, they were well aware that the conflicts 
that have arisen in the region have no prospect of solution in the coming years, On the 
basis of compromise and mutual consent of the parties. At the same time, neither in the 
region of the South Caucasus nor beyond its borders is any power or military-political 
alliance that could force the conflicting parties to agree on the basis of the ideas proposed 
by these external players. Therefore, the freezing of conflicts and the preservation of 
Russia's key role in maintaining the post-war status quo became the main task of Russian 
policy. It fits well into the general context of the course that Moscow pursued in 
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international affairs in the 1990s. 149Experiencing enormous difficulties and tensions 
during the implementation of internal political reforms, gradually moving away from the 
West, since 1993, Russia could not claim some significant role in the formation of a new, 
post-Stalinist world, even in the limited space of the former USSR. The only task that 
Moscow has been able to do is to preserve the results of the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union in those forms and at the stage where the disintegration processes were suspended, 
and their actual results were fixed in 1992-1994. And, of course, Moscow left for A role of 
the guarantor of stability of this "temporary" Order. 
       Russia in world politics, therefore, turned into a power status quo. "Paradoxes" 
and contradictions of peacemaking. At the same time, peacekeeping, which required from 
the Russian Federation to refrain from the principles of impartiality and equidistance in 
relation to the conflicting parties, continued to be combined in Moscow's policy with 
maintaining exclusive relations with one of the partners. Such a strange "splitting" of 
Russian policy became possible not because of the "cunning" of the Kremlin or the skill of 
its diplomacy. In the situation that developed in the 1990s in the South Caucasus, the state 
of this region could count on the fact that other world players will take the initiative in 
restoring the situation that existed at the time of the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, they 
were forced to agree to maintain Russia's dominant position. So, shortly after the military 
defeat of Georgia in Abkhazia, Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze insisted on his 
country's accession to the CIS, believing that while only being part of this international 
organization dominated by Russia, Georgia will have a chance to restore its territorial 
integrity.150 
       There is a very common opinion that Russia's peacekeeping policy has never 
been consistent, that Moscow has always sought to use a peacekeeping mandate to support 
one of the parties to the conflicts, for the gradual redrawing of the internationally 
recognized borders of the states located here in their own interests. However, the 
assertion about Russia's adherence to unilateral actions is only partially true. It mainly 
reflects the course of Moscow towards Georgia, and even at a time when it has headed for 
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NATO membership, and the Russian-American and Russian-NATO relations have 
entered a phase of confrontation. But this turn happened later. The events of August 2004, 
when the Georgian forces attempted to restore control over the capital of South Ossetia, 
Tskhinvali, were finally destroyed by the desire of the Russian and Georgian governments 
for constructive interaction, although in the previous period the parties to the conflict 
achieved notable progress on the way to its settlement.  
        The same line aimed at maintaining stability in the region and cautious 
rapprochement of the sides' positions, Russia also adhered to the Armenian-Azerbaijani 
conflict, although it would seem that the very logic of bilateral relations with these 
countries had to push Moscow to a tough choice In favor of one of them. So, on the one 
hand Armenia Officially became Russia's only military ally in the South Caucasus. During 
the reign of the pro-Western politician, President L. Ter-Petrosyan, in 1995 the Russian 
military base in Gyumri was deployed on the territory of Armenia. In August 1997, the 
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the two countries was 
concluded. As a result, Russia assumed the role of guarantor of Armenia's security. In 
Moscow, the presence of such an ally as Armenia was seen as an important factor in 
safeguarding the balance of power in the South Caucasus, restraining Turkey's desire to 
expand its influence in the region. Armenia, after a victorious war with Azerbaijan, which 
led to the establishment of control over part of the bordering Azerbaijani territories (the 
so-called "security belt" of Nagorno-Karabakh), actually ended up in peace in the world 
Situation of semi-insulation.151 Relations with Turkey have not been normalized, 
moreover, the prospects for their normalization in connection with the new situation 
around Karabakh have only worsened.152 
      In such cases, while maintaining Yerevan's tough position on Karabakh, only 
Russia could act as guarantor of Armenia's security, inviolability of its borders. Thus, the 
conclusion of the Russian-Armenian alliance was a pragmatic decision of both sides. But, 
on the other hand, as energy Problems became one of the central themes of world politics, 
the importance of Azerbaijan for Russia as the most important exporter and the country 
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for the transit of oil and gas increased significantly. 153This demanded from Moscow a 
more flexible policy in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. To keep these two important 
foreign policy positions in the South Caucasus - Armenia as the only military ally and 
Azerbaijan as a key economic partner, Russia was forced to balance. 154At the same time, 
Moscow was well aware that the resumption of the armed conflict in and around 
Karabakh would inevitably lead to the collapse of Moscow's positions both in Yerevan and 
Baku.  
         It was only during the presidency of D. Medvedev that he held five meetings 
between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan - S. Sargsyan and I. Aliyev (in Moscow in 
November 2008 and July 2009, in Astrakhan in September 2010, in Sochi in March and in 
Kazan in June 2011). In particular, on the initiative of D. Medvedev, on November 2, 
2008, the so-called. Moscow (Mayen-Dorf) "Declaration of three presidents" on Nagorno-
Karabakh, according to which official Baku He committed himself to resolving the 
Karabakh conflict exclusively by peaceful means. In July 2009, the Russian representative, 
along with representatives of the governments of the United States and France, co-
chairing the MG, took an active part in the preparation of the so-called "updated version" 
of the Madrid Principles for a peaceful settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh, which was 
designed to stimulate the development of the negotiation process between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.    
        The 21st century begins to gradually change the role of  Caspian-Black Sea 
region in world politics. It turns into territory, through Which can pass corridors for the 
transit of energy from the countries of Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe. This added 
another important task to the Russian policy in the South Caucasus: to maintain Russia's 
role as a key transit country for oil. In 1999, despite the negative attitude of Russia, the 
governments of Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on the construction 
of an oil pipeline  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. In Moscow, from the very beginning, this project 
was considered to be a political project, not having Under a serious economic basis that 
Aims to direct Caspian oil to Europe by passing Russia.  
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      At the beginning of the 21st century, as the transformation of Gazprom into a 
leading player on the European gas market for Russia, the importance and dominance of 
gas transit routes to Europe increased. In these new international situations, the role of 
not only Azerbaijan as one of the gas producers, but also Georgia as a potential transit 
country, has significantly increased. This strengthened positions of these states in regional 
politics, strengthened the positions of those forces in the Which advocated a reduction in 
From Russia and the reduction of its influence in the region. Russian diplomacy has made 
a lot of efforts to persuade the states of the European Union and the South Caucasus to 
abandon the NABUCCO gas pipeline project in favor of the Russian "South Stream". This 
question has not been finally resolved to this day. He continues to be at the center of 
various International political intrigues and diplomatic negotiations.  
          In the expert and political environment, there is an opinion that Russia 
actively impeded the implementation of oil and gas pipeline projects through the territory 
of Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey, and even allegedly used its influence in the region 
to increase tensions in conflict zones in order to disrupt Construction plans. Indeed, as 
noted above, the Kremlin reacted painfully to projects of alternative ways of delivering 
hydrocarbons to Europe, considering it a threat to Russia's role as the most important 
transit country for energy resources.155 However, in fact, the growth of competition in the 
issue of energy transit routes made the Russian Policy in the South Caucasus to look for 
more flexible approaches to the states of the region. This had the greatest impact on 
Russia's attitude towards Azerbaijan. And although the current problem of energy transit 
is still acute and urgent for the South Caucasus, it seems that it can no longer seriously 
affect the changes in the configuration of international relations in the region and the 
balances of forces that have formed in it. 156 
       Moreover, in the political and expert circles of the South Caucasus countries 
the opinion is growing that in the near future global and regional powers under the 
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influence of the current realities in the South Caucasus will be forced to move to a policy 
of complementarity of the already located Under the construction of pipelines. In a 
situation where the South Caucasus, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has become 
one of the most conflict-ridden regions of the world, the importance of economic 
Cooperation to accelerate the development of the states and territories in the region has 
never been considered by Moscow as one of the priority tasks. Although Russia was one 
of the founders of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 
1992 and its largest sponsor, the Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry coolly treated 
numerous projects in the field of transport and infrastructure development in the region, 
developed in the depths of the BSEC.  
     Apparently, such a position of Moscow is objective Reflected the complex 
realities of the region, which is clearly not yet ripe for the development of multilateral 
cooperation. To maintain the status quo, bilateral ties were viewed by Moscow as more 
effective. 157At the same time, Russian capital has taken significant positions in the 
economy of Armenia and Georgia. But if in the first case this became an additional tool to 
strengthen Russia's political influence on the partner country, then in the second case a 
different situation was observed.  
         Despite Difficult relations between Russia and Georgia, and even Military 
confrontation with it in August 2008, the position of Russian capital, especially in the 
energy sector, banking business, telecommunications of this country turned out to be very 
strong. Neither the big politics affected them, nor, on the contrary, the activity of Russian 
capital could not contribute to the warming in bilateral relations. At the same time, That 
the presence of Russian capital in the economy of Armenia and Georgia has no strategic 
significance for Russia. As for Azerbaijan, cooperation with this country in the field of 
hydrocarbon production and transportation is strategically important for Russia's foreign 
economic activity. After 2000, the situation around the South Caucasus began to change 
markedly. In connection with the increased role of this region in the extraction and 
transit of energy carriers, interest in it from other world players, the US and the EU, has 
increased sharply.  
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         For the United States, which began large-scale military operations in 
Afghanistan, the military-political importance of the region has increased as it directly 
adjoins the zone of military operations. In particular, it was decided to establish military 
bases for NATO and the US in Bulgaria and Romania. With the entry of these two 
countries into the EU, in 2007 the activity of European diplomacy in the countries of the 
Black Sea basin increased noticeably. In Russia, unlike the US and the EU, it could not 
offer the attractive social order to the South Caucasus countries, it was perceived as a 
serious factor weakening its influence in the region. In connection with the expansion of 
the US and EU presence in the South Caucasus, the states located here began to connect 
hopes with the fact that these global players will help to resolve the frozen conflicts. The 
growth of similar expectations in the states of the South Caucasus also troubled Moscow, 
which, in the course of time, was afraid of losing its monopoly on peacekeeping. In 
general, the activity of Western countries in the South Caucasus began to be perceived in 
the Kremlin as an attempt to limit Russia's influence in this important area of the post-
Soviet space. 
         The change in Russian policy in the region began after 2004, and as noted 
above, was associated with a reaction to the events in South Ossetia. However, the true 
reasons for the change in Russian policy in the South Caucasus were deeper158. In addition 
to the general change in the balance of power in the Black Sea region, not in favor of 
Russia, the activation of the US and the EU here, played a significant role.  
       For first, after the American operation in Iraq, the gradual deterioration of 
relations between Russia, on the one hand, and the US and NATO, on the other. For 
many reasons, the South Caucasus has become ruling circles in Moscow one of the most 
important lines of defense of the interests of the Russian Federation. 
      Secondly, the support of George W. Bush's junior "color revolutions", first in 
Georgia (November 2003), and then in Ukraine (November 2004-January 2005), which 
initiated the course "promoting democracy to the east", was perceived in Moscow was 
already a threat to internal political order in Russia itself. 
        Thirdly, in the Russian capital, a new line of the American administration 
met with a lack of understanding and irritation to "thaw" conflicts around the world, 
including in the post-Soviet space. The Kremlin believed that the necessary conditions for 
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this were not yet ripe, and that the Russian policy of maintaining the status quo remains, 
as before, the best available solution. Although Moscow did not interfere with attempts to 
resolve the Karabakh conflict Within the so-called "Prague process", started in April 2004 
in the capital of the Czech Republic, in which the key role was played by  American 
diplomacy.  
         Fourthly, in the context of intensifying confrontation with the United States, 
the most proclaimed in Moscow was the proclamation  of Georgian leadership to integrate 
the country into NATO, his intention to restore the territorial integrity of the country 
with the support of the EU and the North Atlantic Alliance. 159Official Tbilisi began to 
persistently seek the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the zones of the Georgian-
Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts and replace them with international police 
forces. In 2007, after the request of Georgia, Russia withdrew its troops from the territory 
of this state. 
         Fifthly, after  September 2006, Tbilisi regained control of the upper Kodori 
Gorge and Announced the move there to the government of the Abkhazian autonomy, 
formerly located in the Georgian capital, Moscow began seriously to fear Georgia's 
attempts to restore its territorial integrity with the help of military force. On the way to a 
direct clash with Georgia, the development of a new policy towards Georgia and conflicts 
in its territory, caused serious discussions in Russian political circles. However, these 
discussions, taking place in an atmosphere of secrecy, characteristic of the decision-
making process in modern Russia, never came to the level of public discussions. As a 
result, a new Russian policy was defined with regard to the former Georgian autonomies, 
which was unofficially called "rapprochement without recognition."  
        Back in August 2006, Moscow withdrew from the ban on trade, economic 
and financial ties with Abkhazia. On April 16, 2008, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
instructed the government to develop measures to provide substantive assistance to 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By this order in fact, the legal personality of not only the 
authorities of the former Georgian autonomies, but also legal entities registered on their 
territory, including industrial, commercial and financial enterprises, was recognized. In 
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political and expert circles, this was regarded as a serious move by Moscow towards 
Economic absorption of the former Georgian autonomies, their gradual integration into 
the political space of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the Kremlin refused to 
officially recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, aware of how much 
damage can be caused by the international consequences of such a move of Russian 
foreign policy. At the same time, Moscow allowed and even encouraged the distribution 
of passports to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, using the new law on the 
citizenship of the USSR, adopted in 2002. The Russian authorities saw in this certain 
guarantees for the preservation of Russia's presence in the former Georgian autonomies. 
       Tensions in the Russian-Georgian relations have been constantly increasing. 
After deporting Russian servicemen from Georgia accused of espionage in favor of 
Moscow, the Russian Federation responded by introducing the visa regime in 2006 against 
Georgian citizens, mass expelling them from the country under various pretexts. And yet, 
the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was not inevitable exit from the 
developed situation. Several circumstances contributed to the fact that tense bilateral 
relations moved to the stage of armed conflict. From the Bush administration on the eve 
of the war, Tbilisi seemed to receive ambiguous signals that the government of M. 
Saakashvili perceived as certain guarantees of American support in the event of a military 
clash with Russia. Neither the US nor the EU could, and apparently did not really want to 
convince Moscow of their readiness to take into account Russia's interests in the process 
of settling the conflicts around the former Georgian autonomies, provided that this 
process becomes a multilateral format.160 On the contrary, the statements and actions of 
some American and European diplomats have contributed to minimizing the significance 
of Russian interests in the region in the perception of Georgian politicians161.  
In Moscow, all this was regarded as an alarming symptom. The fact that the West 
once again intends to ignore Russia's interests. Moscow also feared that if Russia did not 
take active measures to protect the Abkhaz and Ossetian population of former Georgian 
autonomies from Tbilisi's attempts to impose territorial reintegration with Georgia by 
force, this could lead to a significant aggravation of the political situation in the North 
Caucasus, primarily in the Republics with the Circassian (Adyghe) ethnic component and 
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in North Ossetia. Therefore, the leadership of Russia came to the conclusion that it is 
possible to use military force against Georgia to ensure the status quo in the zone of the 
Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. Moreover, officially such a tactic 
could be justified and be a necessity for the protection of Russian citizens living on the 
territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Back in July 2008, the newspaper “Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta” published information with reference to an analytical report for the country's 
leadership recommending "all necessary measures with all the ensuing circumstances" to 
protect Abkhazia and South Ossetia.162 
Not only Russia, but Georgia was also preparing for war. However, as it has 
happened in history, both sides obviously did not expect the military conflict to break out 
so soon. The study of the events that led to the August 2008 war, apparently, for a long 
time will be the object of special historical research. To date, the most objective version of 
direct causes of the war was outlined in the report of the Independent International 
Mission on the establishment of the actual circumstances of the war in Georgia ("Mission 
Tagliavini"), established in December 2008 at the EU summit. Although the conclusions of 
this report, first introduced in September 2009, inevitably affected certain political and 
diplomatic constraints, due to the status and character of the Mission. Nevertheless, it 
follows from the report that the war was the result of coincidence of several dramatic 
circumstances, and both sides contributed to the unleashing of the conflict.163 The 
conclusion about mutual responsibility is shared by many other independent analysts 
from different countries of the world. 
However, in the international analytical community, it is also widely believed that 
Russia as a great power, bears great responsibility for what happened164.  An important 
issue, still subject to various assumptions and interpretations, concerns the reasons that 
prompted Russia's leadership to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, contrary to Moscow's previously adopted policy on "rapprochement without 
recognition". Apparently, this decision was determined to a large extent by the fact that as 
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a result of the postwar settlement, Russia would inevitably lose the status of a 
peacekeeper. Its armed forces would be forced to leave the territory of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. On the contrary, the recognition of these territories by independent states 
opened up the possibility for Russia to consolidate the outcome of the war and its 
presence, including the military one, in the former Georgian autonomies.  
  At the same time, Moscow was well aware of the negative consequences 
recognition for the positions of Russia in the international arena. However, as it turned 
out later, the miscalculation of the Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry was made only with 
regard to the reaction of the countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to Russia's recognition of the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. None of the countries included in these 
international organizations, including Belarus, Kazakhstan and China, did not support 
Russia. True, and this circumstance became a certain compensation for Moscow, the 
CSTO and SCO member states recognized Russia's special role in ensuring stability and 
order in the Caucasus region. The number of states that recognized the independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are Latin America and Oceania. But this was enough for 
Moscow to attribute Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the category of partially recognized 
states. As for Russia's relations with the West, then, as it was believed in the Kremlin, 
over time, the discussion of the issue of Georgia's territorial integrity turned into a routine 
exchange of views and reproaches on this topic. 
 
 
To the new status quo 
 
       The August war, of course, has become a frontier in Russian policy towards 
the South Caucasus. After that, it seemed for a while that Russia had completely changed 
its role in the region, instead of a country that maintained the status quo, a revisionist 
power. However, it soon became clear that, to create a new international order in the 
region and a new structure of regional security, Moscow hadn’t any ideas, or resources. At 
the same time, the Shortly after the war in September 2008, the global financial and 
economic crisis changed much in world politics. The US and EU, for various reasons, were 
forced to sharply limit their activity in the post-Soviet space, including the South 
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Caucasus. In this regard, they have lost the opportunity to act as world players capable of 
offering the region a new model of development and international relations. In Moscow, 
however, it was felt that its main objectives as a result of conflict were reached. 165The 
question of Georgia's accession to the NATO  was postponed indefinitely. The military 
presence of Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia has strengthened and has acquired a 
new, more solid in the legal sense and a long-term basis of bilateral treaties. And although 
President Saakashvili remained in power (many analysts in the West believe that one of 
the goals of the entry of Russian troops into the territory of Georgia was just to overthrow 
him), from the point of view of Russian leadership, the military potential of Georgia to 
unleash a new conflict was undermined. At Moscow, nevertheless, did not object to the 
normalization of relations with Georgia, but only on the condition that the "territorial 
issue" should not be affected at the talks. In the long run, it was assumed that if Tbilisi 
could establish a direct dialogue with the former autonomies, Moscow would not object to 
the creation of a confederation of Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Tbilisi did not like this approach at all. They believed that the basis for the 
beginning of the normalization of bilateral relations should be Russia's refusal to 
recognize the independence of the former autonomies and the confirmation of the 
territorial integrity of Georgia. 
In the next few years, Russia's policy in the South Caucasus, aimed at preserving 
the new Status quo, formed after the August war 2008, most likely, will not undergo 
significant changes. Moreover, most likely further deterioration of the situation in the 
Russian North Caucasus will encourage Moscow to strengthen support for Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. In the longer term, the return to active politics in the South Caucasus of 
global players - the US and EU, and the possible arrival of a new world actor - China 
substantially will change the situation in the region.166 For the states located here, the 
space for foreign policy maneuver will expand, and new opportunities for international 
cooperation will appear. In these circumstances, the Russian Federation, with its limited 
economic resources and an unattractive socio-political model, will find it increasingly 
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difficult to compete for role of the main partner of the countries of the South Caucasus 
and defend leadership positions here.  
Apparently, the role and participation of the Russian Federation in the settlement 
of the Karabakh problem will noticeably decrease. However, the recognition of new 
realities will hardly force Russia to reconsider its approaches to politics in the region 
towards multilateral cooperation. Apparently, Moscow will focus on Preservation of 
influence within the framework of new dividing lines with an emphasis on retaining 
control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.167 
During the years of post-Soviet independence, several periods have gradually 
changed in Russian-Azerbaijani relations.Post-Soviet years was marked by sharp leaps. 
Among the objective reasons for the slowdown, the problem168s related to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict are the first, followed by problems related to the creation of a new 
political elite, the disintegration of a single economic mechanism, and the division of all-
Union property. Among the subjective - the pro-Armenian position of the political and 
power groups of the Russian leadership, the Moscow's establishment of a transport 
blockade during the first Chechen campaign, irritation over the arrival of Western oil and 
gas companies in Azerbaijan. 
With the coming to power of Vladimir Putin, a surge of Russian activity in the 
post-Soviet space brings countries closer together and allows building a policy of strategic 
partnership. Nwe are witnessing the continuation of this line. Azerbaijan and Russia got 
rid of many complexes and illusions, learned new realism and pragmatism, overcame the 
difficulties of the transition period of their own development. Managed to go through a 
difficult path from the policy of emotion to long-term partnership. The dense fabric of 
today's relationships creates contacts at the senior management level business elites in the 
process of working on joint projects separately. Is it possible to say that the Russian-
Azerbaijani strategic partnership for today is a complete, and ideal geopolitical project? 
Probably, it will be more accurate to define it as a constantly developing multifaceted 
process that requires regular tuning. At the same time, the total result of these years is 
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with a positive balance. And given the rather impressive volume of complex regional and 
global problems, the final balance of relations inspires optimism.169 
Important and even key aspect of the relationship, while thin and not Always 
public - friendly relations between presidents, mutual sympathy. By the presence or 
absence of this feature, you can More accurately draw a picture of relations between 
countries. It is noticeable how Putin has changed his attitude to the West, primarily to the 
United States, and Ilham Aliyev is well aware that he is dealing with the strongest leader 
in the post-Soviet space, which will exert no less influence on Russian foreign policy 
beyond 2008. 
 
The interests and strategic lines of Turkey in the South Caucasus 
 
 In the early 1990s, ended the era when Turkey had a common land border with 
the Soviet Union, so that the Turks once again discovered their own Neighbors in the 
South Caucasus. For the first time in many centuries (except for the period from 1918 to 
1920), Turkey and Russia did not have a common land border. Establishing its first 
contacts with the former Soviet republics, Ankara showed the utmost caution in order not 
to cause a sharp reaction from Moscow, and it built up an even relationship with all the 
players. As a result of a new era of "old geographical discoveries," accompanied by changes 
in the cutting of interstate borders in the southern Caucasus region, the former Turkish-
Soviet border became a zone of instability, there was a danger of direct confrontation 
with Russia, and once again the phantom of the frequent Russian-Turkish wars of the past 
centuries flashed. In these conditions, the perception of [part of] the former Soviet space 
as a "geography of the Turkic world" receives a certain amount of fuel at the expense of 
the strategic course of the United States in the region, where Turkey is mainly prepared 
for the role of the West's bastion against Russia. Striving to maintain its strategic 
importance within NATO, Turkey perfectly combined its functions as a flank and front-
line alliance during the 1990s.  
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At that time, the ambiguous idea of "Turkishness" became an important leitmotif 
of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in the South Caucasus region, which led to a 
confrontational tone in relations with Russia and the pro-Azerbaijani "roll" in Ankara's 
position in the context of regional conflicts. The cornerstone of Turkey's policy towards 
South Caucasus region is a project to lay the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. 
Ankara's regional policy has actually been squeezed into the framework of the BTC issues. 
Such a narrow approach limits the opportunities for Ankara's more active involvement in 
the affairs of the region and the formation of strategic thinking. Overcoming the 
remaining frictions in the 2000s will be helped by the strengthening of bilateral Turkish-
Russian ties. In its relations with Russia, Turkey is gradually overcoming the legacy Cold 
war, which directly affects its strategic vector in the South Caucasus.170 
The era of "geographical discoveries": the reopening of neighbors in the South 
Caucasus Turkey began to once again worry about the future of the South Caucasus in 
January 1990, when, in response to attacks on the Armenian community in Baku in the 
capital of Azerbaijan were introduced Soviet troops and killed several hundred 
Azerbaijani demonstrators. Despite the sympathy of the broad masses of the Turkish 
population towards the Azerbaijani brothers, the government of Turkey nevertheless took 
a very cautious position based on the insistent assertion that the events in Azerbaijan 
were purely a domestic affair of the Soviet Union. Istanbul also refused to recognize the 
premature independence of Azerbaijan, proclaimed on January 20. 
In March 1991, President of the Turkish Republic Turgut Ozal paid an official 
visit to Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, as well as to Moscow; Regular flights 
between Istanbul and Baku were opened. A month later, the first in the history of 
relations between the two countries, a high-ranking official of Turkey visited Armenia, 
when the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Volkan Vural arrived in Yerevan to discuss 
ways of improving Bilateral relations. The government of M. Yilmaz decided to take a 
certain risk by recognizing the independence of all former Soviet republics before similar 
decisions were made by the US and other Western countries. One of the latest decisions 
taken by the government of M. Yilmaz before the end of his term of office was the 
recognition of independent Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991. The government of S. 
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Yemmaz replaced the government of S. Demirel and continued the course, recognizing 
December 19 [the same year] all the rest New independent states, Formed in the former 
Soviet space.171 
In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the practice of border crossings 
changed radically. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of new 
independent states in the South Caucasus, Turkey had to build relations with its new 
neighbors. The most significant events of the early 1990s were the closure of the only 
border crossing with Armenia in 1993 and the opening of new border crossings with 
Georgia and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.172 
 
Armenia-Turkey: Strategic Opportunities for all 
 
      One of the most significant new situations in this region is the normalization 
of relations between Turkey and Armenia. This new diplomatic activity opens up a 
number of strategic opportunities at various levels: the possibility of reintegration for the 
entire South Caucasus region; A new level of relations that are not burdensome and not 
obscured by the history associated with the genocide, for Turkey and Armenia; And, 
finally, for the United States, in particular, there is a powerful chance to re-create the 
geopolitical map of the South Caucasus, which will have consequences that go beyond the 
region, and will affect Russia and even Iran.                          
Moreover, the strategic opportunities that characterize the Turkish-Armenian 
diplomacy are associated with several special advantages. First, it strengthens stability in 
the region, as it seeks to resolve disputes by diplomatic rather than military means, which 
is a striking contrast to the terrible lesson learned from the war in Georgia.  
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Second The chance is connected with the possibility to optimize the Turkish-
Armenian diplomacy with the aim of renewing efforts to resolve the unresolved conflict 
in Nagorno-Karabakh, the last "frozen" conflict in the South Caucasus.173 
The third possibility is focused on the wider implications of normalizing relations 
with Turkey as an important mechanism for deepening democracy and supporting 
reforms in each of the countries, which at the same time offers a new path towards 
regional reintegration and wider development after the opening of the borders and the 
resumption of trade. Finally, in a broader perspective, diplomatic activity Turkey in 
relation to Armenia can help with the possible accession to the EU, especially in the light 
of Turkey's recent launch of the Kurdish Initiative. 
Despite the fact that initiatives aimed at achieving normalization in the past have 
not yielded significant success, the potential advantages of even the simplest and most 
primitive forms of activity are obvious to both countries and unite them. For Turkey, 
opening the border with Armenia will be a strategic opportunity to increase economic 
activity in the poor eastern regions of the country. Such development could play a key 
role in the economic stabilization of the turbulent eastern regions with Kurdish 
settlement, and so fulfill the important task of national security, counteracting the causes 
of Kurdish terrorism and separatism with similarly, opening the border with Turkey 
would allow Armenia to withdraw from regional isolation and marginalization, and at the 
same time become a bridge that gives access to larger markets that is necessary for 
economic growth and development. In addition, commercial and economic activity 
resulting from the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border would have a positive impact 
on the subsequent trade ties between the two countries, which in turn would lead to 
greater formal cooperation in the customs sphere and border security. The deepening of 
bilateral ties and cross-border cooperation could undoubtedly be followed by the 
establishment of diplomatic relations.174 In this way the opening of the Turkish-Armenian 
border  would not only lead to a significant breakthrough in the development of trade and 
economic ties, but would also serve as an impetus to support stability and security in the 
conflict-prone region of the South Caucasus.  
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The energy vector in bipolar Approach to security factor 
 
       However, despite the growing volume of mutual exchanges in the border zone 
between Turkey and the countries of the South Caucasus, during the 1990s Turkey had to 
combine its traditional function of the flank state of NATO with a new task - to ensure 
the front line of the alliance. In the early 1990s Turkey's role in NATO has acquired a 
new dimension: it became a "front-line" state. It was assumed that the new cold war with 
Moscow could rather take the form of friction in the remote southern periphery of Russia 
than a more direct confrontation in the European theater. Security challenges were 
considered more serious, more direct and more fraught with the use of force in the 
eastern Mediterranean, possibly on the border with Turkey. The regional position of 
Turkey was formed under the influence of US energy policy, imbued with confrontational 
logic in relation to Russia. 
          The cornerstone of Turkey's policy towards South Caucasus region is a project to lay 
the BTC oil pipeline. Turkey took an active part in the development of the concept of the 
project, and its completion symbolizes the real success of Turkish diplomacy, which made 
considerable efforts to unravel the complex tangle of the existing problems. The 
importance of the pipeline connecting the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean Sea 
through the territory of Turkey, is mainly due to its political, not economic dimension. In 
the traditional bipolar paradigm, Turkey seeks to extract political and strategic benefits by 
finding its niche in the dynamics of relations between the United States and Russia. The 
official opening of the BTC oil pipeline was held on July 13, 2006 at a solemn ceremony in 
Ceyhan, which received wide coverage in the press.  
           That day was called historic. It is expected that the volumes of oil pumped through 
the BTC will in the future reach the level of two million barrels a day (b / d), which will 
allow even more diversification of energy sources at the expense of countries not included 
in the OPEC. At the same time, revenues from transit operation, the oil pipeline will 
depend on the volumes of oil transported. During the first 16 years of operation of the 
pipeline, the expected level of revenues will be in the range of 140-200 million US dollars, 
and in the next 24 years - between 200 and 300 million US dollars. Before the BTC 
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pipeline reaches its maximum capacity of 1 million b / d, the expected level income from 
its operation should not exceed level of revenues from oil pipeline operation Iraq-Turkey. 
With the expansion of the circle of supporters of the BTC pipeline (which Ankara gave its 
preference to), Turkey also strengthened its security ties among the countries of the 
region. Azerbaijan and Georgia have launched an active campaign to expand their 
relations with NATO in the military and security spheres. Azerbaijan offered its territory 
to the US, NATO and (or) Turkey to deploy a military base in exchange for the country's 
joining NATO as a leading a bulwark in opposing Russian expansionism. 175 
        Both Azerbaijan and Georgia have expanded their military ties with Turkey, 
including training [military] personnel and conducting joint exercises, and made a 
proposal to intensify cooperation with NATO in order to ensure the safety of the pipeline 
infrastructure176. All three partner countries tried to consolidate their willingness to 
cooperate in some official document related to the BTC. 177This process resulted to the 
signing on July 23, 2003 of the Protocol "On Ensuring the Security of the East-West 
Energy Corridor" between the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of 
Turkey. The regional security system created under the auspices of Turkey is aimed at 
preserving the status quo.178 The emerging regional security system, focused on Tasks of 
"pipeline protection", contributes to "deep freezing" of existing conflicts and aggravates 
polarization processes due to the advancement of bipolar regional order, which is fraught 
with aggravation of tension and the emergence of additional threats and security 
challenges in this volatile region. 
        As a result of its regional policy, entrenched in the "Procrustean bed" of the 
BTC project, Turkey largely contributed to the freeze of the Azerbaijani-Armenian 
conflict. The diplomatic potential of Ankara in the region was significantly weakened by 
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the compromise formula of the relationship between security considerations and 
economic expediency found by Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
         The policy of Turkey in the region was hostage to her Relations with 
Azerbaijan in the field of security. Moreover, the occupation of the frankly pro-
Azerbaijani position on regional issues was the price paid for the BTC pipeline project.   
 
 
Triangle Turkey-Azerbaijan-Armenia And the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh,  
Inviolability of international borders 
 
However, towards the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border, it was not this 
dispute that ultimately led, but an exacerbation the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The 
closure of the border in the midst of the war in Karabakh was a kind of retaliation, which 
Turkey responded to the occupation of part of the territory of Azerbaijan by Armenia. 
since then, the question of opening the border has been perceived as a question of lifting 
the ten-year-long blockade imposed by Armenia by Turkey and is linked to the issue of a 
political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the return of the occupied 
territories to Azerbaijan. Any potential departure [of Turkey] from this traditional 
position causes concern in Azerbaijan, which fears a possible weakening of its position as 
a result of this in the search for a political settlement of the Karabakh dispute. A 
widespread fear in Azerbaijan is that if the normal regime of the transition of the Turkish-
Armenian border is resumed, Baku will lose the main lever of influence on Yerevan. In 
these conditions, Azerbaijan exerts pressure on Turkey in order to preserve the existing 
status quo, since the effectiveness of the blockade can only be achieved if Armenia's 
isolation on both sides remains. In this context, it is believed that the resumption of the 
normal functioning of the border may jeopardize relations between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan, moral and political and economic support to Armenia and adversely affect the 
prospects for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
 Adherents of such logic do not try to put question  for the effectiveness of 
Turkey's adherence to the idea of maintaining a closed regime on the border with 
Armenia, accepting as a self-evident argument that if the economic blockade of Armenia 
gives leverage to other participants in the peace negotiations, the leverage of influence on 
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Yerevan. At the same time, the main issue here should sound as follows: did the policy of 
boycotting Armenia on the part of Turkey lead to the development of any solution and 
finding any way out of the conflict? Does such a policy help Azerbaijan at the negotiating 
table? Finally, was Azerbaijan closer to being able to force the Armenian side to make any 
major concessions? Is not it time for Turkey to abandon the course that did not lead to 
positive results, and begin the process of normalizing relations with Armenia in order to 
more actively promote Resolution of the Karabakh issue and more effectively promote the 
interests of Azerbaijan. 
   In essence, Azerbaijan's support from Turkey in the form of closing the border 
with Armenia was nothing more than a symbolic gesture. Over the past twenty years, the 
boycott of Armenia by Turkey has not contributed to the development of any decision. 
Moreover, Ankara's policy has limited the potential for Turkey to influence Turkey. 
Despite the fact that Turkey is a permanent member of the Minsk Group and fully 
Supports all efforts undertaken by her, the very unenviable state of her relations with 
Armenia only hampers the realization of her potential, which she could play [more] 
active mediation role in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Consequently, the 
preservation of the status quo does not help Turkey in achieving its foreign policy goals. 
Preservation of the status quo also hardly corresponds to the interests of Azerbaijan. 
   Turkish-Armenian protocols in Zurich October 10, 2009 opened a historic 
window of opportunity to normalize bilateral relations. Both sides have worked hard for a 
month to study carefully  and agree on documents designed to create conditions for 
achieving bilateral intergovernmental agreement. The signed protocols contain a detailed 
plan for establishing diplomatic ties, opening common borders And improving bilateral 
official relations and strengthening ties at the level of ordinary people on the basis of a set 
of common principles and an agreed timetable. At the moment, apparently, we can say 
that the process of normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia has reached a 
deadlock. Prospects for a second inclusion of protocols on the current agenda seems to be 
very fragile, especially after the decision taken by Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan on 
April 22, 2010, to suspend the procedure for their ratification by the country's 
parliament.179 A common understanding is that the process is suspended for an indefinite 
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period.180 To achieve success in this process, factors such as efficiency and transparency 
would be needed, but the pace was not high, and positions are ambiguous. In addition, the 
negotiations were strongly influenced by domestic political agendas in both capitals. The 
whole process was upset because of a new condition put forward by Turkey - to link the 
normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations with the settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Conflict. 
          Preservation of Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations in a state of rupture at 
this stage, is fraught with a higher probability of diverting attention of the world 
community from the problems of the region and worsening prospects for achieving any 
settlement of the conflict in the foreseeable future.  
 
Turkey's interest in strengthening Independent Georgia: first of all, a neighbor, 
and not just a transit territory for a pipeline 
 
         The importance of Georgia for Turkey can not be overestimated. The 
development of relations with Turkey helps Georgia to strengthen its independence. On 
the other hand, after the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border, Georgia turned into a 
gateway to the South Caucasus for Turkey and - further - to Central Asia.181 The best 
symbol of this logical connection is the BTC oil pipeline. Georgia, initially perceived 
[only] from the point of view of the transit of Caspian oil along the BTC route, becomes 
also a neighbor. The return of the war to the region in 2008 demonstrated the 
preservation of serious risks associated with the operation of East-West transit and the 
laying of a transport corridor through the territory of Georgia. However, for Ankara, the 
formation of a hotbed of instability and unpredictability as a result of the war that erupted 
literally near the most northeastern borders of Turkey is a much more serious source of 
concern than interruptions to supply of hydrocarbons through the pipeline.182 
The border strip between Turkey and Georgia is completely open to people and 
trade. The airport in Batumi, built and operated by the Turkish company TAV, is operated 
by Turkish Airlines (THY) for  domestic flights. The village of Sarpi, once divided into 
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parts by a Cold War , is reunited [in one piece] thanks to Intensive border exchanges and 
cooperation. Adjaria integrates with the Black Sea coast of Turkey. Once closed, the 
village of Gonio is now the venue for business meetings at the dinner table between 
Turkish and Georgian business partners. Inspired by the experience of the united Europe, 
the Turkish and Georgian authorities are doing their best to virtually erase the borders 
between the two countries. In these conditions, the state of Russian-Turkish relations has 
become an important source of concern for Ankara.183 
 
 
Overcoming the legacy of the Cold War: the rapprochement between Turkey and 
Russia and the events in the South Caucasus 
 
  The strengthening of bilateral Turkish-Russian relations will help overcome the 
frictions that have remained since the 2000s. Turkey is gradually overcoming the legacy 
of the Cold War in its relations with Russia, which directly affects the formation of 
Turkey's strategic course towards the South Caucasus. Russia is gradually becoming the 
main partner [of Turkey] in the former Soviet space, in particular, on the part that was 
defined in the 1990s as the "geography of the Turkic world." Finally, there is some 
discomfort experienced by Ankara with regard to Washington's ambitions in the Black 
Sea region, and also a ripe willingness to pursue a more confident and independent 
foreign policy will help of Turkey to dump the burden of thinking in the spirit of the Cold 
War. In 2003-2004, against the backdrop of the invasion of Iraq, both countries - Turkey 
and Russia - began to fear the growth of the Bush administration's activity in the Black 
Sea and South Caucasus regions, considering it as a major factor of instability.  
        For first, NATO had no need to deploy forces in this region, since there 
already existed adequate regional structures, also already tuned to the wave of interaction 
with NATO.  
Secondly, any regional initiative must necessarily include Russia as well. 
According to Ankara, any movements that irritate Moscow are fraught with 
destabilization of the situation in the region. 
                                                          
183 Revaz Gachechiladze, The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics, Texas A & M University Press: 
College Station, 1995, pp. 19-20 
138 
 
       Russia can be an important participant in the search for ways to resolve frozen 
conflicts in the region. The process of historical reconciliation between Turkey and Russia 
should cause the same enthusiasm as the same process between France and Germany at 
one time triggered when two traditional enemies found [and expand] the general political 
bases of mutual understanding. In this rapprochement between the two nations, the 
economy as a whole and the private sector in particular played the driving force. Both 
countries, which fought each other sixteen times in the history of their existence, 
[suddenly] realized the fact that they have no more reasons for wars. For the 1990s, it was 
typical for the scenery to be set again for the resumption of a 400-year race between 
Turkey and Russia. The conditions that prevailed in the region at the end of the Cold War 
provided grounds for asserting that there was profound hostility at the genetic level 
between the two peoples. Turkey and Russia have always had disputed territories, where 
their interests and mutual claims collided. 
          Before the Transcaucasus appeared on the border between the Republic of 
Turkey and the USSR in 1921, it was a region of direct contact between the Ottoman and 
Russian empires. A distinctive feature of this contact was a rather high level of violence, 
because for many decades, both empires fought among themselves rather than traded. 
Acting as a kind of gray zone between two political rivals and fulfilling the function of the 
buffer zone, the Transcaucasian region has long been a platform for mutual disputes. An 
extensive multilateral partnership, supported by both states, is based on the achieved 
mutual understanding that contributed to the gradual overcoming of the centuries-old 
heritage of mutual claims and conflicts. This is sad, the legacy was filled with many 
unsightly pictures that formed a thick tangle of suspicion, mutual hostility and fear. The 
process of Turkish-Russian reconciliation is  more interesting and promising, since it 
involves ordinary citizens-entrepreneurs and tourists. Russia has become for Turkey the 
largest supplier of natural gas and one of the main partners in the implementation of 
regional energy projects. 
       From the point of view of Turkey, still interested in energy transportation 
projects from east to west [through its territory], energy issues are no longer a factor of 
polarization in the South Caucasus. According to IMF data from 2010, Turkey ranks third 
in the world in terms of growth in energy consumption, second only to China and India 
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and ahead of Brazil. In these conditions, it is extremely necessary to develop a global 
energy strategy (concept) based on pragmatism and market principles.  
 
 
 
 The European Union in the South Caucasus 
 
   The European Union (EU) in the 1990s became one of the main players in the 
South Caucasus.  However, unlike the US and NATO, the EU in its "Caucasian policy" 
does not focus on the military-political, but on the socio-economic sphere. The second 
priority direction of the EU is to ensure stability in the region, as well as respect and 
compliance with the "European standards" in the field of human rights and democratic 
freedoms.  
The emphasis in the close bilateral and multilateral relations of the EU on 
political, economic, and humanitarian ties with the countries of the South Caucasus shows 
the advantage of considering the interests of security and the economy. There are 
different approaches of the European Union to the Caucasus region. To implement these 
approaches at their disposal EU has various political and economic means. 
In accordance with this approach, political instability in the Caucasus region is 
obvious, security issues and ethnic conflicts are the main problems of the Caucasus, 
therefore the Caucasian region should occupy the appropriate place on the agenda of the 
European Union. In accordance with the energy interests, the Caucasus for the EU is one 
of the most important regions. 
 The EU's relations with the countries of the South Caucasus can be assessed: 
• within the framework of relations established with the former Soviet Union 
countries After 1990; 
• in the framework of regional relations with the EU; 
• within the framework of EU relations with individual countries; 
• within the framework of International Organizations and formations. 
The EU recognized the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 
December 1991. In 1994, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
considered the issue of prospects for cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
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In 1995, the EU Council adopted a draft "common position" on the states of the South 
Caucasus, which stressed the need for comprehensive assistance to the former South 
Caucasus republic in the construction of democratic institutions. All the countries of the 
South Caucasus are in favor of European integration and consider this direction of their 
foreign policy one of the priority. But the "European character" of its policy stresses 
Georgia. In 1997, the parliament of this state adopted the "Concept of Strengthening 
Stability of Public Life, State Sovereignty and Security, Restoration of Georgia's Territorial 
Integrity." This document emphasized the constructive role of European institutions. In 
1999, President Shevardnadze proclaimed the European direction of Georgian foreign 
policy to be one of the priority. In early 1999, Georgia was admitted to the Council of 
Europe, despite the unsettledness of the two inter-ethnic conflicts. This recognized the 
"European" democratic character of the republic. In October 1999, the head of Georgia 
visited Germany, where he was received not just as head of a foreign state, but also as an 
"architect of a united Europe" and "new thinking". A year later, Federal Chancellor of 
Germany G. Schroeder visited Georgia. With the advent of Saakashvili's team, Tbilisi's 
aspirations to the EU were pushed to the background, the main efforts were focused on 
the country's introduction into NATO. Moreover, by that time Brussels had made it clear 
to all members of the next wave of candidates for membership in the EU that the 
admission to the Union had been suspended for an indefinite period of time. 
       Azerbaijan, in comparison with Georgia and Armenia, was most often 
awarded criticism from the EU. Recognizing the facts of the republic's movement towards 
democracy, representatives of European structures gave a generally critical assessment of 
the political process in Azerbaijan. They invariably noted numerous violations in 
legislation and abuse of power by officials of all levels. Nonetheless, the leaders of the 
republic, declaring the need for close integration with the EU in all directions, constantly 
stressed that the republic "is aware of itself as a constituent element of a new Europe". 
       But, despite these declarations, there is no conscious and well-developed 
policy of integration in Baku until now. The EU and the Council of Europe are often 
indignant over gross violations of human rights, persecution of journalists in Azerbaijan, 
and in Baku they are dissuaded that in the West they do not understand the local features. 
If we forget about the energy factor that Europe is worried about, it turns out that 
everything that the authorities of the republic has undertaken regarding integration is 
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nothing more than a good wish. It is not uncommon for a high-level government, that 
Europe is reprimanded for its comments on the limitation of Democracy, violation of 
human rights, justifying this by the originality Historical moment, the burden of problems 
from the past. Sometimes even Europeans are reprimanded: they say that there are many 
similar problems, the situation in Azerbaijan is no worse than that of its neighbors, 
Georgia. European standards, which are the only true criterion for European integration, 
are not affirmed either in the economic, cultural or social life. 
      The European direction has become one of the priorities in Armenia's foreign 
policy. In January 1994 the visit of the head of the Armenian Parliament to Armenia was 
held in Strasbourg, and in September of the same year Armenia took part in the session of 
the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. In 1996, Armenia was the first of the 
South Caucasus states to be granted special guest status in the PACE. In subsequent years, 
representatives of the Council of Europe often criticized Armenia for a "non-European" 
political style (strengthening authoritarian tendencies in Internal policy, as well as the 
lack of flexibility in the Karabakh Settlement). For their part, representatives of the 
political class and public figures of Armenia, criticize European Structures for the desire to 
impose ideas that are alien to the Armenian society (tolerant attitude towards sexual 
minorities, non-traditional religious associations, etc.). Still, it should be noted that 
Yerevan's position in terms of building up promising relations in three directions – 
Russian, American and European - is preferable to its neighbors in terms of Region.  The 
official policy of Armenia is complemented by the work of strong lobbying centers, 
various ties in the capitals of the most important states of the world. Losing in recent 
years Azerbaijan in the discussions of international organizations, Yerevan nevertheless 
finds its understanding of its unyielding policy at the diplomatic level and enjoys great 
support on the international Level. 
        Armenia's relations with its Islamic neighbor are developing in all directions 
and are almost friendly, while Azerbaijan's relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
which has more opportunities and grounds for this, remain tense, periodically even 
tingling.  
Having studied the position of the EU in relation to ethnic conflicts and rich 
natural resources in the region, some researchers argue that the EU is interested in the 
Caucasus, without pursuing any policy. Nevertheless, contrary to these statements, after 
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the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region was recognized as a new market for ensuring 
the security of Europe's enlarged borders with rich resources and developing trade, and 
thus gained a place in the EU strategy. Rapprochement of the South Caucasus with the 
West, a partial or complete desire to pursue an independent policy independent of Russia, 
accelerated economic and political cooperation with Western Countries. 
          After the enlargement of the European Union, the South Caucasus region 
has acquired great importance for the EU and the Western world. Adoption of the 
countries of the region of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia in the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP) creates conditions that allow developing relations that will benefit both the 
South Caucasus and the EU. Inclusion in the integration process, through which the 
implementation of the reform potential is developing, is of great importance for societies 
in transition. Nevertheless, the rich natural resources and geopolitical position of the 
South Caucasus region is an important criterion for the EU. The EU, the largest 
international energy-consuming actor, will in future buy most of the oil and natural gas 
through imports. In that Context, the continued importation of oil and natural gas and its 
delivery through the Middle East and Russia is a direct threat to the energy security of the 
EU. 
         Taking advantage of political and economic influence, the EU has been 
trying on a regional level since 2000 and through bilateral dialogue to strengthen its 
relations with the main energy producers towards the establishment of market rules. 
Within the framework of this policy, relations with the countries of the South Caucasus, 
being regulated by legal laws, are developed by projects and programs related to energy. 
One of the mechanisms that the EU uses to strengthen energy security is a strategically 
important policy of energy diversification [9]. The policy of diversification (diversity) at 
the EU level was not quite successful due to lack of political support. First, it was aimed at 
reducing dependence on Russia. However, contrary to the logic of the policy of 
diversification, several EU states have concluded bilateral agreements with Russia. 
Nevertheless, the EU, considering such important competitors as China and India, is 
making efforts to ensure the implementation of pipeline projects in the east-west 
direction.  
In addition to this, the Caucasus, connecting two important seas - the Black and 
the Caspian, is located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Islam, and Christianity. The 
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South Caucasus provides an opportunity for interregional, intercultural, and interreligious 
cooperation.  The region can play a key role in the development of mutual understanding 
and dialogue between the East and the West. At the same time, this region, perceiving 
external influences and synthesizing optimal answers, can make contribution to the 
modeling of effective forms of modernization and Europeanization, which will have a 
huge impact in the east. Thus, we can say that the development of relations between the 
EU and the South Caucasus has a positive outlook and is in the interests of the countries of 
the region and the EU. 
The European Union on most key issues relating to policy in the South Caucasus 
and further development of the region, is worth on positions close to the United States.184 
In this case, often the "military fist" of the United States and NATO and the "soft power" 
of the European Union actually complement each other, which gives a synergistic effect, 
remains objective complementarities between the resources and intentions of the United 
States and the European Union to expand their influence in the east in general and in the 
South Caucasus in particular. With the expansion of the European Union, the significance 
of the South Caucasus has increased for him. Recently, European experts have been 
increasingly emphasizing that instability in the Caucasus is a threat to the EU.185 The main 
tasks in the region, the solution of which the EU intends to give priority to, are the 
following: 
- development of the energy production sector and provision of transportation of 
Caspian energy resources to the West; 
- settlement of ethnopolitical crises in the Caucasus; 
- Building a democratic and legal society in the states of the South Caucasus. 
The activation of the Caucasian policy of the EU can be noted since 2003, when 
the EU special representative for the South Caucasus was appointed (Heike Talvitie, since 
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2006 this position is occupied by Peter Semneby).186 In June 2004, the South Caucasus 
states were included in the EU's "European Neighborhood Policy" program, which aims to 
develop closer contacts with states located near the external borders of the European 
Union. Since 2007, funding for specific projects under this program has been started, and 
substantial funds are being allocated from the EU budget. The activities planned within 
the framework of the "European Neighborhood Policy" program will become the EU's 
main tool for penetrating the Caucasus. At the same time, the weakness of the EU, which 
is intensely engaged in developing a common foreign policy doctrine, is that on many 
issues within this Union, an agreed position has not yet been formulated. In addition, the 
further development of common approaches and the expansion of EU activity in the Black 
Sea-Caspian region are complicated, exacerbated internal problems (the failure of 
Introduction into the political practice of the EU) and contradictions are arising between 
the EU member states.187 
Washington, for its part, seeks to direct the EU's resources to strategically 
beneficial projects for the US. (So, he insists On the accession of one of the most 
important players in the South Caucasus - Turkey to the EU.) With regard to energy 
resources, the common interests of the US and the EU are to ensure the uninterrupted 
supply of Caspian oil and gas through Azerbaijan and Georgia (including Armenia in the 
future, bypassing Russia) . 
But it is also important to note that the competitive struggle of the "Westerners" 
with other players and centers of power that are leading their policy in the region is 
intensifying. What this competition will lead to and whether it is an absolute boon for the 
countries of the region is not yet clear. The expected rapid influx of investment from 
competing forces, a noticeable economic growth, an increase in the standard of living of 
the population in most countries of the region has not happened yet.188 The level of 
security and stability also leaves much to be desired, and compared to the times of the 
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Cold War, it even went down. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the escalation of 
military tension around Iran with the possibility of another war in close proximity to the 
borders of the region give enough reasons for pessimistic forecasts. The war in the 
immediate vicinity of strategic energy communications is extremely undesirable for both 
Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan. In addition to conflicts, the situation in the region can be 
affected by increased expectations from petrodollars, unprecedented enrichment of a 
small part and greater poverty. This horrendous social polarization, forces people to turn 
to religion, , and also leads to massive forced emigration and migration.  
Today, it is quite possible to talk about a single geopolitical model of Western 
countries in relation to the South Caucasus, acting on the principles of atlantism. Its 
distinctive features: the unity of the energy policy, which provides for the creation of a 
South Caucasus corridor for the supply of energy resources to Western markets, which 
operates around Russia; Use of the communication capabilities of the region in the 
common interest;189 The conduct of a common defense and security policy, which in 
practical politics results in the entry of the countries of the South Caucasus and Central 
Asia into the North Atlantic Alliance; Complete "squeezing" of Russia from the region - 
not only politically, but also culturally, the weakening of economic ties between the 
South Caucasian states and Russia, ideological reorientation Of the population of the 
South Caucasus to the West using anti-Russian motives; Admission of other players to the 
region; 190The use of the South Caucasus as a kind of bilateral barrier that prevents both 
the spread of Russian influence in the south and Islamic influence in the west. A 
significant place in the palette of external forces that affect Countries of the region, 
occupies Turkey and as the "southern anchor" of NATO, and how one of the most 
influential regional powers, historically striving for leadership among the Turkic-speaking 
countries and actively developing partnership relations with Georgia.  
Several European political initiatives are being conducted in the South Caucasus. 
In addition to the Southern Energy Corridor, such initiatives are the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy. The 
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geopolitical situation causes a great interest of external players in the development of this 
region. In addition to Russia, the United States and the EU are actively involved in this 
process by regional players: Turkey and Iran. The integration of the South Caucasus into 
the ENP began relatively recently. The strategy of the EU consisted in the parallel 
development of relations with all countries with which the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement was concluded in 1999. The next phase used the ENP Action Plans, which 
were designed to support democratic reforms, stimulate the market economy and 
cooperation with the EU. All Action Plans were aimed at economic recovery after ethnic 
conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. According to this plan, Georgia was to 
become a stable and prosperous democracy that could integrate separatist South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia at the expense of economic attractiveness. 
Mediation of conflicts is not part of the "Eastern Partnership ", although this 
should be the main pre-requisite for the development of the region. To stimulate the 
creation of an effective governance system in the countries of the South Caucasus, the EU 
needs to unite efforts aimed at resolving conflicts, economic cooperation and support of 
civil society. Only active participation of the EU in all regional processes, including those 
not related to energy, may indicate support for the principles of democracy, transparency 
and a market economy.  
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter four 
 
 
History of attempted solutions 
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The so-called frozen conflicts are among the most difficult challenges to the 
security of the Black Sea region, as well as the national interests of several post-Soviet 
states. These include the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. 
These conflicts differ in scale, history, and regulatory options, but they are 
structurally similar. In each of these conflicts there are factors such as weakness of states, 
economic depression and external support. Moreover, they create the same threat to the 
national security of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Artificially "frozen" or muffled, all 
these conflicts remain unresolved. Along with traditional geopolitical problems, they are 
also a source of transnational threats. Common sense suggests that regional integration is 
one of the best possible answers to this kind of problem.  
However, despite numerous attempts to include frozen conflicts within the 
framework of various integration projects, they are still far from the solution. It is possible 
that now they are even further from the solution than ever earlier. Here a dilemma arises. 
Is regional integration an ineffective tool for resolving the problems of individuality and 
separatism? This would mean that a liberal approach to conflict management, in its 
broader sense, loses its appeal. Or there is something special either in the conflicts 
themselves, or in the conditions in which they develop?  
Such pluralism can have different origins, but most often it is ethnic or 
ideological. Most modern theories of ethnic conflict suggest that it is better to regulate 
ethnic / ideological differences than to eliminate them.  
With 285 politically active minority groups, inhabiting only about 200 countries, 
ethnic problems are inevitable. Simultaneously with ideological, religious, and internal 
political disagreements, they create an extensive base for various internal political 
conflicts. If we consider the effects of globalization and the growing interdependence on a 
global scale, it is impossible to solve the problems of individuality by eliminating ethnic, 
religious, and ideological diversity through genocide or ethnic cleansing, as well as by 
artificially creating an isolated homogeneous society. For those who define politics, there 
is only one option - to manage disagreements, and not to liquidate them. Strategies can be 
different. They are usually aimed at various causes of internal conflicts, attempts to 
improve ethnic security dilemma, to minimize the level of discrimination and to ensure a 
more effective separation of power. 
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All this is important for the internal post-Soviet conflicts. They are due to the 
interaction of factors, among which structural and political are the most important. The 
combination of a weak state and an active local elite creates a dilemma of ethnic security 
in which state norms and regularities can no longer contain mutual distrust, suspicion, 
and hostility between ethnic groups. This combination is enhanced by economic 
problems, political instability and growing cultural discrimination. With small variations, 
all these factors could be observed in the initial stage of frozen conflicts. They also have 
another common feature. Except for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Russian-
speaking minority plays a significant role.  This opens the door to permanent Russian 
support for the self-proclaimed states of   Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia's 
participation in these conflicts not only raises doubts about objectivity of Russia as an 
intermediary, but also changes their structure, increasing asymmetry and reducing the 
likelihood of reaching an agreement. 
In these circumstances, it is problematic both to improve the security dilemma, 
and to create effective mechanisms for the separation of power. Theoretically, such 
Conflicts, as in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, are best resolved through strategic 
liberalization. This approach involves a long-term transformation of the social structure 
with a view to eliminating all forms of discrimination and ensuring equal access to power 
by various ethnic groups, thus minimizing the likelihood of outbursts of hostility. Unlike 
rapid democratization, this approach does not provoke a sharp increase of nationalist 
ideology and rhetoric, since it pays more attention to the means of limiting aggression and 
does not support the "win or lose "in relations with other ethnic groups. Strategic 
liberalization is aimed at the gradual construction of a democratic society in which both 
the strengthening of the state and the separation power, are achieved through the 
introduction of democratic norms and institutions. 
Moreover, the Caucasus is the only part of the former USSR, where neighboring 
states do not have diplomatic relations with each other (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia 
and Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey). The borders of Armenia with Turkey and Azerbaijan 
are closed. The opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway route will only increase the 
isolation of Armenia. 
After the collapse of the USSR, all countries in the region haven’t demonstrated 
readiness to find compromises to strengthen regional cooperation. They preferred to 
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contact external partners to replenish their own resources and solutions to various 
political and economic tasks, often to cause damage to a neighbor. Three South Caucasus 
states are involved in intense competition between European and Eurasian integration 
projects. 
Therefore, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is now considered the most explosive. 
And there is, as I said, the long-playing historical background is the Armenian-Turkish 
conflict, which, apart from other conflicts, is not explosive, but is a very important 
component, primarily in the Karabakh conflict and in the geopolitical situation of the 
entire region. The South Caucasus differs from the Balkans in that, there was no peace 
agreement in the South Caucasus - the maximum that the parties agreed upon is a 
ceasefire that was respected in some situations, and in some cases, it was not. In 2008, it 
was violated in the Georgian conflicts and was constantly violated in the Karabakh 
conflict. In the Balkans peace treaties were signed, there was a trial - tribunal - for the 
former Yugoslavia, there was a transitional international administration in Kosovo, a 
detailed plan for restructuring the political systems. That is, the world in the Balkans was 
indeed constructed according to all the rules. 
All this, of course, does not add stability. But if you return to your question about 
why the world was established there, and in the Caucasus - no, the answer is simple: 
because the Balkans had a priority, because this is Europe. I must say that the Russian 
factor was not so strong in the Balkans - it was not absent, but it was not so strong as it 
was in the South Caucasus, and in such a situation there was not a big deal between the 
external forces. 
Under the Russian factor, I mean the position of Russia on a compromise, 
agreement between the parties. Russia did not play the role of an honest broker in the 
conflicts in the South Caucasus, because it is increasingly confidently considering this 
region as a property - or, as they say, as a sign of its interests. Russia does not benefit from 
a large-scale war. The only thing that Russia did during the times of Yeltsin's rule is, in 
fact, an agreement on a cease-fire - both in the Karabakh situation and in the Georgian-
Abkhazian one. But today Russia is an obstacle to the creation of a sustainable world, 
because any bilateral agreement between the participants in thesis of the most existential 
conflicts, will entrench the ability to control this region. Europe needed peace in the 
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Balkans, at any cost, and Russia does not need such a world in the Caucasus, and not at 
any cost. 
 
Georgia 
 
The ruling party of Georgia "Georgian Dream", despite the acute confrontation 
with ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili, continues strengthening of cooperation ties with 
the EU and NATO. It was the government of the "Georgian dream " which signed the EU-
Georgia Association Agreement. It also agreed on a visa-free regime from 2017. These 
tasks seemed almost unattainable during the presidency of Saakashvili. The current 
Georgian government has strengthened cooperation with NATO (despite the low 
probability of Georgia joining the Alliance) and bilateral military- political ties with the 
United States (apart from NATO projects). At the same time, the Georgian Dream uses a 
different tactic than the team of Saakashvili. Its strategic goal the ruling party of Georgia 
sees the accession to NATO and the EU, but the process itself was perceived through the 
prism of the concept of "normalization" in relations with Moscow, and not through 
confrontation with Russia and the "revival" of two ethnopolitical conflicts. Thus, the 
strategic vector of Tbilisi is still a consensus between authorities and parliamentary 
opposition. At the same time in recent years there is an increase in Euroscepticism in the 
country. There are several reasons for this. In- First, strengthening cooperation with 
NATO and the EU does not help Georgia in resolving its issues of territorial integrity. 
Despite the confrontation with Moscow, the West is not interested in aggravation of 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
           Over six years of institutional reforms in Georgia, there have been changes 
that no post- socialist country, the author writes. Despite the authoritarian nature of 
Saakashvili's power, he has considerable support of the population, the country's economy 
is provided with investments and tranches, and Russian business continues to operate, 
which under certain conditions could become a link in the normalization of Russian-
Georgian relations191 
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The processes of transformation of the Russian-Georgian conflict largely depend 
on the general nature of the regional policy of the United States, the European Union and 
NATO, on the one hand, and the state of relations between Russia and Georgia with the 
countries of the West, on the other. If Russia has practically no levers of influence in 
Georgia, the United States invests heavily in it, contributing to the reform of the Georgian 
army. However, the ability of the American side to control the situation in the region is 
less than most observers think. Returning to the general problems of the Black Sea-
Caspian region, one cannot help noticing that the processes occurring in it are causing 
increasing alarm. The conflicts that arose after the collapse of the USSR are not solved, 
and in some cases, are exacerbated. In the struggle for the extraction and transportation of 
energy the resources of the Caspian Sea, which the United States used to be most active, 
were now joined by Turkey and Iran, claiming transit infrastructure in their own interests 
and using the Georgian "buffer" in the interests of restricting Russia's access to the Black 
Sea-Caspian region. 
In the light of what has been said, it seems necessary to conduct further, more 
profound, and concrete studies of the impasse that has developed in our relations with 
countries located at our southern borders. 
The events of August 2008 played an important role in changing the current 
system of international relations and building a new world order. After the end of the 
hostilities, a new, no less complex stage in the life of the republics began, connected with 
seeking approval in the desire to be an independent and equal member of the 
international community. After the military actions in South Ossetia in 2008, the only 
legal guarantor of stability and security in the region is the jointly developed "Medvedev-
Sarkozy Plan", which includes six points for stabilizing the situation in the region. Despite 
the West's opinion on the need to preserve the territorial integrity of Georgia, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia are the first post-Soviet countries to receive partial recognition. The 
end of hostilities and recognition of the republics on the part of Russia influenced the 
decline of tension in the South Caucasus, but did not resolve the issues of guarantees of 
stability and order. The prospects for settling the contradictions of the Georgian, Abkhaz 
and Ossetian peoples will depend on the mutual desire of the countries to peacefully 
resolve the remaining disputes, by overcoming the existing social tension. In view of the 
fact that the European community refuses to put up with the current situation and 
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continues to perceive the territories of the republics as part of the Georgian state, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia face a difficult task to consolidate their right to be an equal 
participant in international relations. 
 
 
Azerbaijan  
 
Multi-vector is a distinctive feature of Azerbaijan's foreign policy. While Armenia 
is a member of the CSTO and the EEA, and Georgia is positioning itself, as a reliable 
partner of the US, NATO and the EU, Azerbaijan is trying to distance itself from tight 
binding to any bloc or state. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan consistently 
upholds the principles of "equidistance". In September 2014 in Baku celebrated the 20th 
anniversary of the so-called "Contract of the Century" (agreement between Azerbaijan 
and twelve Western oil and gas companies). This agreement has become one of the largest 
commercial contracts for the last two and a half decades and, in many respects, remains 
the basis for foreign trade and foreign policy of Azerbaijan. Baku managed to find 
sensitive areas in the EU and the US, which consider the Russian monopoly on energy 
supplies to Europe, as a risk factor and even a danger. For Azerbaijan, the advantages of 
cooperation with the West are obvious. First, it minimizes Western criticism of 
Azerbaijan's domestic policy (violation of rights and authoritarian tendencies). Secondly, 
Azerbaijan is looking for counterweight Moscow and the Armenian lobby in the US and 
Europe, with the support of Western politicians. Azerbaijan's participation in the EU-
patronized "Eastern partnership "should also be considered, although Baku does not seek 
membership in the European Union. Azerbaijan, unlike Georgia, does not seek to join 
NATO. Baku is extremely wary to the attempts of Western politicians to discuss 
democratization in Azerbaijan. Not less than skeptically there also refer to the so-called 
"Arab spring" in the Middle East. On the one hand, democracy does not bode well for a 
political monopoly of Aliev. On the other hand, Baku is wary of situations such as US 
intervention in Iraq (and the potential interference of the West in neighboring Iran). 
Consequently, Azerbaijan supports cooperation with Russia.  
The significance of the Russian- transboundary cooperation on combating 
terrorism (they have the general section of the state border in the Dagestan direction) is 
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large. Moscow and Baku also have a common approach to the status of the Caspian Sea. 
Active purchases of Baku of the Russian weapons are, in fact, a solid financial 
compensation for Moscow for pro-Western elements of the policy of Azerbaijan. They 
also show that Russia is not a potential opponent of the Caspian republic in the Nagorno- 
Karabakh conflict, despite Russia's security guarantees for Armenia (as at the bilateral 
level, and within the framework of the CSTO). Unlike the West, Moscow does not Strives 
to criticize the internal political standards of Azerbaijan. The approach of Russia is an 
important factor for the international legitimization of the Baku elite. Thus, Azerbaijan is 
an example of policy of maneuvering between West and Russia. He does not seek to join 
any of the competing integration projects - neither to the Association with the EU nor to 
joining the EEA. Baku supports one or the other side when it considers it useful or 
necessary, and Azerbaijani diplomats are well versed in how to cross the "red lines". 
First, with the success of democracy and the construction of modern state 
institutions Azerbaijan can become a stronger country and more important strategic 
partner. 
The second point concerns the energy partnership between Turkey, Azerbaijan, 
and the US: American representatives hope that through this partnership, Azerbaijan will 
be able to find resources to strengthen its state, peace, and security in the region. 
The third point relates to the impact that strategic cooperation between the US, 
Turkey and Azerbaijan will have on the region stretching from the Black Sea to China. In 
implementing the tasks set, Turkey accepts the most vivid participation.  
 
Armenia 
 
In comparison with its neighbors, Armenia has the highest degree of integration 
with Russia. It is Moscow's priority partner in the South Caucasus. Armenia is the only 
country in the region that is present in the collective security treaty organization (CSTO) 
which is unofficially called "Eurasian NATO". In January 2015, Yerevan joined the 
Eurasian Economic Union (ЕАЭС). Moscow plays an extremely important role in the 
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a peaceful mediator - co-chair of the 
OSCE Minsk Group, as well as the organizer of regular consultations between 
representatives of Yerevan and Baku.  
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Nevertheless, Yerevan is trying to maintain a high degree of partnership with the 
West.  
First, Armenia seeks not to admit Azerbaijan's monopoly on interpretation of 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Secondly, Yerevan is vitally interested in cooperation with 
Washington and Paris, because they act as co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. Thirdly, 
Armenia hopes to use authority and resources of the Armenian Diaspora for the 
promotion of their goals, such as recognition of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman 
Empire in the early twentieth century, support self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh 
and the adoption of international declarations on the Azerbaijan and Turkey. Fourth, 
Yerevan stands for economic rapprochement with the EU, they are ready to sign the 
economic part of the Association Agreement with the EU (the political segment could 
contradict the interests of Moscow). At the same time, neither the US nor the EU is ready 
to offer Armenia more guarantees in security sphere, than Moscow does today. 
Membership in the CSTO allows Armenia count on military aid from Russia (for example, 
if there is an invasion on the territory of Armenia). Armenia has access to Russian arms by 
preferential, domestic, and not market prices. The US and EU do not have alternative 
initiatives to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which would be different from the 
joint approach with Russia. These factors narrow the space for Yerevan's maneuver and 
practically do not give it alternatives to Russia as an ally, especially given the fact that 
Turkey is part of NATO and is the second largest country in the Alliance. 
However, this is also understood in Europe, so the entry of Azerbaijan, Armenia 
and Georgia in the EU today is considered only in a remote term. Nevertheless, this does 
not interfere with the dialogue between European representatives and leaders of the 
South Caucasus, which is becoming more intense. The reasons for the EU's increased 
interest in the South Caucasus were outlined by representatives of the EU's foreign policy 
- Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindt and European Commissioner for External 
Relations Christopher Patten regarding their trip to the South Caucasus: "There is as much 
oil in the Caspian Sea as in the North. Here and in Central Asia is huge gas reserves - and 
this is good news for countries of Europe, experiencing an energy hunger. The Caucasian 
corridor is the shortest route from Southern Europe to the Middle Asia and beyond; hence 
the importance that the European Union from the outset attaches to helping the South 
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Caucasus realize its potential in the field of transit of goods and energy from the Caspian 
region and Central Asia. " 
 
Nagorno Karabakh 
 
For two decades, the Karabakh conflict continues to be a major factor affecting the 
political map of the South Caucasus and the fate of Armenians and Azerbaijanis residing 
in the region. Motion of Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh for self-determination, which 
started in February 1988, resulted in a violent conflict between the population of this 
former Soviet autonomy (and the Armenians who supported them in Armenia and all 
over the world) first with Communist authorities of the USSR and Soviet Azerbaijan, and 
then, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with independent Azerbaijan.  
Thousands of people became victims of the conflict on both sides; hundreds of 
thousands were deported, lost their homes and property, turned into refugees and IDP’s. 
All the conflicting parties cite a significant number of historical, political, and legal 
arguments to substantiate their position and policies. At the same time, the public and the 
elites of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, demonstrating the minimum of 
readiness for a compromise settlement, entirely lay the blame for the escalating conflict 
and the lack of will to peace on the opposing side. Involved to some extent in the conflict 
itself or in the process of peaceful settlement, third countries and international 
organizations do not have a common position and often pursue their own goals and 
interests. 
As a result, the negotiation process on Nagorno-Karabakh resembles the situation 
of permanent déjà vu. Surprisingly, although there hasn’t been noticeable progress in 
reaching a peaceful agreement soon around Karabakh, the conflicting parties themselves 
perceive the situation of the remaining status quo as minimally acceptable. Even the loser 
in the war, Azerbaijan, which declared from time to time its readiness to take revenge by 
force, nevertheless, based on political and military restrictions, also must consider the 
prevailing realities, where the persistence of uncertainty in the negotiation process is the 
"lesser evil". 192 
                                                          
192 Coding decisions based on expert analyses found in: Monahan, James. “The Former Soviet 
Union’s Diverse  
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State of "no peace, no war" around Nagorno-Karabakh and the inability of the 
conflicting parties and mediators for the second decade to achieve a final settlement are 
due not only to the complex geopolitical background and regional rivalry of superpowers. 
This is primarily a result of the lack of will and desire for a settlement among the 
conflicting parties themselves. Such ethnopolitical and ethno-territorial conflicts are 
almost never managed to settle through a parity compromise agreement, equally satisfying 
all parties. The world history of the last century practically does not know such examples, 
except for very exotic cases when conflicts did not reach such bitterness, they had a small 
area or were not a priority for the conflicting parties themselves.  
Strategies and political approaches of the conflicting parties In the Karabakh 
conflict, is a complete lack of convergence in approaches and the unpreparedness of the 
conflicting parties to compromise. The level of hypothetical maximum concessions for 
which, in principle, each of the warring parties during negotiations, absolutely does not 
meet the expectations of the society and elites of the opposite side. On the other hand, as 
external constraints in the form of the positions of the leading powers and the 
international community, the military-political and military-technical balance that has 
developed in the conflict at the present stage really inhibit the resumption of hostilities in 
the conflict zone. However, the sharp confrontation between the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani sides does not weaken from this, but simply takes a different form. The need 
for the return of Karabakh even at a very high price, has become a key element in the 
state construction of post-Soviet Azerbaijan and the ideological basis for the consolidation 
of Azerbaijani society. Over the past two decades, the struggle for Karabakh has been one 
of the foundations of Azerbaijan's foreign and domestic policy.  
The focus in this struggle was initially made on the communication blockade of 
Armenia and Karabakh with the support of Turkey, as well as diplomatic and propaganda 
efforts at the international level. To date, Azerbaijan's main argument in the Karabakh 
conflict is significant revenues from oil and gas production, which give hope to Azerbaijan 
to achieve a cardinal advantage in the military-technical sphere and force Armenia and 
Karabakh to make concessions. The real hydrocarbon potential of Azerbaijan is very 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Peoples: A References Sourcebook.” (Santa Barbara:ABC-CLIO), 2004. Gammer, Moshe. 
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significant, although it is limited. However, a policy based on oil revenues and military 
superiority, faces two problems. 
First, oil and gas are not a guarantee of either stable economic growth or the 
political development of exporting countries, especially if these countries have only a 
small experience of state construction and make the first steps towards democratic transit 
and the formation of civil society institutions. It is not by chance that there is even the 
term "oil curse", which quite accurately characterizes the degree of economic, social, and 
political problems and difficulties that arise when the country is hit by a cash flow from 
the sale of natural resources. These problems are the dark side of the facade of the 
economic well-being of oil-exporting countries. In history, there are dozens of examples 
of countries in whose destiny the presence of rich natural resources (primarily oil and gas) 
played an insidious and even fatal role - from Nigeria to Mexico, from the Spanish Empire 
of the Habsburgs (in this case - cheap silver from mines in the Spanish colonies in 
America) 
And secondly, the situation in the conflict zone is such that it will be very difficult 
for Azerbaijan to regain Karabakh under its authority because of the existing military-
technical and military-political balance, the most important part of which is a convenient 
and fortified defense line along the borders of Karabakh. According to many military 
experts, the saturation of the defensive positions of the Karabakh army with anti-tank 
weapons and artillery allows them to inflict serious losses on the offensive troops, which 
eliminates the multiple superiority of the Azerbaijani army in tanks and other armored 
vehicles during the first strike, and does not allow the possibility of a "blitzkrieg" and 
rapid breakthrough in the depth of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
Moreover, according to the estimates of many international experts, in the coming 
years the military balance in the conflict zone will not change radically. Karabakh and 
Armenia are fully aware of this, and accordingly, the threats of war do not have the 
expected impact on them. As for the diplomatic efforts and the negotiation process, the 
reality that emerged after more than twenty years of negotiations on the settlement of the 
Karabakh conflict is such that now the return of Karabakh to Azerbaijan is not present on 
the negotiating table. In any of the currently negotiated options for a peaceful settlement 
(be it the Madrid principles or other relevant proposals of the mediators), Azerbaijan can 
theoretically expect to return the "occupied territories", but will have to agree that 
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Nagorno-Karabakh itself, along with the land corridor for communication with Armenia, 
in the administrative borders of the Soviet era, will not immediately returned to its 
jurisdiction. This is exactly the content of the proposals currently on the negotiating table 
of the OSCE Minsk Group. 
A key element of the Madrid principles is the referendum as a mechanism for 
international political-legal legitimization of the separation of Karabakh from Azerbaijan. 
Meanwhile, the desire of Azeri society and elites to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan within 
the next few years will not weaken.  
The struggle for the independence of Karabakh, which began at the end of the 
Soviet era, for the modern Armenian political elite was no less important than the 
struggle with the communist regime for the independence of Armenia. The burden of the 
unsettled Karabakh conflict, the economic costs of the transport blockade and the need to 
maintain a military balance in view of the threat of resumption of hostilities naturally 
hamper Armenia's political and socio-economic development. In view of the parties' 
unpreparedness for compromises, for a speedy settlement of relations with Azerbaijan in 
the short or even medium term, not necessary. Accordingly, Armenia is trying to establish 
relations with external actors in isolation from the Karabakh factor. In addition, the 
Armenian political elite hopes that regional integration and the establishment of more 
trusting relations in the region in the future will create a field for establishing cooperation 
with Azerbaijan (in this sphere there was an unfinished project of the Armenian-Turkish 
normalization).193 
At the same time, Armenia uses the Karabakh factor as a resource of its foreign 
policy, attracting the attention of European organizations and world powers to the South 
Caucasus precisely because of the unsettled Karabakh conflict. The conflict factor is used 
to maintain information and political interest in the region, as well as to stimulate 
economic assistance and political assistance. Yerevan "exploits" the topic of the Karabakh 
conflict to enhance Armenia's geopolitical role both in the regional format and at the pan-
European level. Another component of Yerevan's policy in the Karabakh conflict is the 
so-called foreign policy "complementarity", that is, an attempt to balance the interests of 
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various actors, including those in strained or even hostile relations (Russia and Georgia, 
the United States and Iran). In the context of the Karabakh conflict, the successful 
balancing is facilitated by the fact that Azerbaijan is not regarded as equally undeniably 
pro-Western and deserving of the West's support state, like Georgia.  
In addition, Armenia has a resource that helps it to implement its complementary 
policy, balances Azerbaijan in the sphere of political lobbying and contributes to the 
inflow of economic and financial resources. It is a large Armenian diaspora scattered all 
over the world, which occupies a strong position in the economic, social, cultural, and 
political life of some of its countries of residence. Ironically, especially the large and 
influential Armenian diasporas are concentrated in the three co-chairing countries of the 
OSCE Minsk Group (USA, France, and Russia).  As a result, the United States, the co-
chairing country of the Minsk Group, is the second country after Armenia, which 
provides direct financial assistance to Nagorno-Karabakh. Another co-chair is Russia - the 
main military-political ally and partner of Armenia in the military-technical sphere, and 
the third - France - the main lobbyist of Armenia on the European platform, a country 
with traditionally profound cultural and social ties with Armenia. Of course, the arms 
race falls heavily on Armenia's economic opportunities. As for the danger of a new war, 
Armenia relies on a military balance and the technical impossibility of a blitzkrieg in 
Karabakh, as well as the fact that as the arms race escalates, the likelihood of hostilities in 
the conflict zone is decreasing. This pattern, although somewhat paradoxical, has been 
well known since the Cold War and is widely studied in political science. 
   The format of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs includes Russia, the United 
States and France (in the latter case it is envisaged that the French co-chair also expresses 
to a certain extent the EU's position), while the interests and policies of the three 
countries on a global scale and in the post-Soviet space often not only compete, but also 
enter an open contradiction. This occurs even directly in the South Caucasus region, 
particularly regarding Georgia, where the US and the EU can openly oppose to build its 
policy towards Russia on the verge of open confrontation, and in the neighborhood, in the 
same Caucasus region, to have similar approaches to the process of peaceful settlement of 
the Karabakh conflict and even a consensus opinion on the issue of preventing the 
unleashing of new fighting in Karabakh.  
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Such a unique and at the same time realistic policy of the three co-chairs allows 
preserving and continuing an extremely difficult negotiation process in the conditions of 
the unpreparedness of the societies and political elites of the conflicting parties 
themselves for any real compromises. It is quite natural that the approaches of the main 
external actors to the Karabakh conflict are determined, among other things, by their own 
interests in the South Caucasus and in the adjacent regions. It can be interests in the 
sphere of such as energy and communications (which is relevant, for example, for the US 
and France), and security and geopolitical dominance (as in the case of Russia and the 
United States, as well as regional powers - Iran and Turkey). In addition, the approaches 
of external actors to the Karabakh conflict are affected by considerations of a different 
order: ideals and principles of democracy and integration (clearly manifested in the 
positions of European countries and organizations involved in the settlement processes, 
for example, the Council of Europe or the OSCE). as well as historical and cultural 
proximity to certain states of the South Caucasus (which is especially relevant in the case 
of Russia and Turkey). 
The settlement of the Karabakh conflict will reduce the regional importance of 
Georgia, deprive it of the economic and political advantages, that Tbilisi obtains in the 
face of the conflict between its two neighbors in the South Caucasus region. Even the 
change in the general background around the Karabakh conflict, as many fear in Georgia, 
could have a negative impact on Georgia's monopoly regional position. For example, as 
Georgian experts point out, in Georgia there is a feeling that in the case of the Armenian-
Turkish rapprochement, the opening of borders and communications, Tbilisi will lose its 
"privileged position" in regional transit and economic projects. Although Georgian experts 
also express hope that the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border will reduce the 
Russian military and political presence in Armenia and the whole South Caucasus, which 
also comes from the interests of Georgia. 
  
 
 
 
The EU and NATO: Readiness to Action or Inaction? 
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The US, the NATO countries, the EU and, in general, Europe for the South 
Caucasus are "external" players, while Russia is an "inside" player. At the same time, the 
activity of the West in the South Caucasus direction is higher than that of Russia. The lack 
of a broad view of the possibilities and depth of cooperation with the new states makes 
Russia's position region of the world and opens the West a lot of opportunities to declare, 
that he should occupy the vacant place of the Soviet Union. According to the West, Russia 
is not able to be responsible for the situation in the South Caucasus, and therefore it is 
believed that without Western guardianship, the Caucasus cannot develop steadily. In the 
South Caucasus, the US and its allies are proposing to the new states such combinations of 
political and military co-operation that are much broader than that implying today Russia. 
On a more distant prospect, the South Caucasus for the West is still and a 
bridgehead for confrontation in the Iranian direction. If the bilateral relations of the 
countries of the South Caucasus with the United States are understandable and 
predictable, then everything that concerns New Europe looks different. 
First, Europe itself is still in the stage of formation as a single organism. And 
political, military, and economic. 
 Secondly, only now - after a lapse of more than fifteen years formal independence 
- the period begins when the countries of the South Caucasus can really begin to 
formulate provisions of their political-military aspirations. 
Thirdly, the countries of the South Caucasus gravitate towards Europe, and the 
enlargement of a united Europe due to them in the future is possible. 
Fourthly, Russia continues to gain economic weight. Her claims to return to the 
informal club of world leaders have become quite real. In other words, the main events in 
the region are still ahead. And the situation in the South Caucasus begins to resemble a 
period of redistribution of the world almost two centuries ago. With the only difference is 
that now geopolitical reality forces participants in the process to exit for the regional 
framework. Another feature of the situation is that both Europe as a single force, and 
individual members of the EU, and the US do not know the Caucasian problems and do 
not have the experience of solving them. Western influence in the region is due to the 
observance of Western interests, without considering the deep aspirations of the South 
Caucasian peoples. 
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For centuries, Russia has mastered the Caucasus through trial and error.  Ethnic, 
religious, and cultural diversity placed the problem of mutual adaptation at the forefront, 
not the division of the region into spheres of influence, as the "external forces" always 
tried to do (formerly Iran and Turkey, then Great Britain, and now the US and NATO). In 
the recent past, through joint efforts, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Russia managed 
to find a way to manage numerous local contradictions. After decades, Russia in the 
region was recognized as a power capable of bringing order and prosperity, but the events 
of the past 20 years have crossed out centuries of experience.  
Historically, the only “guarantor” of stability and a competent arbiter is Russia. 
This status she confirmed in August 2008. Is there an alternative to this? It is possible, if 
the states of the South Caucasus themselves find the strength to create a certain union, 
self-sufficient in political terms. It must be emphasized that, despite the seeming 
impossibility of such a union, there are already precursors of the development of this 
direction. If such a new formation does not take place, then Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
Georgia are doomed to permanent maneuver between the interests of numerous friends 
and enemies and, most importantly, to abstract considerable material resources for the 
decision of political and military problems.  
Peace in this case in the Caucasus will not wait for a long time. And military 
political alliances will not be a stabilizing factor, but a disruptive factor. Observation of 
the formation of the states of the South Caucasus as independent subjects of the world 
community is extremely interesting from all points of view. However, one cannot help 
noticing that a certain group of researchers, including those who live and work in the 
states of the South Caucasus, send a solid part of their creative energy for studying the 
problems of the region. Perhaps this is due to the fact that progressively thinking 
representatives of the ruling and political circles of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia 
agree with the truth that is in sight - joint efforts to consolidate the positions of the South 
Caucasus region on the world stage will bring their countries more benefits than the 
isolated actions in the same direction.  
This approach makes it necessary to take a different look at the problem of 
regional security in the South Caucasus, attempt to determine the main direction of the 
efforts of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, aimed at ensuring that the region finds a 
political stability, and distrust, has disappeared from the interrelations of its member 
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states. Today's South Caucasus is a transforming region, a region that is in search of its 
identity (national-state, geopolitical, sociocultural). South Caucasus still retains a very 
high destructive potential due to the presence of several "frozen conflicts", i.e. separated 
and virtually sovereign states (now officially recognized by Russia).194  
The destructive potential is also connected with two other factors, which today 
cannot be said to be in a latent state. The first factor is the developed separatist tendencies 
among such large minorities as Armenians, Talyshs, Lezgins, Avars, the issue with the 
Kurds (Azerbaijan) stands apart; the Armenians, the Azerbaijanis and the Turcomishetians 
in Javakheti, who have isolated themselves in Javakheti. These processes are most 
infectiously infiltrated into the territory of Russia - in Dagestan and beyond.  
If we add here the problem of Southern Azerbaijan, which can worsen during 
military intervention USA, or because of internal political outbursts of discontent, we get 
a tangle of problems, in its destructive potential, not less than the so-called "frozen 
conflicts". And this cannot be ignored. Despite the varying degree of implementation of 
separatist aspirations, their solution is possible under the same conditions: improving the 
welfare of the entire population, de facto democratization of public life, neutralizing 
ideological and political influence from the outside. It’s time for the South Caucasus states 
to start working out the principles of peaceful coexistence, the core of which would be 
the pact for the removal of territorial claims. 
However, that current leaders tend to solve these problems, like their 
predecessors, - agreeing on personal basis of presidents, to drive the disease inwards. Of 
the four such now-existing unrecognized states Post-Soviet space three are in this region. 
To date, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been unable to resolve problems of the integrity of 
their territories. Recall that the Georgian de facto jurisdiction does not extend to most of 
the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, in fact, Azerbaijan has lost control over 
the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO), as well as seven areas 
outside the "rebellious autonomy". 
The main problem of the political elites of the countries of the South Caucasus - 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia - the lack of new approaches to the solution "Frozen" 
interethnic conflicts. Azerbaijan, already with the President Aliyev, reassigned the 
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solution of the problem on international mediators and now hopes for resuscitation of the 
strength and effectiveness of international law. All expectations and hopes of Georgia are 
reduced to the possibility of replacing the Russian presence. Recently, such sentiments 
have intensified in Baku. Here, it is hoped that other players - the US, NATO or the 
European Union with the OSCE - will be able to solve the internal problems of both 
states. In fact, the entire geopolitical fantasy of the leaders of the newly independent 
states was limited to playing on the contradictions of the "great powers" in the region. 
And if Azerbaijan and, to some extent, Armenia managed to build a diversified 
relationship with all participants of the "Great Game", then Georgia uniquely placed its 
stake on the US (and to a lesser extent on the EU). 
Apparently, it was the all-embracing US support that created the illusion of the 
Georgian leadership's ability to solve the territorial problems by force. The hope for the 
strength of his overseas ally played a cruel joke with the Saakashvili regime in August 
2008. In this regard, the Transcaucasian vector is one of the "hot" areas of Russian foreign 
policy, which is particularly distinguished by the dynamism, complexity and severity of 
the problems being solved, having a geostrategic dimension. 
The most important obstacle to the integration of the states of the South Caucasus 
into the European Community is the presence in the region of Russian military bases. In 
this regard, it is necessary to consider the intentions of the leading European states 
regarding the Russian military presence in the South Caucasus. 
In general, the European states consider this problem not so much as a problem 
for the US, but as their own problem. For the US, this problem is, rather, a medium-term 
nature, since the US has not yet developed its strategy in Eurasia and allows for the 
weakening of its geo-economic interests. The US is interested in political neutralization of 
Russia, but is not interested in confrontation with it. 
This was repeatedly stated by American generals representing the Command of 
American Forces in Europe (for example, General Charles speech during his visit to 
Armenia in 2003). As part of more practical plans, the US pursues the goal of completely 
depriving Russia of the ability to control the extraction and transportation of Caspian oil. 
For example, unlike oil companies and Great Britain, the US negatively considers the 
possibility of transporting Russian oil via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. However, 
even in the framework of such an uncompromising position, the goals of the leading 
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European states on the issue of the withdrawal of Russian bases are, nevertheless, 
different. According to British analysts and experts, the United Kingdom, which has the 
most extensive economic and political activity in the South Caucasus, most of all insists on 
withdrawing Russian troops and drastically reducing Russia's influence in this region. But 
it is this large-scale economic presence of the UK and its plans for the development of the 
Eurasian Corridor project, that put before it the security problems in the region that so far 
only Russia can solve. 
However, the withdrawal of Russian bases does not at all reflect the national 
interests of France, which poses the task of limiting the influence of the United States 
(and Great Britain and Germany) in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The withdrawal 
of Russian bases from the South Caucasus will only strengthen the positions of the 
opponents of France. Therefore, Russia has a subject for negotiations with France on this 
issue. 
According to political analysts dealing with European security issues, Germany is 
most interested in ousting Russia from Central and Eastern Europe, from the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Germany is gradually and consistently implemented in the 
European and Eurasian regions, relying on its enormous economic opportunities. 
Germany, which is difficult to acquire positions in the zones of French and British 
influence, is trying to create its continental, Eurasian influence zone.195 
At the same time, Russia in this super project is given the role not of a strategic 
partner, but of an energy-raw province. If at the beginning of the 1990s there were hopes 
for strategic cooperation among Russian and even German political scientists, later it 
became clear that Germany does not need a political partnership with Russia. She is only 
interested in Russia's participation in her communication projects, ensuring guaranteed 
delivery of goods from Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as well as from Russia itself. 
However, this is difficult to attribute to the task of political strategy. Germany is 
much more interested in the "DE russification" of Eurasia, the regions of the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia, than the United States and Great Britain. Germany does not 
need to force events on the withdrawal of Russian bases, since this process occurs without 
its accentuated participation. Moreover, the forcing of this process can lead to the 
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strengthening of the positions of Great Britain and the United States as competing powers. 
Among Russian politicians and political scientists, there was an opinion that the state of 
European-Russian relations should be judged by the results of Russia's integration into 
European structures. At the same time, the processes of European integration are an 
integral part of "linking" Russia to the interests of European states, which occurs to 
impose Russia on relevant norms and rules of international order. The policy of the 
leading European states towards Russia needs to be judged by their actual steps in the 
Western and Southern regions of the post-Soviet space. 
As for NATO and the EU, there is a simple question: will joining in one or both 
organizations will help to resolve frozen conflicts? Since accession to the EU looks like a 
very distant prospect for any GUAM country, I will say, in mainly, about NATO as a 
system of collective security and, thus, an instrument for resolving internal conflicts. 
Of course, the subsequent chain of events looks quite the opposite: joining NATO, 
for example, will be possible only after the conflict resolution. But the political leadership, 
especially in Georgia, continues to rely on NATO mechanisms in search of solutions for 
the protracted problems of separatism. There are two principal problems with NATO as a 
tool for resolving internal conflicts. The primary sources of conflict are structural, 
political, and historical. NATO is ineffective in solving such problems. The alliance 
remains primarily a system of interstate security with very little capacity for regulation of 
internal conflicts. Examples of such conflicts in NATO member countries (such as Turkey) 
are enough to see the lack of such opportunities. Founded as a traditional interstate 
coalition, NATO has not changed so much as to solve problems at the domestic level. It is 
even less suitable for regulating transnational or civil problems. At the same time, 
separatism in frozen conflicts still remains due to the weakness of states, lack of legality, 
economic instability, and historical / cultural features. NATO's participation in any of the 
frozen conflicts can, in fact, worsen the situation by transforming frozen conflicts into 
aggravating and, possibly, interstate conflicts. This is especially true for Georgia.  
The EU could provide a broader way to resolve conflicts. Being a common market 
and a common political space, EU could help to solve the dilemma of ethnic security, by 
building effective mechanisms for sharing power and guaranteeing cultural autonomy. 
But there are also obstacles that make such a scenario unrealistic for the short and 
medium term. 
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The level of democratization in the countries is not sufficient to create structures 
for conflict management. Separatist regions are governed by the local elite, isolated from 
society, which the existing status quo is beneficial. Thus, both strategic integration and 
rapid democratization would require a long transitional period. In this regard, the 
attempts of the European Union to play a more active role in the region are noteworthy. 
Of course, the bureaucratic structures (and, of course, the EU) are characterized by inertia 
and slowness, especially in the sphere of foreign policy.  
However, the realities that have changed after the "five-day war" of August 2008 
in the South Caucasus have affected the regional policy of Brussels. At the same time, in 
European countries, at the expert level, statements arose in favor of a revision of the 
approaches of Brussels to the population of the unrecognized republics of the South 
Caucasus.196 The need for greater involvement of the de facto state population in EU 
projects is also argued by the fact that this will prevent their involvement in the political 
and economic space of Russia. And if earlier the geopolitical predilections of Brussels with 
respect to the conflict regions were rather on the side of the "former metropolises" (at 
least, in the case of Georgia), now the situation has changed. De Facto State of the South 
Caucasus, previously isolated from the EU, is benefiting from the new European policy, as 
it helps to maintain the status quo in the regional conflicts, regardless of their 
configuration.  
Both the EU leadership and the public of European countries have clear value 
priorities regarding the format of conflict resolution. The priority is to prevent military 
escalation and the resumption of hostilities. In the situation where it is impossible to 
achieve a compromise settlement soon in any of the ethnopolitical conflicts in the South 
Caucasus, this approach contributes to their freezing. This is in the direct interests of 
those actors in regional politics who benefit from maintaining the status quo (i.e. de facto 
states, as well as Armenia supporting Nagorno-Karabakh). Another important priority of 
EU policy in the South Caucasus is the promotion of regional integration. However, the 
intensification of regional cooperation, and the opening of borders, and the establishment 
of communications, will also contribute to the preservation of status in conflicts, since 
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until now the calculation has been made that it is precisely the desire to break out of 
isolation that will drive the secessionist states to compromises.  
As for pragmatic considerations, the EU is extremely concerned about the fate of 
existing and projected regional energy projects. For the safe operation of all oil pipelines 
and gas pipelines passing around Russia through the territory of the South Caucasus, non-
resumption of hostilities in the zone of the Karabakh conflict is a paramount condition for 
the EU. There are also indirect results of EU involvement in regional security and 
stability, that directly affect the situation around the conflict. For example, these are 
humanitarian and economic projects of the European Union, which promote the 
rehabilitation of refugees, reduce poverty and social tension, strengthen civilian control 
over the armed forces and power structures, build political institutions and 
democratization in the states of the South Caucasus.  
All of this, among other things, reduces tensions in conflict zones. For all that, the 
Karabakh conflict is not in the focus of attention of the world community, which controls 
the settlement process through a relatively small format of three co-chairs and several 
military. The low-budget and small involvement of international structures in the 
negotiation process under the aegis of the OSCE, is an indicator that the problem is on the 
periphery of world politics, but rather that the international community does not consider 
the conflict to be so acute and dangerous compared with many other similar conflicts and 
problems) to give him increased attention.  
The above-mentioned countries are simply too far from joining the EU. Taking all 
this into account, it can be said that the mechanisms of the EU and NATO will not be 
directly used to resolve frozen conflicts. 
It seems that most likely they will serve as a model for creating a structure for 
conflict resolution. The ideology and values that underlie Euro-Atlantic integration could 
help to build more democratic societies, which in turn will create more opportunities for 
the solution of internal conflicts. security problem Regulation of frozen conflicts is 
problematic. Structural factors are too strong, ethnic division too difficult and economic 
interdependence is too low. In combination with a set of Russian interests in the region, 
conflicts are a serious challenge to regional security. Attempts to solve the problem 
through strategic liberalization, in the majority, have failed. Democratization is too slow 
and civil society remains underdeveloped. This hinders effective separation of power, 
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creates discrimination, and gives ground for aggressive rhetoric of the local elite. Appeal 
to any form of regional integration looks like is sensible. Regional integration helps to 
establish common benefits, provides economic growth, and promotes activities 
international organizations and regimes.  
Over time, it establishes common procedures and norms for political regulation 
and creates elements of a common individuality. This did not work in cases of frozen 
conflicts. But such a failure occurred more at the expense of specific features of conflicts, 
and not at the expense of the approach itself. For various reasons projects on regional 
integration failed. There is some economic cooperation, but it cannot replace the process 
of integration when it comes to internal conflicts. Levels of economic interdependence 
among the countries of the region remain relatively low, and there are no overflow 
effects. Regional integration could be effective, but it must be meaningful. The 
introduction of democratic measures, legislative protection of minority rights, stimulating 
the "win-win" approach in conflict management - all this could be strengthened by 
integration.  
However, in societies first there must be institutional and regulatory frameworks 
created. Until this is done, integration will help to save problems and difficulties. The 
integration process that is effective for conflict management should be economically 
sound and follow the logic of a gradual increase in interdependence. In this respect, an 
example of the EU could play an important role. Integration will be successful if it 
benefits the ethnic minorities and weakens the dilemma of ethnic security. But it will fail 
if the interdependence and practical cooperation in it are replaced by slogans and political 
rhetoric.  
 
 
 
 
 
Prospects for the resolution of "frozen" conflicts in the region 
 
To resolve conflicts in the South Caucasus, it is necessary to change the way 
people think. It is impossible to resolve the conflicts in the South Caucasus, remaining as 
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we are now, we need to change ourselves and change the society and then, perhaps, there 
will be such types of conflict resolution that we now cannot imagine. Nowadays there are 
no open wars in the Caucasus, as there are mechanisms of balance, sometimes extremely 
stringent. Our task is not to eliminate conflicts, but to transform them. It is necessary to 
learn how to live in a conflict, being able to regulate it not by relative methods, then we 
can discuss and solve them on paper, and not killing each other. At the same time, the 
states existing in the Caucasus are built on an ethnic basis, and the conflict becomes a 
natural thing. We need to interact with our politicians and societies. Nothing new can be 
invented to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is necessary to change ourselves. 197 
The countries of the South Caucasus and Russia are connected by thousands of 
visible and invisible threads. The whole issue is Russia's ability to work out and propose to 
Azerbaijan and Armenia such a plan for maintaining fraternal relations, which would 
"nullify" all efforts of those interested in deepening the split between them. 
The "hot spots" of the South Caucasus, which largely determine the level of 
regional security, are Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Each of these 
conflicts has its own reasons. But the leading and general cause of the impasse lies in the 
main principle embodied in the settlement processes - "the right to self-determination of 
peoples within the territorial integrity of the state". In modern conditions, the "right to 
self-determination of peoples", legalized by the UN resolution of December 14, 1960 in 
the process of the collapse of the colonial world order, contradicts the "territorial integrity 
of states", fixed on the international level for the last time on August 1, 1975 in the 
Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE. The military adventure of Saakashvili in South Ossetia, 
undertaken by him in the summer of 2008, pushed Russia to recognize the state 
independence of ethnic breakaway ethnic enclaves from Georgia. However, it is 
premature to speak about a full international recognition of the sovereignty of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. For most of the countries of the world, they continue to remain 
"rebellious", separatist territories of Georgia. 
The events of the late XX and early XXI centuries, became a stage not only of 
profound changes in the political system of the world, but also the emergence of a new 
social thinking and world outlook. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to natural 
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consequences: the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, the 
bipolar world and, as a consequence, the end of the Cold War. The state of confrontation, 
in which the United States and the USSR were constantly (NATO and ATS), as well as the 
social and economic difficulties that created the crisis in the Soviet Union, led to the need 
for systemic changes. 
The three countries of the South Caucasus are an example of the post-Soviet 
geopolitical conflict. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, they don’t demonstrate their 
sincere readiness to promote a common language for regional security and compromises 
on economic development. They value external partners more than own neighbors. But 
even in relation to their external partners, they all 6th prefer to hedge their rates, as well 
as to prevent the situation "Final choice" between different integration associations. Pro-
Western Georgia is interested in normalizing relations with Russia, although it seeks to 
build up cooperation with the West. Pro-Russian Armenia considers the EU as a key 
vector in the diversification of foreign policy, but remains close to Russia. Azerbaijan in 
the post-Soviet period succeeded in implementation of the "swing" policy. Of course, one 
of the ways to break their deadlock would be to reduce the level of confrontation between 
the West and Russia. However, the Caucasus here is not a critically important site. But if 
the improvement of relations between major international players will still happen, the 
chances of improving security and conflict resolution in this will increase 
Analysis of inter-ethnic clashes has shown that the emergence and development 
of conflicts are a complex process based on the struggle of objective and subjective 
contradictions, competition between two international legal principles: the right of 
nations to self-determination and the territorial integrity of states. 
In view of the multi-ethnicity of the countries of the modern world and the threat 
of escalation of ethnic contradictions, the international community for many years 
adhered to the principle of the territorial integrity of the state in its policy. However, the 
turning point in changing the system of international relations was 2008 - the year of 
recognition of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
The Caucasus region has always been the center of the intersection of interests not 
only of regional but also world powers. Bloody wars in the eyes of the international 
community created the image of the region as a center of instability and ethnic conflict. 
An important factor in solving regional conflicts today is the energy resource factor, 
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which is most evident in the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict. Due to the availability of 
energy resources in the Caspian basin, the world powers use the policy of maneuvering, 
which only delays the process of resolving the issue.  
However, we should not underestimate the actions of a number of states that 
played a major role in ending the war and preserving peace in the region, despite the 
unsettled issue. The analysis of the negotiation process showed how important is Russia's 
role as an intermediary in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, all key documents on 
the conflict were signed with the assistance of Russia, during it’s active policy in the 
Caucasus.198 
Over time, on the basis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, another confrontation 
of extra-regional players for influence arose, where Russia and the USA played the main 
role.Contradictions between mediating countries in the course of resolving the conflict 
began to be sharply manifested in the period of 1993-1994. It was at this time that the 
struggle for leadership grew into a desire to play a major role in the peace process. The 
main task that Washington set for itself in the process of settling the conflict - to prevent 
the strengthening of Russia's influence in the South Caucasus and its superiority in 
mediation, in turn, Moscow could not allow the growth of US and Turkish influence in 
the region. 
In view of the fact that in the modern world the solution of such ethno-territorial 
disputes is possible with the support of the leading power of one of the sides of the 
conflict, the availability of energy resources and the geographic location of the conflict 
zone only hinders the process of resolving the issue. 
The main reason for the "unresolved" conflict, in the opinion of some experts, is 
the mutual distrust of the conflicting parties.199 
In the current situation any compromise of the conflicting countries is tantamount 
to a loss and is perceived as a betrayal of national interests. In this regard, the way from 
the moment of signing the peace to resolving the disputable issues and determining the 
status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to the parties to the conflict was never able to 
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pass. The main requirement of the Government of Azerbaijan during the negotiations on 
the conflict is the preservation of the territorial integrity of the country, through the 
liberation of the occupied territories. Armenia's official position on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict after decades, remained unchanged and diametrically opposite from 
Azerbaijan one. Ethnopolitical conflicts like the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh have three 
solutions: military; Through peaceful negotiations; Under the influence of an external 
actor, however, all the listed variants of conflict resolution, for a given period of time, do 
not approach the situation that has arisen in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Trying to find ways out of the conflict, many experts tried to combine the 
demands of the conflicting parties and unite the two principles of international law - the 
principle of territorial integrity and the right of the nation to self-determination. Thus, 
the model of a "common state" was suggested, according to which Nagorno-Karabakh, 
while remaining part of Azerbaijan, would have many rights of an independent state. This 
model of conflict resolution was approved by the governments of Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabakh, but the Azerbaijani authorities rejected the proposals, believing that they 
contradict the national interests of the country. 
Many researchers of this conflict believe that the current situation of "no war, no 
peace" is beneficial to the governments of both countries, "is a tool for fighting dissent and 
strengthening power." Armenia expects that over time the world community will get used 
to the current situation, and Azerbaijan believes that it will be possible to take revenge 
after the economic recovery due to the sale of energy resources. 
As a result of the system analysis of ethnopolitical conflicts in the South Caucasus, 
taking into account the growing interest of international organizations and states to the 
region, general conclusions have been drawn up for developing methods for their 
resolution and the following scientific results have been obtained: 
1. The basis of ethnic conflicts is the desire of ethnic groups to preserve their 
culture and unity through political definition. In view of the fact that in the modern 
world the number of ethnic groups exceeds the number of sovereign states tenfold, the 
problem of interethnic conflicts is an urgent topic for the entire world community.  
2. Interethnic contradictions have a negative impact on the socio-economic and 
political development and security of not only a single country, but of the whole of 
mankind, taking into account the fact that the process of the emergence of new ethnic 
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clashes is endless, the study of conflict prediction and management mechanisms underlies 
each country's internal policy State. 
3. It is established that the negotiation process with the participation of an 
intermediary (third state or international organizations) is the most popular method for 
solving ethnic conflicts. However, the analysis of the contradictions in the South Caucasus 
demonstrated the effectiveness of this method in the issues of cessation of hostilities, and 
its incapacity for the final settlement of ethnic disputes. Thus, the negotiation process in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for many years created a situation of "neither war nor 
peace", but in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts this method of 
regulating ethnic contradictions could not prevent the outbreak of hostilities in South 
Ossetia in August 2008 . 
4. It is revealed that ethnopolitical conflicts in the South Caucasus are a 
consequence of the policy of the leadership of the USSR, when the internal borders were 
established or changed at the request of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and 
without taking into account the resettlement of ethnic groups, and illegal actions of 
newly-formed states. Despite the fact that the creation of post-Soviet states took place 
under the sign of the right of ethnic self-determination of peoples, the leadership of 
independent republics began to conduct an ethno-nationalist policy that only complicated 
inter-ethnic contradictions within states and in many cases led to armed actions. Wishing 
to obtain their own independence, the republics armedly resisted the wishes of 
autonomous entities in protecting their ethnic and political equality, citing violation of 
the principle of territorial integrity of the state. 
5. It is proved that the energy resource factor played an important role in the 
solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is the natural riches of the Caspian basin 
that cause the unstable position of world powers in this matter, which only delays the 
process of forming ways out of the protracted ethnic confrontation. Thus, the lack of 
success in resolving the conflict is associated not only with the ambitions and 
contradictions of the conflicting parties, but also with hidden interests in the region of 
mediator states. 
6. Despite the active policy in the negotiation process on the resolution of the 
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, on the one hand - regional players, caused by the need to 
stabilize the situation at their own borders and the desire to increase the influence in the 
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region; On the other hand, extra-regional players interested in the stable extraction and 
transportation of the Caspian's natural resources, the situation in the region "no war, no 
peace", negatively affecting the socio-economic development of the conflicting countries 
remains. 
7. It has been established that the main obstacle to the final resolution of the issue 
of the status and future fate of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is the uncompromising 
policy of the leadership of the conflicting parties, any concession to either party is 
perceived by the authorities, and sometimes by the people as a defeat. However, despite 
the openness of the status issue, for 20 years (since the end of hostilities), the Republic of 
Nagorno-Karabakh has demonstrated its independence, commitment to democracy and 
the right to be in line with other subjects of the world community. 
8. Despite the options for a peaceful Georgian solution to ethnopolitical conflicts 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by granting broad autonomy to the republics, the five day 
August war, perceived by the society as genocide against the Ossetian people, has become 
a fatal mistake of the Georgian president, which left no hope for the restoration of the 
territory of Georgia of the Soviet period. 
9. The war in South Ossetia showed the realities of the modern world and the role 
of a new type of weapon, information, in achieving the strategic objectives of the state, 
the main objects of which are the consciousness and worldview of people. It is this type of 
weapon that allowed the Georgian leadership to present Russia in the minds of the 
European community as the main aggressor and a threat to the territorial integrity of the 
sovereign Georgian state.  
 10. An analysis of the actions of the OSCE and UN peacekeeping forces during the 
period of the beginning the five day war the inhabitants of South Ossetia made it possible 
to establish the inefficiency of the work of the organizations and their bias in this matter. 
International organizations failed to cope with the peacekeeping mission in the region 
and left the scene the day before the operation began, moreover, OSCE observers were 
observed in close cooperation with the Georgian special services and in providing 
assistance in preparing the military operation. Thus, in view of the loss of the reputation 
of international organizations, the presence of European observers in the region is possible 
only after carrying out reforms to eliminate facts that adversely affect the impartiality and 
neutrality of such organizations. 
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11. The active policy of the Russian leadership on the issue of cessation of 
hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the prevention of the genocide of the 
Ossetian people, followed by recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, is caused by historical, political and economic aspects. However, if Moscow's 
mediation in the signing of the peace treaty between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-
Karabakh was connected with the desire to establish stability in the region, in time, in 
view of the growing influence of world powers in the Caucasus, Russia's participation in 
the Georgian-Ossetian war (August 2008) and in the subsequent recognition of the 
republics, is connected not only with the elimination of tension near its southern borders, 
but also with the desire to maintain its influence in the region.200 
Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was the result of the age-old struggle 
of peoples for independence, but it is not a guarantor of security in the region, due to the 
incompleteness of the process of forming the statehood of the republics. However, due to 
the fact that in modern politics the process of recognition depends on the geostrategic and 
economic goals of the influential countries, the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict and the recognition by the world community of the independence of the 
Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia will largely depend on the 
strategic interests of these or those states. 
It is obvious that the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh 
impede normal political and economic development, threaten security even outside of the 
Caucasus and complicate relations with Russia and Turkey. The mechanisms for resolving 
the acute contradictions that existed at that time did not involve the participation of the 
EU, and so far, have been largely ineffective. If it was destined to play a key role in 
implementing and supporting peace agreements, it should be actively present in the 
negotiation process, if it was recognized by all the parties to Brussels. It is necessary to 
participate in one or more of the available conflict resolution mechanisms. The EU could 
also use its political and financial weight to facilitate the reconciliation process, coordinate 
efforts with the main partners (not least Russia), initiate the planning of its possible role 
in conflict resolution, and publicly declare their interest in resolving them. 
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The confidence-building measures would help to resolve the situation in Georgia. 
In part, similar proposals were put forward in the second half of 2007, when tensions 
started to increase. The above measures included the deployment of staff for 
communication and interaction with the police in conflict regions, technical assistance 
and recommendations to the Georgian Ministry for Conflict Resolution, assistance in the 
rehabilitation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This can include meetings of representatives 
of civil society, the assignment of the function of a liaison to the European group for 
supporting security at the borders, which is present in Georgia. Recommendations on 
customs issues of trade with conflict regions, as well as transit through them, the opening 
there of EU information centers, the participation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
regional drug control programs, support in the elimination of booby traps, a program for 
assistance to refugees and displaced persons. Finally, they are educational programs for 
students, consultations on restoring the damaged infrastructure, as well as discussions 
between the parties to the conflict in South Ossetia to determine a possible European 
contribution to confidence building, not counting the OSCE South Ossetia rehabilitation 
program. 
Many of these initiatives were postponed or disrupted relating to military actions, 
but some could later be continued and implemented with Abkhazia, whose authorities, 
after a short cooling period, de facto retain interest in maintaining and developing diverse 
international relations. However, the post-war situation differed from the pre-war 
situation, as new delicate moments appeared-in, after Russia recognized the independence 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That is why it was necessary to discuss and formulate a 
policy of EU participation. 
The new policy was developed in parallel with the so-called Geneva Dialogue 
between Russia and Georgia, at the center of which is the implementation of the cease-
fire agreement after the August war, and the security problem and the situation of 
displaced persons. The mediation of the EU in signing the ceasefire agreement played an 
extremely important role in terms of the prestige of the European Community and its 
further participation in the resolution of the conflict. It also became clear, that the EU 
needs broader framework legislation to pursue a policy on conflict regions, since it cannot 
be limited to measures stabilization of the situation and enhance security, such as the 
signing of a ceasefire agreement. 
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At the same time, the crisis around Nagorno-Karabakh continues to deepen to the 
south of Georgia, and the situation still seems deadlocked and unsolvable. The internal 
logic and dynamics of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are fraught with serious risks. There 
is a real danger of a sharp escalation. The conflicting parties got involved in an 
unrelenting and destabilizing arms race. There is only a self-regulating and unreliable 
cease-fire agreement without disengaging the belligerents. There is only a self-regulating 
and fragile ceasefire without separation of forces and monitored by only a handful of 
OSCE observers. 
Brussels made it clear that they are ready to contribute to strengthening 
confidence and support negotiations within the framework of the Minsk Group. The EU 
policy on Abkhazia and South Ossetia could be partially used to resolve the situation in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, but the complete lack of trust between the parties has so far made it 
impossible to carry out systemic interaction. The European Union could also, in addition 
to soft confidence-building measures, make a practical and political contribution to the 
work of the Minsk Group. It is necessary to strengthen the ceasefire agreement. 
The second important priority, is that the European Union should continue 
supporting state building and democratization in the countries of the South Caucasus. The 
rationale for such a policy is obvious: effective governance, democracy and human rights 
are indispensable in themselves, but they are also prerequisites for closer relations with 
the European Union based on common values. Among other things, in the framework of 
this direction, consultations were held on legal reform and programs to support 
parliaments and political parties. I also believed in further strengthening of the role of 
Europe in the part of border management in Georgia, as it would contribute to state 
building and strengthening of sovereignty. 
Since then, Brussels has contributed to political stabilization by supporting 
reforms in the three countries. However, the democratic process in the region is still 
slipping. The lack of a credible political dialogue and confidence in the conscientiousness 
and sincerity of relations between the ruling parties and the opposition in the three 
countries, continue to negatively affect the domestic political situation in the region. 
Conflicts also undermine efforts to promote political reform and economic development. 
Brussels also had to manage the expectations of the South Caucasus countries, to 
be their effective partner. The difference between expectations and concrete cases had 
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two sides. In the short term, the European Union did not respond quickly enough to the 
real or perceived needs of the partner countries. For example, until the European 
Commission sent delegations to two countries, the EU was forced to tolerate fair criticism 
for its inconsistency with its expectations and hopes. However, the difference between 
expectations and affairs was also explained by the unrealistic demands of the partner 
countries, who needed to understand the relationship they can expect in the long term 
and what kind of support they can receive in various disputes and conflicts. 
The August war helped to narrow the gap between expectations and deeds. It 
became clear the level of support of the international community in the event of a serious 
aggravation of the situation: vigorous cooperation with a view to ending the conflict, 
support in matters of principle - not least in matters of preserving the territorial integrity 
of Georgia. At the same time, the world takes a more detached and restrained position on 
secondary issues. This concerns the requirement to immediately change the format of 
negotiations and peacekeeping efforts. The war also showed the EU leadership, what 
measures should be taken without delay. As a result, a new regional initiative entitled 
"Eastern Partnership" was given, within the framework of which agreements on 
cooperation, free trade and freer movement were promised. If not for the war, the 
initiative would have a more difficult fate in the EU Council, although it met the long-
standing aspirations of the partner countries. 
I think that It is necessary to conduct as much as possible a meaningful dialogue 
with Russia, a country with extremely strong historical ties here. The EU should actively 
be present in the region and make the South Caucasus a permanent topic in contacts with 
Moscow. The EU should strive to build relations with Russia on common interests, such as 
cooperation in the fields of security, stability, energy, and transport, to weaken and 
neutralize the logic of "managed instability," while at the same time reserving the right to 
raise more serious problems. Then I was convinced that it was necessary to develop all 
these areas based on bilateral interaction with Russia and within larger regional 
associations. 
In the short term, some aspects of Russian politics have complicated the launching 
of joint security initiatives - for example, Moscow's desire to defend its special interests in 
neighboring countries, recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
and a unique interpretation of the 2008 ceasefire agreement. The EU still expects that 
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Russia will fully fulfill its obligations to withdraw troops within the framework of the six-
point plan that put an end to the war in Georgia. However, this should not prevent a joint 
discussion of some long-term plans and common interests right now. In particular, it is 
quite possible to open the ways of communication, despite the remaining disagreements 
on the status of the two republics. 
Most importantly, the transformation of the South Caucasus into a transport hub, 
promoted by the geography of the region, would further increase the interest of the EU 
and Russia in its security. For Russia, the most important routes are from the south to the 
north, and for the European Union - the routes going from east to west. But this should 
not damage either side. Such an approach would facilitate the resolution of protracted 
conflicts, since the economic benefits of opening strategic communications through 
conflict zones would become more tangible for all participants. For example, the opening 
of the railway traffic through the territory of Abkhazia would have a huge positive impact 
on more remote regions. Such initiatives would allow the peace process to move from the 
deadlock and make significant progress. 
Already in 2006, I noted that it is very important to promote the establishment of 
good-neighborly relations between Turkey - another great historical power of the region - 
and the countries of the South Caucasus. The importance of Turkey is obvious, since all 
three countries in the region have borders with this very serious economic partner - 
through energy transit, trade, and development assistance. The Turkish blockade of 
Armenia allowed Ankara indirectly to participate in delicate negotiations on Nagorno-
Karabakh. I saw several possible ways of EU-Turkey cooperation in the South Caucasus: 
raising the region's problems in the context of Turkey's multifaceted bilateral contacts 
with the countries of the European Union and by implementing joint programs of 
assistance to this region. 
The period in question coincided with the most far-sighted and ambitious foreign 
policy that Turkey began to implement. Ankara made various initiatives to assert its role 
in the South Caucasus, including the Caucasus Stability and Security Pact, adopted with 
Russia's participation soon after the August war. However, the initiative was not 
successful, primarily because the European Union did not participate in it, which by that 
time had become an indispensable actor in regional politics, and after Bulgaria and 
Romania had become an immediate neighbor in the EU. 
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Turkey's capabilities in the South Caucasus remain limited, as conflicts in the 
region have the most direct impact on it. The Armenian issue continues to cause violent 
emotions, the Turkish population vigorously supports Azerbaijan, and the voice of the 
numerous community of Abkhazians and Circassians in Turkey is also well audible. 
Nevertheless, as Special Representative, I made every effort to establish a close political 
dialogue with Ankara, as it will always be an important part of any framework agreement 
in the region.201 
The difficulties faced by Turkey, which seeks to play a more active role in the 
Caucasus, are reflected in the mirror in its failed attempt to normalize relations with 
Armenia. And without that, she cannot become an important player here. Brussels 
strongly supported the normalization process between Ankara and Yerevan, being firmly 
convinced that the opening of the border will give an impetus to positive dynamics, that 
can facilitate the resolution of other conflicts; However, the joint efforts of the European 
Union and its partners at least serve as a guarantee that the process has only halted, but 
not decayed. 
The three countries here are not alike, and it is unlikely that they will be able to 
develop a framework agreement only with their participation. Both for the EU and the 
countries of the South Caucasus, it is much more beneficial to build cooperation around 
the Black Sea and involve other countries with access to the Black Sea (Moldova, 
Ukraine), as well as states that have recently become members of the European Union 
(Bulgaria, Romania). A broader framework agreement on regional cooperation could also 
help to resolve Russian-Georgian and Turkish-Armenian differences. 
In the past few years, Brussels has, in fact, made serious efforts to establish 
regional cooperation and expand the sphere of interaction of the South Caucasus with 
neighboring countries and regions, but all initiatives have had certain shortcomings. One 
of them, entitled "Black Sea Synergy", is linked to the regional Organization of the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation; unfortunately, this initiative did not justify the hopes placed 
on it. The Eastern Partnership, which also includes Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, has 
achieved concrete results in terms of deepening bilateral relations with each of these 
countries.  
                                                          
201 Hooman Peimani, Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus, (Santa Barbara: 
ABC_CLIO, 2009): 20. 
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However, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan did not give an 
opportunity to reveal the potential of the program. The "Eastern Partnership" also 
provides for the participation of Russia and Turkey in certain regional projects, but this is 
again difficult because of the complex relations of these countries, respectively, with 
Georgia and Armenia. The creation of such framework agreements would be of great 
importance for regional cooperation, but their heterogeneous ratification once again 
shows how important it is to resolve unresolved conflicts.  
The need to develop a joint Transatlantic program was also explained by the 
possibility of opening NATO to the countries of the region. Although you can argue about 
what conditions should precede this. The decision taken at the summit of the alliance in 
Bucharest in March 2008, to grant Tbilisi and Kiev the possibility of joining in the long 
term, unfortunately, led to an aggravation of tensions in the region that culminated in the 
August war. After it, it became clear that Georgia will not be able to become a member of 
NATO very soon. In parallel, the European Union was first obliged to assume a significant 
share of responsibility for ensuring security around conflict regions. 
Finally, European Union should organize monitoring of potential conflict areas 
and take measures to prevent new conflicts. Their potential is significant, because the 
countries of the South Caucasus are small, poor, and unstable, and Georgia is also 
ethnically heterogeneous. It is obvious that the conflict potential will be preserved in 
peripheral territories inhabited mainly by minorities, until the national welfare begins to 
be distributed more evenly. 
Among other things, the 2008 war was a testament to the inability to prevent 
conflict in a timely manner. At least a year before the outbreak of hostilities in the region 
of South Ossetia, tension was constantly growing. EU representatives, have made 
numerous attempts to appease passions and call on the international community to play a 
more active role in preventing conflict, but efforts have not been enough. At that time, 
the European Union was not prepared to insist on a more active role in its resolution or 
the deployment of a police contingent and ground forces capable of exerting a deterrent 
influence on the parties to the conflict. Of course, it is unclear if the European Union 
could prevent a war, but a more active participation and EU presence would mitigate its 
consequences. 
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Perhaps the risk of resumption of hostilities around Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
has declined, but has not completely disappeared. The barrier to military confrontation 
around Nagorno-Karabakh is gradually disappearing, as the parties continue to arm 
themselves. The delicate balance that allowed the conflict to remain relatively 
manageable and prevent its escalation over the past 15 years may soon be violated. In the 
long term, the aggravation of all conflicts can be ruled out, only if their main causes are 
not frozen, but eliminated. Otherwise, the risk remains that the focus of tension will 
continue to smolder imperceptibly in the depths of the earth, until a new volcanic 
eruption suddenly starts. While conflicts are not resolved, it is impossible to realize the 
entire economic potential of the region for the benefit of the countries of the South 
Caucasus and their neighbors. 
In the South Caucasus, there are many potential outbreaks: regions populated by 
minorities, where unemployment and social problems, if not addressed, can provoke a 
conflict on ethnic grounds; religious extremism; the risk of interference between this 
region and the troubled, etc. Many EU programs are aimed at regional development in 
depressed areas populated by ethnic minorities. The European Union is also working on 
the legislative framework, the creation of state institutions, the education system, and 
other legal issues in conjunction with the OSCE. But to be truly effective and capable of 
timely action, preventing the situation from escaping from control, it is important to raise 
awareness about risks. 
Consequently, conflict prevention, as well as the resolution of existing ones, 
remain top priorities. Ensuring the safety of citizens requires (in addition to official 
political negotiations and deployment of security forces) and very different approaches. 
Attention to the needs of individual people is possible only if the international 
community takes on an entirely different toolkit. First, it is about supporting civil society, 
increasing its importance, and organizing dialogue. This brings us back to the question of 
the importance that effective management has and its connection with avoiding possible 
conflicts. I remain convinced that the EU and the OSCE are exceptionally well equipped 
and prepared to organize and conduct such work. 
Conflicts in the South Caucasus are unlikely to be finally resolved soon. There are 
different related levels of confrontation, which must be eliminated in parallel. Georgian 
conflicts include both interstate and intra-Georgian components. These aspects cannot be 
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ignored or denied. Settlement can be considered valid if all involved parties agree. And 
this will happen only after the main needs of the parties are met: physical security, 
people's security, and the right of displaced persons to return. Status - a secondary 
question. Parties to the conflict will otherwise look at the status issues after their primary 
needs are met. Among other things, there is also a strategic level, from the point of view 
of which the South Caucasus is one of several playing fields in a larger game. 
Even today, the foundation for the settlement of the conflict can be laid. Greater 
efforts must be made to make progress in the Geneva Security Negotiations - not least to 
resolve the withdrawal of troops in accordance with the 2008 agreements, as well as to 
deal with the problem of displaced persons. However, this is only part of the plan. Since it 
is impossible to imagine that the conflict areas continue to be fenced off in the long-term 
from neighbors that play an important historical and economic role and pursue a policy of 
isolationism, the main actors in the process - governments, as well as residents and de 
facto authorities in the conflict regions - will inevitably expand contacts, and they need to 
be encouraged in every way. As soon as these ties develop into mutual economic interests, 
the dynamics of resolving the main conflict issues will change. 
The resource of economic interaction and common interests exists not only at the 
level of the local population, but also at the regional level. The closed borders between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey, as well as the lack of functional ties 
between Russia and Georgia prevent the opening of the huge potential of the region. All 
three unresolved conflicts block some of the strategic ties and communication routes that 
can take place in the South Caucasus. This is of enormous importance for a region that 
historically has always been a crossroads of strategic routes from the south to the north 
and from the east to the west. If regional integration receives a new powerful impetus, the 
potential benefits of conflict resolution may become more apparent to their participants. 
The stability of the region requires the agreement of all involved parties. Russia 
has opposed a series of opinions. Western initiatives concerning Nagorno-Karabakh and 
the Abkhazian conflicts, as well as the West hindered Russia's efforts to be the only 
mediator in Georgian internal conflicts. The West in the Caucasus issues is compelled to 
comprise Russia's geographical, military, and economic weight. The solution to the 
problems of the Caucasus for the West is not only the role of mediator between the 
opposing sides but the negotiations with Russia, Turkey, and Iran, as each of the 
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highlands directly deals with the results of attempts to resolve conflicts in the Caucasus. It 
is also necessary to consider the multilateral security framework, such as the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the Independent 
Commonwealth of States.  
Thus, the resolution of a conflict or disagreement is possible only from the 
standpoint of law. It has long been established that international relations can develop 
normally only if the dominant idea is dominance rights. Experience shows that the rule of 
law is equally beneficial to the most powerful and weakest state. 
In addition, the inhabitants of the region need a single identity, to get along better 
with each other. Today they have too little in common. The EU can add a new dimension 
of belonging to a large European family to help the countries of the South Caucasus to go 
beyond the narrow national self-determination, that came to the fore after gaining 
political independence and then was fixed by the wars of the 1990s. A common identity 
would help the peoples of the South Caucasus find common aspirations instead of 
squandering energy into conflicts that no one wins. But for this, Brussels needs to 
demonstrate a consistent adherence to the interests, needs and aspirations of the people 
who inhabit this region. Russia should understand how profitable it would be to allow the 
European Union to play such a role. If this becomes a reality, then the outlook for the 
next decade will be favorable. Most of the foundation is already laid. 
 
 
 
 
 
                               
 
 
 
 
186 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abazov, Rafis, “Economic Migration in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of 
Kyrgyzstan,” Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1999) 
Adalian, Rouben Paul. “Armenia’s Foreign Policy: Defining Priorities and Coping 
with Conflict,” in Dawisha, Adeed and Karen Dawisha, editors. The Making of Foreign 
Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
1995. pp. 309-339. 
Aggestam, Karin. “Enhancing Ripeness: Transition from Conflict to Negotiation.” 
In Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts, edited by I. William Zartman, 
and Guy Olivier Faure, 271-92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Aggestam, Lisbeth. “New Actors, New Foreign Policy: EU and Enlargement.” In 
Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, edited by Steven M. Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and 
Timothy Dunne, 463-84. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Agnew, John. “Capitalism, Territory and ‘Marxist Geopolitics’.” Geopolitics16: 
233. Print. 
Agnew, John. “Contemporary Political Geography: Intellectual Heterodoxy and its 
Dilemmas.” Political Geography22: 603-606. Print. 
Agnew, John. “Emerging China and Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics 
and Chinese Particularity.” Eurasian Geography and Economics: 569-570. Print. 
187 
 
Agnew, John. “Is Geopolitics a Word that should be Endowed only with the 
Meaning it Acquired in the Early Twentieth Century?” Progress in Human Geography28: 
634-637. Print. 
 Agnew, John. “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of 
International Relations Theory.” Review of International Political Economy1: 53-80. 
Print. 
Agnew, John A., and Stuart Corbridge. Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and 
International Political Economy. London: Routledge, 1995. Print. 
Akademiya Nauk Azerbaidzhana.  Azerbaidzhanskaia Respublika: Dokumenty 
imaterialy 1918-1920 gg.Baku: Elm, 1998. 
Akademiya Nauk Azerbaidzhanskoy SSR, Institut Istorii. Istoriia Azerbaidzhana. 
Baku: Elm, 1979. 
Akademiya Nauk Azerbaidzhanskoy SSR. Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: Pod red. I.A. 
Guseinova. Baku: Izd-vo Akademii nauk Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, 1958-1963. 
Akbarzadeh, Shahram, “National Identity and Political Legitimacy in 
Turkmenistan,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1999) 
Akbarzadeh, Shahram, “Political Islam in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, Central 
Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2001) 
Akiner, S., “Post-Soviet Central Asia: Past Is Prologue,” in P. Ferdinand (ed.), The 
New Central Asia and Its Neighbors, London: RIIA/Pinter, 1994. 
Aleksandrov, Ivan, “Is the Islamic Threat to Uzbekistan Real?” Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta—Religii, October 10, 2001. 
Allison, Roy, editor. Challenges for the Former Soviet South. Washington, 
D.C.:Brookings Institution Press, 1996. 
188 
 
Altstadt, Audrey L., “Azerbaijan’s struggle toward democracy,” in Dawisha, Karen 
andBruce Parrott, editors. Conflict, cleavage and change in Central Asia and theCaucasus. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. 110-155. 
___ “Azerbaijan’s First and Second Republics: The Problem of National 
Consciousness,” Caspian Crossroads, Volume 3, Number 4 (Spring 1998) at: 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/casp.htm 
___ “Visions and Values: Roots of Today’s Society in the Azerbaijan Democratic 
Republic,” Caspian Crossroads, Volume 6, Issue No. 1, 2002. pp. 26-29. 
___ “Azerbaijan and Aliyev: A Long History and An Uncertain Future,” Problems 
of Post-Communism. Vol. 50, no. 5, September/October 2003. pp. 3-13. 
Altstadt, Audrey L., The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity Under Russian 
Rule (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992). 
Avery, Graham, and Fraser Cameron. The Enlargement of the European Union. 
England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998 
Asenbauer, Haig E., On the Right of Self-Determination of the Armenian People 
of Nagorno-Karabakh (New York: The Armenian Prelacy, 1996). 
Aves, Jonathan, Post-Soviet Transcaucasia (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1993). 
Anderson, John, “Elections and Political Development in Central Asia,”Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1997). 
Ardzinba, V., U.N. Voronov, P.V. Florensky, and T.A. Shutova. “Appeal of the 
Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia to the State Council of Georgia, 12 August 
1992.” White Book of Abkhazia - 1992-1993 Documents, Materials, Evidences. 1993. 
Print.  
189 
 
Auvinen, Juha, “Political Conflict in Less Developed Countries 1981– 1989,” 
Journal of Peace Research,Vol. 34, No. 2 (1997), pp. 177–188. 
Asmus, Ronald D. A Little War that shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the 
Future of the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Print. 
Asmus, R. “A Little War that shook the World.” Heinrich Böll Foundation. Tbilisi. 
15 Apr. 2010. Panel Discussion. 
Assefa, Hizkias. Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies - The Sudan 
Conflict. 
Baev, Pavel K. Challenges and Options in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 22, 1997. 
Barylski, Robert V. "Russia, The West, and the Caspian Energy Hub," Middle East 
Journal, Volume 49, No. 2, (Spring 1995): pp. 217-232. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Print. 
Barnes, Joe, US National Interests in the Caspian Basin, Getting Beyond the Hype, 
Austin, TX: James A. Baker III Institute Working Paper, 1998. 
Beblawi, Hazem, and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State, London: Croon Helm, 
1987. 
Bennett, Andrew. Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall and Reprise of Soviet- 
Russian Military Interventionism, 1973-1996. Cambridge, Mass: BCSIA Studies in 
International Security, MIT Press, 1999. 
Benningsen, Alexandre, and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, Sufism 
in the Soviet Union, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
Bensahel, Nora, Political Reform in the Middle East, unpublished manuscript. 360 
Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. 
190 
 
Bercovitch, J., and G. Schneider. “Who Mediates? The Political Economy Of 
International Conflict Management.” Journal of Peace Research37: 145-165. Print. 
Bercovitch, J., J. T. Anagnoson, and D. L. Wille. “Some Conceptual Issues and 
Empirical Trends in the Study of SuccessfulMediation in International Relations.” Journal 
of Peace Research28: 11. Print. 
Blainey, Geoffrey, The Causes of War, New York: The Free Press, 1988. 
Bodio, Tadeusz (ed.),Uzbekistan: History, Society, Policy, Warsaw: Elipsa, 2001. 
Bosse, Giselle. “Challenges for EU Governance through Neighbourhood Policy and 
Eastern Partnership: The Values/Security Nexus in EU-Belarus Relations.” Contemporary 
Politics 15 (2009): 215-27. 
Bono, Giovanna. “The EU’s Military Doctrine: An Assessment.” International 
Peacekeeping 11 (2004): 434-56. 
Bournoutian, George A. A History of the Armenian People, Volume II: 1500 A.D. 
to the Present. Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 1994. 
___ A Concise History of the Armenian People. Costa Mesa, California: Mazda 
Publishers, 2002.  
Bowman, Isaiah. “Geography vs. Geopolitics.” Geographical Review32: 646. Print. 
Brass, Paul R., Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (London: 
SAGE, 1991). 
Brown, M.. “Democratic Governance: Towards a Framework for Sustainable 
Peace.” Global Governance9: 141-146. Print. 
Browning, C.S.. “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued 
Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in the European North.” 
Geopolitics8: 56-58. Print. 
191 
 
Brezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard, New York: Basic Books, 1997. 
Brinton, Crane, Anatomy of Revolution, New York: Vintage Books, 1957. 
Brown, Michael E. (ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. 
Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question 
Reframed in the New Europe, Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
“Bush Doctrine.” Princeton University, n.d. Web. 1 June 2014 
<http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Bush_Doctrine.html>. 
Bush, George. “Forward.” The National Security Strategy ofthe United States of 
America Washington, DC: 2002. Print. 
Bush, George H.W., Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge. 
“Public Papers of the President of the United States, Toward a New World Order” The 
Geopolitics Reader. London: Routledge, 1998. Print. 
Cameron, Fraser. The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, 
Present and Future. England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999 
Chelidze, Ana. “Ethno-Nationalistic and Religious-Nationalistic Components of 
Identity in Post-Soviet Georgia.” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe34 (2): 
1–20. 2014 
Cheterian, Vicken, War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier 
(London: Hurst, 2008) 
Chinn, Jeff, and Robert Kaiser. Russians as the New Minority: Ethnicity and 
Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States. Boulder: Westview. 1994 
Cohen, J. “Incentive or Obstacle.” Accord: A Question of Sovereignty, The 
Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process. London: Conciliation Resources, 1999. Print. 
192 
 
Cohen, Saul Bernard. Geopolitics of the World System. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2003. Print. 
Cohen, Stephen F. Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 
1917. New York: Basic Books. 1984 
Colton, Timothy J, and Michael Mcfaul. 2002. “Are Russians Undemocratic?” 
Post-Soviet Affairs18 (2): 91–121. doi:10.1080/1060586X.2002.10641515. CRRC. 2012. 
“Caucasus Barometer”. Tbilisi: CaucasusResearch Resource Center. 
http://www.crrccenters.org/caucasusbarometer/. ———. 2013. “Caucasus Barometer 
Time-Series Dataset Georgia”. Tbilisi: Caucasus Research Resource Center. 
http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb-ge/codebook/. 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Annex to the 
Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague. 
1907. Accessed on 16-01-14. At: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/195?OpenDocument. 
Coppieters, B. and J. Cohen. “The Roots of the Conflict.” Accord: A Question of 
Sovereignty, The Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process. London: Conciliation Resources, 1999. 
Print. 
Coppieters, Bruno, Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from 
the European Periphery. Gent, Belgium: Academia Press, 2004. Print. 
Coppieters, B., G. Nodia, and Y. Anchabadze. Georgians and Abkhazians: The 
Search for a Peace Settlement. Belgium: Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1998. Print. 
Coppieters, Bruno, Tamara Kovziridze, and Uwe Leonardy. “Federalization of 
Foreign Relations: Discussing AlternativesFor the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict.” Working 
Paper 2, 
193 
 
Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government: 13. Print. 
Cornell, Svante E. “The Unruly Caucasus,” Current History, (October 1997): pp. 
341-47. 
___."Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia," 
Journal of International Affairs (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Volume IV, Number 
2, 1999. 
___ Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001. 
___ Georgia after the Rose Revolution: geopolitical predicament and implications 
for U.S. policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007. 
Cornell, Svante E. “The Growing Threat of Transnational Crime.” The South 
Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, European Union, 
2003. Print. 
Corboy, Denis. “EU Soft Power Best Agent to Solve Conflict.” Irish Times. 2 
September 2008. Accessed on 20-01-14. At: http://archive.is/N5KWG. 
Cornell, Svante E. Small Nations and Great Powers a Study of Ethnopolitical 
Conflict in the Caucasus. Taylor and Francis, Inc., 2000. Print. 
Cornell, Svante E., David J. Smith, and F. Starr. The August 2007 Bombing 
Incident in Georgia: Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Region. Silk Road Paper, 2007. 
Print. 
Cornish, Paul, and Geoffrey Edwards. “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The 
Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture.” International Affairs77: 587-603. Print. 
194 
 
Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Union. 
Declaration of Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European 
Union. Tbilisi. 2008. Accessed on 19-01-13. At: 
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/files/557_9866_180263_evropulisabchosadaevrokomisiistavmjdom
aretadeklaracia.pdf. 
D’Agostino, Anthony, Gorbachev’s Revolution (1985-1991) (London: Macmillan, 
1998). 
Danielyan, Emil. “The Role of the Intelligentsia in Forming and Maintaining 
Armenian National Identity,” Prism, Volume 4, Issue 13, June 26, 1998. 
Danilov, D. and J. Cohen. “Russia's Role.” Accord: A Question of Sovereignty, The 
Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process. London: Conciliation Resources, 1999. Print. 
Dawisha, Karen and Bruce Parrott, editors. Conflict, cleavage and change in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
De Waal, Thomas, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War 
(New York: New York University Press, 2003). 
Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the 
Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1953, 1996). 
Diakonoff, Igor M., The Pre-History of the Armenian People (New York: Caravan 
Books, 1984). 
Devdariani, J. “Pulling back Troops, Georgia calls for European Help.” Civil 
Georgia: n. pag. 31 August 2004. Web. 5 Apr. 2009. 
<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7722>. 
Devdiarini, J., and B. Hancilova. “EU Broaches Peacekeeping Possibility in 
Georgia.” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst7 Mar. 2007: n. pg. Print. 
195 
 
Diasamnidze, T. “Protocol of Negotiations Between the Governmental Delegations 
of the Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation, 9. April 1993.” Regional Conflicts 
in Georgia – Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(1989-2005). Tbilisi: Regionalism Research Centre, 2005. Print. 
Diasamidze, Tamaz. Regional Conflicts in Georgia: The Autonomous Oblast of 
South Ossetia, the Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia (1989-2005) - Collection of Political 
Legal Acts. 2nd ed. Tbilisi: Regionalism Research Centre, 2005. Print. 
Diez, T. ‘Roots’ of Conflict, Conflict Transformation and EU Influence. Summary 
ofInitial Comments, European Commission Workshop”, Brussels, 14 February 2003. http: 
//euborderconf .bham.ac.uk/publications/files/brussels20030214.pdf. 
Diuk, Nadia and Karatnycky, Adrian (eds), New Nations Rising: The Fall of the 
Soviets and the Challenge of Independence (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993). 
Domínguez, Roberto. “Constructing the European Union Foreign Policy: Cases for 
Analysis in the Transatlantic Relationship.” Jean Monnet Robert Schuman Paper Series 6 
(2006): 1-16. Accessed on 9-10-13. At: 
http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/Dominguez_Constructing%20EU%20foreign%20policy
.pdf 
Dragadze, Tamara, Azerbaijan (London: Melisende, 2000). 
Duchêne, François. “A New European Defense Community.” Foreign Affairs50: 
69-82. Print. 
Duchêne, François and R. Mayne. “Europe’s Role in World Peace.” Europe 
Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead. London: Fontana, 1972. Print. 
Duchêne, François. Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence. New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1994. Print. 
196 
 
Duchêne, François, M. Kohnstamm, and W. Hager. “The European Community 
and the Uncertainties of Interdependence.” A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy 
Problems before the European Community. London: Macmillan, 1973. Print. 
EARTHSCAN, Internally Displaced People:  A  Global  Survey, second edition  
(London: Earthscan, 2002). 
Ehrhart,H-G., Kreikemeyer, A., & Zagorski, A. (eds) Crisis Management in the 
CIS: Whither Russia? Nomos Verl.-Ges.,Baden-Baden, 1995 
Efferink, Leonhardt van. “Global Position and Political Integration - Interview 
with Federico Bordonaro.” March 2009. Exploring Geopolitics. Web. 1 February 2010. 
<http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Bordonaro_Federico_European_Union_
Global_Power_Position_Political_Integration_Relationship_Russia_Geopolitics_Geopoliti
cal_Briefing.html>. 
Efferink, Leonhardt van. “The European Union: Geographical Imaginations - 
Interview with Luiza Bialasiewicz.” September 2009. Exploring Geopolitics. Web. 17 
October 2011. 
<http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Bialasiewicz_Luiza_European_Union_G
eographical_Imaginations_Self_Representation_Border_Security_Mediterranean_Black_S
ea_Global_South.html>. 
Ekedahl, Carolyn McGiffert and Melvin A. Goodman.  The Wars of Eduard 
Shevardnadze. Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., 2nd edition, 2001. 
EU-Georgia Cooperation Council. European Neighbourhood Policy. European 
Union-Georgia Action Plan. Accessed on 7-08-13. At: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/documents/eu_georgia/booklet_a4_2_en.pdf.  
197 
 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. HIV/AIDS Surveillance in 
Europe 2012. Sweden: ECDC, 2012. Accessed on 29-01-15. At: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/sti_prevention/docs/hivaids_surveillancereport_2012_en.pdf. 
European Council. Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the European Union 
on Forthcoming “Presidential Elections” in Nagorno Karabakh. PESC/02/105 Press. 
Brussels. 2002. Accessed on 13-05-14. At: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PESC-02-
105_en.htm. 
____ Presidency Conclusions. Annex 2. Declaration on Chechnya. 1999. Accessed 
on 8 -04-14. 
____. “Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, 
Following His Meeting with Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia.” Press PCE 267/10. 
Brussels. 2010. Accessed on 19-11-10. At: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117815.pdf. 
European External Action Service. “European Partnership for the Peaceful 
Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.” Project Summery. 2011. Accessed on 
1-02-14. At: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/documents/projects/epnk_phase_1__project_su
mmary.pdf. 
____ “EU and Georgia Sign Framework Agreement on Participation in EU Crisis 
Management Operations.” Press Release 131129/02. 29 November 2013. Vilnius. Accessed 
on 29-11-13. At: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131129_02_en.pdf. 
____ Completed Missions and Operations, Ongoing Missions and Operations. 
Brussels: EEAS. 2014. Accessed on 23-04-14. At: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/index_en.htm. 
198 
 
____ European Neighbourhood Policy. “EU Cooperation with Its Neighbours.” 
Image Map ISBN 978. Brussels: EEAS. 2014. Accessed on 22-02-15. At: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/images/enpmap-web-big.gif. 
European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue. “Comparative Study 
on Status Neutral Travel Documents.” Brussels: mediat EU. 2011. Accessed on 7-05-14. At: 
http://www.mediationnet.eu/resources/publications/item/30-comparative-study-on-
statusneutral-travel-documents. 
European Parliament. Resolution on the Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament on the European Union’s Relations with the 
South Caucasus. P5 TA (2002). 28 February 2002. Strasbourg. Accessed on 2-02-14. At: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/pcc/aag/pcc_meeting/resolutions/2002_02_2
8.pdf. 
____ Resolution on Georgia. P6 TA (2004). 14 October 2004. Brussels. Accessed on 
10-04-14. At: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2004-
73&language=EN. 
____ Resolution on the EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki. P6 TA (2006). 24 
November 2006. Strasbourg. Accessed on 10-04-14. At: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2006-
0566&language=EN&ring=B6-2006-0636 
____ Resolution on a More Effective EU policy for the South Caucasus. P6 TA 
(2008) 0016. 17 January 2008. Strasbourg. Accessed on 23-10-14. At: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-
0016+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
199 
 
____ Resolution on the Situation in Georgia. P6 TA (2008) 0396. 3 September 
2008. Brussels. Accessed on 17-11-14. At: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-
0396+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
___ Resolution on the European Security Strategy and ESDP. 2008/2202. 19 
February 2009. Strasbourg. Accessed on 5-01-13. At: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-
2009-0075+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
____ Resolution on the EU-Russia Summit. 9 June 2011. Official Journal of the 
European Communities L 380 2012. Accessed on 28-01-13. At: 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:380E:0123:0128:EN:PDF
. 
___ Resolution on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Towards a Strengthening 
of the Partnership. 2013/2621. 23 October 2013. Strasbourg. 2013. Accessed on 14-05-14. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-
0446&language=EN&ring=B7-2013-0484. 
____ Decision No 884/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Decision No 1692/96/EC on Community Guidelines for the Development of 
the TransEuropean Transport Network. 29 April 2004. Official Journal of the European 
Communities L 201 2004. Accessed on 9-03-14. At: 
http://ec.europa.eu/ten/transport/legislation/doc/2004_0884_en.pdf. 
____ Parliamentary Oversight of Civilian and Military ESDP Missions: The 
European and National Levels. Policy Department External Policies. Study 
EP/EXPOL/B/2006/38. Brussels. 2007. Accessed on 11-01-14. At: 
200 
 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/pe348610_/PE348610
_en .pdf. 
____ Report from the Chair Mrs Marie Anne Isler Béguin. Ad Hoc Delegation to 
Georgia. 19-08-2008. 2008. Brussels. Accessed on 12-02-10. At: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200809/20080903ATT36101/200
809 03ATT36101EN.pdf. 
“European Neighbourhood Policy Reference Documents, EU/ GeorgiaAction Plan, 
ENP Action Plans and Country Reports.”European Union External Action, n.d. Web. 21 
July 2009. <ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf>. 
European Parliament. “European Parliament Resolution of 20 May 2010 on the 
need for an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus (2009/2216(INI)).” N.p., 20 May 2010. 
Web. 26 Sept. 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0193+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>. 
European Parliament. “EU Strategy for the South Caucasus.” Procedure File: 
2009/2216(INI). N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Sept. 2013. 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?id=583055>. 
“EU Signals Plans to Engage More in Conflict Resolution.” Civil Georgia, 22 Mar. 
2006. Web. 27 September 2013. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12143&search>. 
“Foreign Minister Comments on Abkhazia, Russia’s Role.” Civil Georgia, 4 August 
2006. Web. 1 June 2014. <www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13250>. 
Fuller, Elizabeth, Azerbaijan at the Crossroads (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1994). 
201 
 
Fuller, L., “How Does Abkhazia Envisage Its Future Relationship with Russia?”, 
Caucasus Report,Vol. 4,No. 36(2001), http: //www. rferl.org/caucasusreport/2001/10/36-
291001.html. 
Furniss, Edgar S. “Discussions and Reviews: A Review: ZbigniewBrzezinski, 
Alternative to Partition Henry A. Kissinger, TheTroubled Partnership Timothy W. 
Stanley, NATO in Transition: The Future ofthe Atlantic Alliance.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution9: 532-537. Dec. 1965. Print. 
Furniss, Edgar S. “The Contribution of Nicholas John Spykman to the Study of 
International Politics.” World Politics4: 383-397. Apr. 1952. Print 
Freire, Maria Raquel, and Lícinia Simão. “The EU’s Security Actorness: The Case 
of EUMM in Georgia.” European Security 22 (2013): 464-77. 
Gachechiladze, R.  “Geopolitics in the South Caucasus: Local and External 
Players.” Geopolitics7: 113-131. 2002. Print 
Gatagova, Liudmila, The Russian Empire and the Caucasus: The Genesis of Ethnic 
Conflicts (London: Macmillan, 2000). 
Gänzle, Stefan. “The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Strategy for Security in 
Europe?” In the Changing Politics of European Security. edited by Stefan Gänzle, and 
Allen G. Sens, 110-35. New York: Palgrave, 2007. 
Garb, P. Ethnicity, Alliance Building, and the Limited Spread of Ethnic Conflict in 
the Caucasus. Lake, D. A., & Rothchild, D. (eds) The International Spread of Ethnic 
Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton University Press, 1998 
Garb, P. Mediation in the Caucasus. Wolfe, A. W., & Yang, H. (eds) Contributions 
of Anthropology to Conflict Resolution, vol. 29, University of Georgia Press, Athens GA, 
1996 
202 
 
Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures (London and New York: Fontana 
Press, 1973). 
George, Alexander L. and P.G. Lauren. “Case Studies and Theory Development: 
The Method of Structures, Focused Comparison.” Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, 
Theory and Policy. New York, NY: Free Press, 1979. Print. 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. Print. 
Ghazarian, Haig, Mosgwayi Yev Karsi  1921  Tvagani  Baymanakrern  ou  Nrants 
Voghperkakan Tere Hay Zoghovourti Jagadakroum [The Treaties of Moscow and Kars in 
1921 and their Tragic Role in Armenians’ Fate] (Yerevan: Edit Press, 2010). 
Gilpin, Robert G. “The Richness of The Tradition of Political Realism.” 
International Organization38: 287-304. Print. 
Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). 
Gellner, Ernest, Nationalism (London: Phoenix, 1997). 
Gerhard, Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet 
Union from Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1991). 
Goetz Roland, “Political Spheres of Interest in the Southern Caucasus and in 
Central Asia,” Aussenpolitik, (English Edition) Volume 48 (3/97): pp. 257-266. 
Goldenberg, Suzanne, Pride of Small Nations:  The  Caucasus  and  Post-Soviet 
Disorder (London: Zed Books, 1994). 
Goldsmith, Benjamin E. Imitation in International Relations: Observational 
Learning, Analogies and Foreign Policy in Russia and Ukraine. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005. 
203 
 
Goltz, Thomas, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-Rich, 
War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic (London: ME Sharpe, 1998). 
Gorbachev, Mikhail. “Decree issued by the Supreme Council of the USSR on 
Events in the Abkhaz ASSR, 17 July 1989.” Bulletins of the Peoples’ Deputies Congress of 
the USSR and the Supreme Council of the USSR7: 257. Print. Translated from Russian. 
Gorbachev, Mikhail, Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1996). 
Guluzade, Vafa. Caucasus among enemies and friends. Azerbaijan – Turkey: OKA 
Ofset, 2003. 
Gunter, M.M. “Transnational Armenian Activism,” in Beloff, Max, (ed.) Beyond 
the Soviet Union, the fragmentation of power, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1990. 
Gusseinova, M. “Russian Interest in the Abkhazian Conflict andthe Position of the 
USA.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies8:3. 1995. Print 
Haindrava, I., and A. Gegeshidze. “Transformation of the Georgian–Abkhaz 
Conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm (Georgian Perspective).” Conciliation Resources, Feb. 
2011. Web. 1 June 2014. <http://www.c-r.org/resources/transformation-
georgian%E2%80%93abkhazconflict-rethinking-paradigm-georgian-perspective>. 
Hansen, G. Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide for Practitioners. 
Thomas J.Watson Jr. Institute  for International Studies, Providence, R.I., Occasional 
Paper no. 32, 1998 
Hardt, J.P., and R.F. Kaufman. The Former Soviet Union in Transition. New York, 
NY: Joint Economic Committee, The Congressof the United States, M.E. Sharpe, 1993. 
Print. 
Herzig, Edmund, The New Caucasus. London and New York: The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, 1999. 
204 
 
___ and Marina Kurkchiyan, editors. The Armenians: Past and Present in the 
Making of National Identity: New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005.  
Hewitt, B.G. Abkhazia: a problem of identity and ownership. Central Asian 
Survey, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 267– 323, 1993 
Hewitt, B.G. Demographic manipulation in the Caucasus. The Journal of Refugee 
Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, 1995 
Hewitt, G. (ed.) The Abkhazians. Curzon Press, 1999 
Hoiris, Ole and Yurukel, Sefa Martin, editors, Contrasts and Solutions in the 
Caucasus. Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1998. 
Holsti, Ole R., P. Terrance Hoffman and John D. Sullivan. Unity and 
Disintegration in International Alliances. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985 
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Marks Gary. Multilevel Governance and European 
Integration. Oxford: Rowman, 2001. 
Hosking, Geoffrey A., Jonathan Alves and Peter J.S. Duncan, The Road to 
PostCommunism: Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union, 1985-1991. 
Hovannisian, Richard G. Armenia on the Road to Independence. 1918. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967. 
___Caucasian Armenia Between Imperial and Soviet Rule: The Interlude of 
National Independence. Washington: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 
Occasional Paper, Number 99, 1980. 
___The Republic of Armenia: (4 volumes). Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996. 
___Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide. Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1999. 
205 
 
Hix, Simon, and Klaus H. Goetz. “Introduction: European Integration and 
National Political Systems.” West European Politics23: 1-26. 2000. Print. 
Howorth, Jolyon. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Print. 
Hughes, J. “Managing SecessionPotential in the Russian Federation”, in James 
Hughes and GwendolynSasse (eds), Ethnicity andTerritory in the Former SovietUnion: 
Regions in Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 2002). 
HumanRights Watch/Helsinki, Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War 
and Russia’s Role in the Conflict. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, vol. 7, no. 7, March 
1995 
Hume, Cameron R. Ending Mozambique's War:  the Role of Mediation and Good 
Offices. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994. Print. 
Huntington, Samuel P., cit.n. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul 
Routledge. “The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, The Council on ForeignRelations” 
The Geopolitics Reader. London: Routledge, 1998. Print. 
Hunter, S.T. The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-building and Conflict. 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 1994 
Ingram, J. “Putin warns Georgia: Don’t provoke Russia any further.” The Seattle 
Times5 Oct. 2006: n. pag. Print. 
International Court of Justice. Application of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation). 
Application Instituting Proceedings. The Hague: ICJ. 2008. Accessed on 18-10-14. At: 
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/140/14657.pdf. 
206 
 
____ Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation). Preliminary Objections. 
Summary of Judgement. The Hague: ICJ. 2011. Accessed on 18-10-14. At: 
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/140/16426.pdf. 
International Criminal Court. The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities 2014. Voorburg: ICC. 2014. Accessed on 9-12-14. At: 
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Pre-Exam-2014.pdf 
Ishkhanian, Yeghishe, Lernayin Gharabagh 1917-1920 [Mountainous Karabakh 
1917-1920] (Yerevan: Armad Press, 1999). 
Jager, Sheila Miyoshi, “The Politics of Identity: History, Nationalism, and the 
Prospect for Peace in Post-Cold War East Asia. Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2007. 
Jafalian, Annie, “Influences in the South Caucasus: Opposition & Convergence in 
Axes of Cooperation,” Surrey, England: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defense 
Academy of the United Kingdom, February 2004.  
Jaffarov, Yosef, Between East and West: Is Azerbaijan on the way to 
independence?  Jerusalem: the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1996. 
Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics30: 167-
174. 1978. Print.  
Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978. Print. 
Joseph, J. Pipeline Diplomacy: The Clinton Administration’s Fight for Baku-
Ceyhan (WWS Case Study). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Web. November 
2012.  <wws.princeton.edu/research/cases.xml>. 
207 
 
Kagarlitsky, Boris, Farewell Perestroika (London: Verso, 1990). 
Kaplan, Robert D., The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy. 
New York: Random House, 1996 
Kaufmann, Walter. “A European Path for Abkhazia: Yesterday's Pipe Dreams?” 
Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD)7: 2-6. 2009. Print. 
Kazemzadeh, Firuz, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921) (Birmingham: 
Templar Press, 1951). 
Keohane, Daniel, and Tomas Valasek. Willing and Able? EU Defence in 2020. 
London:  Centre for European Reform, 2008. Print.  
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. Print.  
Keohane, Robert O. Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986. Print.  
Keohane, Robert O. Joseph S. Nye, and G.T. Crane. “Interdependence in World 
Politics.”  The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy: A Reader. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997. Print.  
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. “Power and Interdependence Revisited.” 
International Organization41: 725-753. Print. 
Kemp, Geoffrey, and Robert E. Harkavy, The Strategic Geography of the Changing   
Middle East. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, May   1997.  
Khutsidze, Nino. “Military Expert on Kodori Operation.” Civil Georgia, 26 July 
2006. Web. 1 June 2014. <www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13170>.  
Khutsishvili, George. “Intervention in Transcaucasus.” Perspective4: n. pag. Web. 
1 June 2014. <http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol4/Khutsishvili.html>. 
208 
 
Kleiboer, M. “Understanding Success and Failure Of International Mediation.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution40: 381. Jun. 1996. Print.  
Kleiboer, M., and P.'t Hart. “Time to Talk? Multiple Perspectives on Timing of 
International Mediation.” Cooperation and Conflict30: 307-348. 1995. Print. 
Kleveman, Lutz, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. New York:  
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003 
Kotz, David M. and Wier, Fred (eds), Revolution from Above: The Demise of the 
Soviet System (London: Routledge, 1997). 
Kovács, Pál. “Security of Gas Supply – A Regional Dimension.” In Energy Security 
of the V4 Countries: How Do Energy Relations Change in Europe, edited by Joanna 
Świątkowska, 11-12. Kraków: Kosciuszko Institute, 2011 
Krikorian, Vladimir, Armenia 1988-1989 (Yerevan: Armad, 1999). 
Lang, David M., Armenia:  Cradle of  Civilization (London: George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., 1970). 
Krylov, Alexander. “The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict; The Security of the Caspian 
Sea Region.” Oxford University Press, 4 July 2013. Web. 1 June 2014. 
<http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI01Chufrin/SIPRI01Chufrin16.pdf>.  
Krylov, Alexander. “The Security of the Caspian Sea Region - The Georgian-
Abkhazian Conflict.” Abkhaz World, 15 Oct. 2008. Web. 1 June 2014. 
<http://abkhazworld.com/aw/conflict/739-the-security-of-the-caspian-sea-region>.  
Kupatadze, A. “The Impact of the Rose Revolution on Smuggling through 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” Insight Turkey7: n. pag. Print.  
Kuzio, Taras, “Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM,” 
European Security, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2000): pp. 81-114.  
209 
 
___ “Promoting Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: GUUAM and Western Foreign 
Policy,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol 47, no 3, (May/June 2000): pp. 25-35.  
Libaridian, Gerard J. ed. The Karabakh File: Documents and Facts on the Question 
of Mountainous Karabakh, 1918-1988.Cambridge: The Zoryan Institute, 1988.  
___ editor, Armenia at the Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-
Soviet Era. Watertown, Mass: Blue Crane Books, 1991.  
___ The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking Since 
Independence.Cambridge, Mass.: Blue Crane Books, 1999.  
___ Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2004. 
Kvarchelia, L. “An Abkhaz Perspective.” Accord: A question of sovereignty, The 
GeorgiaAbkhazia Peace Process. London: Conciliation Resources, 1999. Print. 
Ladrech, Robert. “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case 
of France.” Journal of Common Market Studies32: 69-88. 1994. Print. 
Lang, David Marshall. “Georgia under Russian Imperial Rule (Excerpts).” A 
Modern History of Soviet Georgia. New York: Grove Press, 1962. Web. 1 June 2014. 
<www.conflicts.rem33.com/images/Georgia/Lang_3.htm>.  
Lang, David Marshall. The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 1658-1832. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1957. Print. 
Leaderach, Paul J. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies 
(Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997). 
Libaridian, Gerard J., The Karabakh File: Documents and Facts on the Question of 
Mountainous Karabakh 1918-1988 (Cambridge: Zoryan Institute, 1988). 
210 
 
Liphart, Arendt. “The Power Sharing Approach.” In Conflict and Peacekeeping in 
Multiethnic Societies, edited by Joseph Montville, 491-509. New York: Lexington, 1990. 
Livny, Eric, Karine Torosyan, and Mack Ott. “The Economic Impact of the 
Russian Trade Embargo on Georgia.” International School of Economics at Tbilisi 
University, n.d. Web. June 2014. <http://www.iset.ge/index.php?article_id=251&clang=0>. 
Lucarelli, Sonia. “Introduction.” In Values and Principles in European Union 
Foreign Policy, edited by Sonia Lucarelli, and Ian Manners, 1-19. Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006. 
Luchterhandt, Otto, Nagorno-Karabakh’s Right to State Independence According 
to International Law (Boston: Armenian Rights Council, 1993). 
Lynch, Dov. “Security Sector Governance in the Southern Caucasus – Towards an 
EU strategy.” Österreichs Bundesheer, 2004. Web. 2 Sept. 2013. 
<http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_ssg_04_lyn.pdf>.  
Lynch, Dov. The Conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian 'Peacekeeping' 
Policy. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 1998. Print.  
Lynch, Dov. Why Georgia Matters. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2006. 
Print. 
MacFarlane, S.N., A. Schnabel, H.-G. Ehrhart, and D. Haglund. “Russian 
Approaches to Peacekeeping.” The “New Peacekeeping” and European Security: German 
and Canadian Interests and Issues. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995. Print. 
Malkasian, Mark, Gha-ra-baghy: The Emergence of the National Democratic 
Movement in Armenia (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996). 
Masih, Joseph R. and Krikorian, Robert O. (eds), Armenia at the Crossroads 
(Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999). 
211 
 
McCauley, Martin, Gorbachev (London: Longman, 1998). 
McLachlan, Keith. “Introduction.” Geopolitics and International Boundaries. 
Routledge, 1997. Print. 
Menon, Rajan, "After Empire: Russia and the Southern Near Abroad," in Michael 
Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy. New York, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1998. 
Menteshashvili, Avtandil. Trouble in the Caucasus. Cormack, N.Y.: Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc., 1995. 
Meserlian, Zaven, Yerek Tashnakirer,  Alexandrapoli,  Mosgwayi  Yev  Karsi 
Tashnakirere,  1920-1921 [Three  Treaties,  Alexandropol,  Moscow  and  Kars 1920-1921] 
(Beirut: Technopress Modern, 1979). 
Merlingen, Michael, and R. Ostrauskaite. EU Peacebuilding in Georgia: Limits and 
Achievements. The Hague: Cleer Working Papers, 2009. Print. 
Merlingen, Michael, Manuel Mireanu, and Elena Stavrevska. “The Current State 
of European Security.” In OSCE-Yearbook 2008: Yearbook on the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 91-117. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008. 
Mitchell, C. R. “Classifying Conflicts: Asymmetry and Resolution.” The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science518: 26-31. 1993. Print.  
Mitchell, C.R. “Motives for Mediation.” New Approaches to International 
Mediation. New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1988. Print. 
Mitrany, David. “The Prospect of European Integration: Federal or Functional.” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 4 (1965): 119-49. 
Molla-Zade, Jayhun, “Azerbaijan and the Caspian Basin: Pipelines and 
Geopolitics,” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 6, No. 1, (Winter 1998) pp. 28-34.  
212 
 
___ "Treacherous Terrain: The Political and Security Dimensions of Energy 
Development in the Caspian Sea Zone," The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR 
Analysis, Vol. 9, No. 1, February 1998.  
___ Yuri Fedorov, and Ghia Nodia (eds.), Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia: 
The 21st Century Security Environment.Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.  
Nation, R. Craig, Russia, the United States and the Caucasus, Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2007.  
Mostashari, Firouzeh. On the Religious Frontier: Tsarist Russia and Islam in the 
Caucasus.London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2006. 
Nahaylo, Bohdan and Swoboda, Victor (eds), Soviet Disunion: A History of the 
Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1990). 
“NATO and Russia Discuss Peacekeeping in Bosnia.” RFE/RL Newsline: n. pag. 
Print.  
“NATO’s Relations with Georgia.”North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 31 Mar. 
2014. Web. 1 June 2014. 
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm?selectedLocale=en>. 
Nikoladze, G.The War in Abkhazia. Abkhazia Institute for Social and Economic 
Research, 2007. Print. 
Nissman, David. The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan:The Uses of 
Nationalism for Political Penetration.Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 
Odom, William E. and Dujarric, Robert, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, 
Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus. Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Press, 1995. 
Ohmae, Ken. The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked 
Economy. New York: HarperBusiness, 1990. Print.  
213 
 
Ohmae, Ken. The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies. New 
York: Free Press, 1995. Print 
Olcott, Martha Brill, Central Asia’s New States, Washington, D.C.:United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1996. 
O’Malley, William D., Evaluating Possible Airfield Deployment Options: Middle 
East Contingencies, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1353-AF, 2001. 
Organski, A.F.K., World Politics, 2d ed., New York: Knopf, 1968.Osh/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict,2001. 
Orme, John D. “U.S. Mediation in Revolutionary Conflicts, 1944–1986.” Mediation 
Quarterly7: 60. 1989. Print 
OSCE, Annual Report onOSCE Activities 2002, Press and Public Information 
(Vienna: OSCE Secretariat, 2002). 
Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. “Borderless Worlds? Problematising Discourses of 
Deterritorialisation.” Geopolitics4: 141-143. 1999. Print.  
Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. 
London: Routledge, 1996. Print.  
Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. “Political Geography of Contemporary Events VIII the 
Language and Nature of the ‘New Geopolitics’ -The Case of US-El Salvador Relations.” 
Political Geography Quarterly5: 73-85. 1986. Print.  
Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. “Theorising Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the 
United States Response to the War in Bosnia.” Political Geography21: 603. Jun. 2002. 
Print.  
Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. “Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk 
Society.” Journal of Strategic Studies22: 109-113. 1999. Print.  
214 
 
Ó Tuathail, Gearóid, and John Agnew. Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical 
Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy. 1992. Print.  
Ó Tuathail, Gearóid, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge. The Geopolitics Reader. 
London: Routledge, 1998. Print 
Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Fault Linesin the New 
Security Map, 2001. 
Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace,2001. 
Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, The IMU and the Hizb-UtTahrir: 
Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign, 2002; see 
http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=538. 
Panossian, Razmik, “The Past as Nation: Three Dimensions of Armenian Identity,” 
Geopolitics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn 2002) pp. 121-146. 
Parliament of Georgia. “Appeal ofthe Georgian Parliament to the Supreme Soviet 
of the Russian Federation, To Presidentof the Russian Federation Mr. Boris Yeltsin.” 
Bulletins of the Parliament of Georgia. 1991. Print. 
Peck, Connie. Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations 
in Preventing Conflict. Boulder, CO: Rowman &Littlefield, 1998. Print.  
Peters, I., and A. Krohn. “The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.” The Baltic Sea Region: National and International Security Perspectives. Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996. Print. 
Pirseyedi, Bobi, The Small Arms Problems in Central Asia: Feature sand 
Implications, Geneva: UNIDIR, 2000. 
Platz, Stepahnie, “Pasts and Futures: Space, History and Armenian Identity, 1988-
1994,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996) In ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 
215 
 
Pomfret, Richard, The Economies of Central Asia, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995. 
“Putin, Saakashvili Meet at CIS Summit.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 
Sept. 2004. Web. 1 June 2014. <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1054877.html>.  
“Putin Saakashvili Spar at CIS Press Conference.” Asbarez Armenian News, 17 
Sept. 2004. Web. 1 June 2014. <http://asbarez.com/50704/putin-saakashvili-spar-at-cis-
pressconference/>.  
“Putin says Georgia acts like Stalin's Henchman.” Reuters2 Oct. 2006: n. pag. 
Print.  
Posen, Barry. “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to 
Unipolarity?” Security Studies 15 (2006): 149-86. 
Radaelli, Claudio M. “Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and 
Substantive Change.” European Integration Online Papers, 17 July 2000. Web.20 Sept. 
2013. <eiop.or.at./eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm>. 
Reno, William, Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1999. 
Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures, Washington, D.C., October 
1997. 
Republic of Armenia, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, March 2001. 
“Report by the Government of Georgia on the Aggression by the Russian 
Federation against Georgia.” Civil, 1 Jan. 2010. Web. 1 June 2014. 
<http://www.civil.ge/files/files/GeorgianGovernmentReportWar.pdf>.  
216 
 
“Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia.” IIFFMCG-CEIIG. September2009. Web. 4 Sept 2010. 
<http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html>.  
“Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia 
(S/2001/401)”, Web. 6 May 2015, <http://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/report-
secretarygeneral-concerning-situation-abkhazia-georgia-s2001401>.  
“Resolution 876, Adopted by the UN Security Council 19 October 1993 to Letter 
of 12 October 1993 by the Chairman of theGeorgian Parliament, UN Document S/26576.” 
United Nations Security Council, October 1999. Print.  
“Resolution 1255 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4029th meeting on 
30 July 1999.” United Nations Security Council, 30 July 1999. Web. 1 June 2014. 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1b472.html>. Respublika Abkhazia109: 5-6 
November 1997. Print. 
Rommens, Thijs. The Impact of the European Neighborhood Policy on 
Democratisation in the South Caucasus (Paper Presented at the Changing Europe Summer 
School 2008).  
Bremen: Central and Eastern Europe in a Changing World - University of Bremen, 
2008. Print.  
Rondeli, Alexander. "Security Threats in the Caucasus: Georgia's View," 
Perceptions Volume III, Number 2 (June-August 1998): pp. 43-53. 
Rothstein, Robert L. Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1968. 
Rueschmeyer, D., E.H. Stephens, et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
217 
 
Ruseckas, Laurent. "Energy and Politics in Central Asia and the Caucasus," The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, AccessAsia Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (July 1998): pp. 41-
84. 
Rywkin, Michael, Moscow’s Muslim Challenge, Soviet Central Asia, Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1982. 
Postel, Sandra L., and Aaron T. Wold, “Dehydrating Conflict,” Foreign Policy, 
September/October 2001, pp. 61–67. 
Raczka, Witt, “Xinjiang and Its Central Asian Borderlands,” Central Asian Survey, 
Vol. 17, No. 3 (1998), pp. 373–407. 
Rashid, Ahmed, “China Forced to Expand Role in Central Asia,” Central Asia–
Caucasus Analyst, July 19, 2000. 
Redo, S., “Uzbekistan and the United Nations in the Fight Against Transnational 
Organized Crime,” in Tadeusz Bodio (ed.), Uzbekistan: History, Society, Policy, Warsaw: 
Elipsa, 2001. 
Roberts, Sean R., “The Uighurs of the Kazakhstan Borderlands: Migration and the 
Nation,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1998) 
Roos, John G., “Tools of Transformation: Army’s Sights Focused Far Beyond 
Interim Brigade Combat Teams and Future Combat Systems,” Armed Forces Journal 
International, October 2001. 
Ross, Michael L., “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,” World Politics, 
Vol. 51 (January 1999) 
Rowland, Richard H., “Urban Population Trends in Kazakhstan During the 
1990s,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 40, No. 7 (1999) 
218 
 
Ruseckas, Laurent, “Turkey and Eurasia: Opportunities and Risks in the Caspian 
Pipeline Derby,”Journal of International Affairs, No. 1 (Fall 2000). 
Rywkin, Michael, “Kazakstan and the Rest of Central Asia: Fifteen Shades of 
Difference,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1998) 
Saakashvili, Mikheil. “Remarksby President Mikheil Saakashviliat the 60 The 
Session of the UN General Assembly.” The Administration of the President of Georgia, 15 
Sept. 2006. Web. 30 July 2011.  
<www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/News/SpeechesAndStatements?p=2731&i=1>.  
Saakashvili, Mikheil. “Remarks by the Georgian President Saakashvili at the 
Dinner Dedicated to the 42nd International (Security) Conference in Munich.” The 
Administration of the President of Georgia, 3 Feb. 2006. Web. 2 May 2011. 
<http://www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/News/SpeechesAndStatements?p=2687&i=1
>. 
Saakashvili, Mikheil. “Remarks on the Occasion of the 59th Session of the UN 
General Assembly.” United Nations, 21 Sept. 2004. Web. 1 June 2014. < 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/statements/geoeng040921.pdf>.  
Saakashvili, Mikheil. “Speech delivered by Mikheil Saakashvili at Johns Hopkins 
University.” The Administration of the President of Georgia, 4 Feb. 2004. Web. 28 Feb 
2011. 
<http://www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/News/SpeechesAndStatements?p=2779&i=1
>.  
Saakashvili, Mikheil. “Speech Delivered by the Georgian President Saakashvili at 
the Meeting with Members of Supreme Council of Abkhazia.” The Administration of the 
219 
 
President of Georgia, 10 Sept. 2004. Web. 11 Mar. 2010.  
<http://www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/News/SpeechesAndStatements?a=200409>.  
Saakashvili, Mikheil. “Statement by his Excellency Mr. Mikheil Saakashvili 
President of Georgia at the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly.” United 
Nations General Assembly, 22 Sept. 2006. Web. 8 June 2014.  
<http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/georgia-e.pdf>.  
Saakashvili, Mikheil. “Verbatim Record of the 59 Th Session of the General 
Assembly, Remarks on the Occasion of the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly.” 
United Nations, 21 Sept. 2004. Web. 6 Oct 2009. <http://daccess-
ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/516/10/PDF/N0451610.pdf?OpenElement>.  
“Saakashvili Outlines Tbilisi’s Abkhaz Initiatives.” Civil Georgia, 28 Mar. 2008. 
Web. 13 Nov 2011. <www.civil.ge/eng/print.php?id=17473>.  
“Saakashvili Speaks of Russia, Hails Putin as ‘Historic Figure’.” Civil Georgia, 23 
February 2007. Web. 1 June 2014. <www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14683>.  
“Saakashvili Unveils ‘Fresh Roadmap’ in UN Speech.” Civil Georgia, 22 September 
2006. Web. 1 June 2014. <www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13621>.  
“Saakashvili Upbeat after Talks with Putin.” Civil Georgia, 10 June 2007. Web. 1 
June 2014. <www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15251>. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and 
Economic Growth,” Development Discussion Paper No. 517a, Harvard Institute for 
International Development, October 1995. 
Said, Kurban. Ali and Nino. Woodstock, New York: The Overlook Press, 1999.  
220 
 
Safizadeh, Fereydoun, “On Dilemmas of Identity in the Post-Soviet Republic of 
Azerbaijan,” Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1998); 
http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0301-04.htm. 
Salukvadze, Khatuna, “The Struggle for the Remains of Geopolitical Weight: 
Russia Dodges from Disengaging Militarily from Georgia,” The Analyst,Vol. 21, Issue 23 
(July 19, 2001); www.cacianlayst.org. 
Schatz, Edward A.D., “Framing Strategies and Non-Conflict in MultiEthnic 
Kazakhstan,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2000). 
Schwartz, Donald V. and Panossian, Razmik, editors., Nationalism and History: 
The Politics of Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Centre for Russian and East European Studies, 1994. 
Selimov, Seymour, “Peace over Nagorno-Karabakh Remains Elusive as Populaces 
Drift Further Apart,” Transitions Online, August 24, 2001. 
Shenoy, Bhamy, and William James, “Caspian Energy Exports: Turkmenistan 
Fumbling Opportunities Afforded by Trans-Caspian Pipeline,”Oil & Gas Journal, May 28, 
2001. 
Shevardnadze, Eduard, “Georgia, the United States, and the New Security 
Paradigm in Eurasia,” speech given at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C., October 4, 
2001. 
Shervashidze, Michael. Materials and Notes on Possession and Property Rights of 
Descendants of his Highness Prince Michael Shervashidze, Last Possessor of Abkhazia. 
Verdun: 1913. Print. Document obtained from the personal archive of Prime Minister of 
Abkhazia, 2010 
221 
 
Shevardnadze, Eduard. “Address byMr. Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Chairman of the 
Council of State of the Republic of Georgia.” General Assembly: Forty-Seventh Session - 
12th Meeting. United Nations. UN Headquarters, New York, NY. 25 Sept. 1992. Speech.  
Shevardnadze, Eduard. Als der Eiserne Vorhang zerriss: Begegnungen und 
Erinnerungen.  Duisburg: Peter W. Metzler Verlag, 2007. Print.  
Shevardnadze, Eduard. “Decree issued by the Presidium of the State Council of the 
Republic of Georgia on Introduction of theState of Emergency on the Railway Transport, 
10 August 1992.” n. pag. Print.  
Shevardnadze, Eduard. “Open Letter by Shevardnadze to the Russian Vice-
President Alexandre Rutskoi.” Republic of Georgia newspaper21 June 1992: n. pag. Print. 
Translated.  
Shevardnadze, Eduard. “Speech of Eduard Shevardnadze before the47th session of 
the General Assembly.” 2 Oct. 1992. Speech. 
Slider, D., “Georgia”, in Glenn Eldon Curtis (ed.), Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia. Country Studies (Washington, DC:  Library of Congress, 1995), pp. 149-230. 
Smith, Robert, “Politics, Production Levels to Determine Caspian Area Energy 
Export Options,” Oil & Gas Journal, May 28, 2001. 
Smith, Karen Elizabeth. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. 
Oxford, UK: Polity, 2003. Print.  
Smith, Karen Elizabeth and J. Zielonka. “The Instruments of European Union 
Foreign Policy.” Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The Hague, The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998. Print.  
Smith, Martin A., and Graham Timmins. “Russia, NATO and the EU in an Era of 
Enlargement: Vulnerability or Opportunity?” Geopolitics6: 69-76. 2001. Print. 
222 
 
Snyder, Jack L., and Edward D. Mansfield, “Democratization and the Danger of 
War,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995). 
Snyder, Jack L., and Karen Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” 
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996) 
Somakian, Manoug Joseph. Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 
1895-  1920.London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995. 
Specter, Michael, “Letter from Tbilisi: Rainy Days in Georgia,” New Yorker, 
December 18, 2000. 
Starr, S. Frederick, “Making Eurasia Stable,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 
1996. 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993.  
___ Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993.  
___ “Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” 
International Security24, no.3 (Winter 1999/2000): pp. 139-79.  
___. “Constructing Primordalism: Old Histories for New Nations,” The Journal of 
Modern History, Vol. 73, No. 4, (Dec. 2001) pp. 862-896. 
Svante, E. Cornell, “Conflicts in the North Caucasus,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 
17, No. 3 (1998). 
Sweetman, Bill, “Airlift for the 21st Century,” Jane’s International Defense 
Review, December 2001. 
Swietochowski, Tadeusz. Russian Azerbaijan 1905-1920: The Shaping of National 
Identity in a Muslim Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.  
223 
 
___ Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995.  
___and Brian C. Collins. Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan. Lanham, Maryland:  
The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1999.  
___ “The politics of a literary language and the rise of national identity in Russian 
Azerbaijan before 1920,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Volume 14, Number 1, January 1991, 
pp. 55-63.  
___ “National Consciousness and Political Orientations in Azerbaijan, 1905-1920,” 
in Suny, Ronald Grigor, ed. Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the 
History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Revised Edition, Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 1996. pp. 211-234. 
Szayna, Thomas S., and Ashley J. Tellis, “Introduction,” in Thomas S. Szayna (ed.), 
Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model, Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, MR-1188-A, 2000. 
Szporluk, Roman, “The Fall of the Tsarist Empire and the USSR: The Russian 
Question and Imperial Overextension,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), The 
End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective, Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997. 
Talbott, Strobe. “A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, (July 1997): pp. 10-13. 
Toal, Gerard, and Magdalena Frichova Grono. 2011. “After Ethnic Violence in the 
Caucasus: Attitudes of Local Abkhazians and Displaced Georgians in 2010.” Eurasian 
Geography and Economics52 (5) (September 1): 655–678. doi:10.2747/1539-
7216.52.5.655.54  
224 
 
 
Toal, Gerard, and John O’Loughlin. 2013. “Inside South Ossetia: A Survey of 
Attitudes in a De Facto State.” Post-Soviet Affairs29 (2): 136–172. 
doi:10.1080/1060586X.2013.780417. 
Tocci, Nathalie, M. Keating, and J. McGarry. “EU Accession and Conflict 
Resolution in Theory and Practice: The Case of Cyprus.” European Integration and the 
Nationalities Question. London: Routledge, 2006. Print.  
Tocci, Nathalie. The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the 
Backyard. London:  Routledge, 2007. Print. 
Togeby, Lise. 1994. “The Gender Gap in Foreign Policy Attitudes.” Journal of 
Peace Research 31 (4) (November 1): 375–392. doi:10.1177/0022343394031004002.  
Thomas, Daniel C. “Explaining EU Foreign Policy: Normative Institutionalism and 
Alternative Approaches.” In Making EU Foreign Policy: National Preference, European 
Norms and Common Policies, edited by Daniel C. Thomas, 10-29. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2011. 
Turner, Roy M. Adaptive Reasoning for Real-World Problems: A Schema-Based   
Approach. (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 1994) 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Rome. 1957. Official Journal of 
the European Communities C 83 2010. Accessed on 2-08-13. At: 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF. 
Treaty on European Union. Maastricht. 1992. Official Journal of the European 
Communities C 83 2010. Accessed on 1-08-13. At: 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:en:PDF. 
225 
 
Treaty of Amsterdam. Amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts. Amsterdam. 1997. 
Official Journal of the European Communities C 97 1997. Accessed on 1-08-13. At: 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/tif/JOC_1997_340__1_EN_0005.pdf. 
Treaty of Lisbon. Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community. Lisbon. 2007. Official Journal of the European 
Communities C 306 2007. Accessed on 2-08-13. At: 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF. 
United Nations. A/47/49. New York: United Nations, 1992. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/1997/558. New York: United Nations, 18 July 1997. Print.   
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/1997/827. New York: United Nations, 28 October 1997. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/1998/51. New York: United Nations, 19 January 1998. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/1999/60. New York: United Nations, 20 January 1999. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/1999/805. New York: United Nations, 20 July 1999. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2000/39. New York: United Nations, 19 January 2000. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2000/697. New York: United Nations, 17 July 2000. Print.  
226 
 
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2001/1008. New York: United Nations, 24 October 2001. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2002/742. New York: United Nations, 10 July 2002. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2002/805. New York: United Nations, 10 July 2002. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2003/412. New York: United Nations, March 2003. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2004/26. New York: United Nations, 14 January 2004. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2004/570. New York: United Nations, 14 July 2004. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2004/822. New York: United Nations, 18 October 2004. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2005/32. New York: United Nations, 17 January 2005. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2005/269. New York: United Nations, 25 April 2005. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2005/453. New York: United Nations, 13 July 2005. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2005/657. New York: United Nations, 19 October 2005. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2006/19. New York: United Nations, 13 January 2006. Print.  
227 
 
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2006/173. New York: United Nations, 17 March 2006. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2006/435. New York: United Nations, 26 June 2006. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2006/771. New York: United Nations, 28 September 2006. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2007/15. New York: United Nations, 11 January 2007. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2007/182. New York: United Nations, 3 April 2007. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2007/439. New York: United Nations, 18 July 2007. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2007/588. New York: United Nations, 3 October 2007. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2008/219. New York: United Nations, 2 April 2008. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2008/480. New York: United Nations, 23 July 2008. Print.  
United Nations. Report of the Secretary General concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia S/2008/631. New York: United Nations, 3 October 2008. Print.  
United Nations. Security Council Debate, Security Council 5839th Meeting 
S/PV.5839. New York: United Nations, 18 February 2008. Print.  
228 
 
United Nations. Security Council Report, Extraordinary Meeting of the Security 
Council after the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, S/ PV.5839. New York: United 
Nations. Print. 
US Embassy. Cable, 06Moscow7863, Georgia-Russia: Putin-Saakashvili Meeting 
off, Leaving Little Clarity and Much Suspicion. Moscow: US Embassy, 21 July 2006. Print. 
Vachridze, Zaza. “Two Faces of Nationalism and Efforts to Establish Georgian 
Identity.” Identity Studies4: 1–7. 
http://ojs.iliauni.edu.ge/index.php/identitystudies/article/view/47/35. 2000 
Van der Leeuw, Charles.  Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000. 
Vashakidze, Nika.  “The Role of 9 March 1956 in the Formation of Georgian 
Ethnopsychic.” Iveria30 April. http://iveria.biz/18-1956-wlis-9-martis-roli-
qartulietnofsiqikis-formirebasi.html. 2013 
Végso, Roland. “Stalin’s Boots and the March of History (Post-Communist 
Memories).” Cultural Critique83 (Winter): 31–62. 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural_critique/v083/83.vegs.html. 2013 
Visser, Penny S., and Jon A. Krosnick. “Development of Attitude Strength over 
the Life Cycle: Surge and Decline.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology75 (6): 
1389–1410. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.6.1389. 1998 
Walker, Christopher J. Armenia: The Survival of a Nation, revised second edition. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. 
Wasserman, Aryeh, “A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan,” in Ro’i, 
Yaacov. Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. Essex, England: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 
1995. pp. 143-161. 
229 
 
Wegren, Stephen K.“Rural Reform and Political Culture in Russia.” Europe-Asia 
Studies 46 (2) (January): 215–241. doi:10.1080/09668139408412159. 1994 
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics.” International Organization46: 394-395. 1992. Print.  
Wendt, Alexander. “On constitution and Causation in International Relations.” 
Review of International Studies24: 102. 1998. Print.  
Wendt, Alexander, C. Bretherton, and J. Vogler. The European Union as a Global 
Actor. London/New York: Routledge, 1999. Print. 
Wildavsky, Aaron. “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural 
Theory of Preference Formation.” American Political Science Review81 (1) (March): 3.  
doi:10.2307/1960776. 1987 
Williams, Richard. “Generalized Ordered Logit/partial Proportional Odds Models 
for Ordinal Dependent Variables.” The Stata Journal6 (1): 58–82. 
http://www.statajournal.com/article.html?article=st0097. 2006 
Wolfers, Arnold. Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962.  
Wolfers, Arnold, ed. Alliance Policy in the Cold War. Baltimore Md.: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1959. 
Wohlforth, William C. “Revisiting Balance of Power Theory in Central Eurasia,” 
in Paul, T.V., James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Balance of Power: Theory and 
Practice in the 21st Century.Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004 
World Bank. “Georgia: Poverty and Income Distribution. (In Two Volumes) 
Volume I: Main Report”. Washington, D.C.: Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Managemen Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region. 1999 
230 
 
Yeltsin, Boris, and Eduard Shevardnadze. Diplomatic Internal Report about 
Communiqué jointly issued by Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze about the 
Dagomys Meeting on June 24, 1992. 1992. Print. Personal Archive of author. 
Zakareishvili, P. “A Georgian View.” Accord: A Question of Sovereignty, The 
GeorgiaAbkhazia Peace Process. London: Conciliation Resources, 1999. Print.  
Zartman, I.W. and J.Z. Rubin. “Explaining Disengagement.” Dynamics of Third 
Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East. New York: Praeger, 1981. Print. 
Zartman, I. William. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. 
New York:  Oxford University Press, 1985. Print.  
Zartman, I.W., J. Aurik, L. Kriesberg, S.J. Thompson. “Power Strategies in De-
Escalation.”  Timing the De-Escalation ofInternational Conflict. New York, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1991. Print. 
Zedania, Giga. “Societal Values in Georgia: Twenty Years Later.” In 20 Years after 
the Collapse of Communism: Expectations, Achievements and Disillusions of 1989, edited 
by Nicolas Hayoz, Leszek Jesien, and Daniela Koleva, 253–272. Bern: Peter Lang. 2012 
http://www.identitystudies.ac.ge/index.php/IStudies/article/view/38 
Zhorzholiani, G., Istoricheskie i politicheskie korni konflikta v Abkhazii/Gruzia   
(Tbilisi:  Metsniereba, 2000).  
Zhorzholiani, G., Lekishvili, S.  Toidze L.  andKhoshtaria-Brosset E., Historic, 
Political andLegal Aspects of the Conflict in Abkhazia (Tbilisi: SamshobloPublishers, 
1995). 
 
